Ukraine's new government, formed by President Viktor Yanukovych after he was  inaugurated in March, this week affirmed that the country's gas transportation  network is for sale to no one, including Russian gas monopoly Gazprom.
At the same time, Russia has made it clear that it is willing to cooperate with  the European Union in any project to modernize the network, which includes more  than 60,000 kilometers of pipe plus 71 compressed air plants and 13 underground  gas storage facilities. Last year, it carried over three-quarters of natural gas  exports from Russia to Europe.
Fears were raised during Ukraine's hotly  contested election in February that the gas system might be privatized or sold  to Gazprom. Presidential candidate and then-prime minister Yuliya Tymoshenko had  personally written a law passed by the Ukrainian Rada (parliament) that set out  everal different ways in which the gas transportation system could be alienated  from state property, and forbade them all in detail. This law has the force of a  constitutional provision.
In the event, the new government is seeking to  work out a "three-sided" plan involving Ukraine, Russia and the European Union  to upgrade the network.
As the head of the Ukrainian delegation to the  European Union, Kostyantyn Yeliseyev, insisted in Brussels last week that his  country would maintain ownership of the system, Ukraine's new energy minister,  Yuriy Boiko, was beginning discussions with Russian authorities on means to  avoid disputes over gas in the future.
Russia suspended gas supplies to  Ukraine several times in the early 1990s in disputes over non-payment. More  recently, in January 2006 (in a dispute with Ukraine over the country's alleged  diversion of gas intended for European consumption) and again in January 2009  (in a dispute over the size of Ukraine's gas debt), Russia cut off gas supplies  to Ukraine, leading to severe winter shortages in EU countries, since Russian  gas also transits Ukraine in large quantities for consumption in the  EU.
In its talks with Russia, Ukraine has four goals: to renegotiate  current prices lower; to reconsider the June 2009 gas bilateral delivery  contract; to ensure the "stability and predictability" of gas supply especially  via Ukraine to Europe, and to consider options for modernizing the gas transit  network.
In this last regard, an important normative document was signed  with the EU in March 2009 in Brussels, which states that the gas transit system  "is and will be" the property of the Ukrainian state. Russian Prime Minister  Vladimir Putin had at the time criticized the failure of the agreement,  negotiated by the Ukrainian government then headed by Yuliya Tymoshenko as prime  minister, to include Russia.
Three major international financial  institutions - the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and  Development, and the European Investment Bank - are reported to have allocated  US$1.7 billion for industrial modernization projects such as the replacement of  old compressor stations responsible for important leakages.
However, the  prime minister has estimated the full cost of the system's modernization to be  at least $15 billion to $20 billion.
The Russian ambassador to the EU,  Vladimir Chizhov, told EurActiv on Tuesday that his country welcomed recent  proposals by the new government in Kiev for a "three-sided" plan to modernize  Ukraine's gas pipeline network, with Moscow's involvement.
Nevertheless,  this willingness masks contradictory stakes that are involved.
Last  month, the first pipe-laying ship for the Nord Stream pipeline left port to  begin laying pipes off the Swedish coast. Nord Stream, passing under the Baltic  Sea from Russia to Germany, is designed to circumvent Ukraine and  Poland.
The eventual Nord Stream throughput plus the potential increase  in efficiency and security of a modernized Ukrainian gas transportation system  to Europe (along with other European sources and those that will come on line in  the meantime), make another Russia-sponsored project, the South Stream pipeline  under the Black Sea from Russia to Bulgaria, extremely difficult to  justify.
South Stream is already a laggard in the race to supply gas  along the Southern Corridor to Europe (see Locks turn in Nabucco door, Asia  Times Online, March 12, 2010).
Russia has long sought a financial stake  in Ukraine's pipeline system. Over the past 15 years, the pipeline systems of  many other countries on former Soviet territory, including in Central Asia and  the South Caucasus, have come into Russia's hands.
This was often  accomplished through the expedient of allowing the country to run up debt for  gas imports. Russia would then offer to settle the debt in return for alienation  of the national pipeline system.
These events has been extensively  studied by European and North American academics who have traced them as a  conscious strategy for the extension of Russia's geo-economic influence  throughout Eurasia.
In theory, if Russia or a Russian company owns the  pipelines, then it has the right to say whose gas may and may not transit  through the system. This is one reason Turkmenistan insists that no Russian firm  may become proprietor of any pipeline in the country that it rebuilds or  modernizes, such as the East-West Pipeline across the southern part of the  country ( see Turkmenistan gas sets Ciceronian riddle, Asia Times Online,  October 30, 2009).
At the beginning of April, Ukraine's new prime  minister, Mykola Azarov, announced that his government would look for a  three-sided approach that would include Russia. Such an approach could  conceivably extend beyond industrial modernization to corporate management, if  not to ownership (since the country's constitution now excludes this - unless  amended again.)
Nearly 10 years ago, Ukraine and Russia began exploring  the creation of a gas transport consortium with European partners for the  purpose of managing and modernizing Ukraine's gas pipeline network. Those plans  were put on hold after the "Orange Revolution" in 2004-2005 brought Viktor  Yushchenko into the president's office.
Another factor that might  complicate, in practice, Ukraine's goal of maintaining control over its pipeline  network while forging partnerships with Europe and Russia, is that there is no  such thing as an "EU" energy company, only national companies.
If German  energy companies are involved, then these have a long history of cooperation  with Gazprom and other Russian companies stretching well back into the Soviet  era. That is not a problem in itself, but it raises the issue whether Ukraine's  national interests will be well respected.
Would a German company  hesitate to compromise them for financial gain if induced by a Russian  offer?
 
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