The Russian government has announced a 1,000 square mile protected reserve to safeguard habitat for rare Amur leopards and Amur tigers.
The national park, dubbed Land of the Leopard, is in Russia's Far East.
The Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) says it combines existing wildlife refuges and previously unprotected land along the Chinese border.
But one expert said it was "too little, way too late" to save the Critically Endangered leopard.
Conservation groups have commended Russia for the move.
WCS Russia's program director Dale Miquelle said he was "optimistic" that it would "provide a critical refuge for some of the most endangered big cats on the planet".
An estimated 30 Amur leopards occupy a narrow sliver of forest between the Sea of Japan to the east and Jilin Province, China, to the west.
In a wider area of forest habitat, about 500 Amur tigers are thought to remain in the wild.
Joerns Fickel, from the Institute for Zoo and Wildlife Research in Berlin, Germany, who has studied both the Amur leopard and Amur tiger said it was a "significant step in the right direction" but pointed out that safeguarding such a large area from poachers would be difficult.
"Regarding the tigers, he explained that prey density and cover were the "two main components to secure [their] survival".
"[It is not clear whether] this has been considered and if the park size provides space for at least a moderate population growth.
"For the leopards - where we don't even know how many of the last ones are still reproducing - but the situation is very gloomy."
The WCS pointed out that tigers regularly moved across the border into China, and the reserves' proximity to that border represented "a critical source population for recovery of tigers in North-East China".
WWF agreed that this "connection across the border" was crucial.
The conservation organisation's head of species, Diane Walkington, said: "Hopefully, by providing leopards with protected space to live, hunt and breed they will start to make a similar recovery to the Amur tiger, which is still endangered but has made a spectacular comeback since the 1930s when as few as 20 were left."
Peter Zahler, WCS deputy director for Asia said in a statement: "The creation of this park greatly increases the amount of land protecting critical populations of two of the world's big cats, and it will go a long way to securing their future.
"We look forward to continuing to provide whatever support is requested to help conserve tigers and leopards in the region."
Dr Fickel was less optimistic.
"It's better than nothing, and maybe for the tiger, it is not totally too late,"
"[But] for the leopards, hope dies last."
Showing posts with label Russia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Russia. Show all posts
Sunday, 15 April 2012
Authorities mull exit tax for leaving Russia
Travelers might soon be obliged to pay to leave Russia as officials are considering a new exit tax for international passengers.
The levy is needed to boost domestic flight demand which would be freed of the value added tax, according to the proposal submitted by the Transport Ministry.
Ticket prices for international routes might rise by up to 1,000 rubles, but experts are dubious as to whether flying within the country’s borders will become cheaper.
Zero VAT on domestic flights could leave the budget without annual 32 billion rubles, but transport officials want travelers to plug that hole.
Exit taxes for international flights have been proposed “from national airports for all commercial flights regardless of the carriers’ national identity.
The document has been submitted to the Finance Ministry, which has yet to announce its decision.
The levy is needed to boost domestic flight demand which would be freed of the value added tax, according to the proposal submitted by the Transport Ministry.
Ticket prices for international routes might rise by up to 1,000 rubles, but experts are dubious as to whether flying within the country’s borders will become cheaper.
Zero VAT on domestic flights could leave the budget without annual 32 billion rubles, but transport officials want travelers to plug that hole.
Exit taxes for international flights have been proposed “from national airports for all commercial flights regardless of the carriers’ national identity.
The document has been submitted to the Finance Ministry, which has yet to announce its decision.
Permanent Seliger youth base planned for monastery grounds
Pro-Kremlin youth might soon start "camping" at Lake Seliger all year round, as the specially protected grounds of a local monastery are expected to be handed over to the Federal Youth Agency.
A letter to the governor of the Tver region, where the agency has been holding its annual summer forum since 2000, has been endorsed by Sports, Tourism and Youth Policy Minister Vitaly Mutko.
"The camp is developing, they want to tidy it up and stop living in tents,"
Hordes of young people have been descending on Lake Seliger's vicinity since 2000. And their numbers grew dramatically after gatherings of Kremlin-supporters from the Nashi and Idushchiye Vmeste movements were transformed into the All-Russian Educational Forum in 2009.
But camp-like gathering are soon to become history, as permanent facilities might be erected on an 18.76 hectare site, which was previously owned by the Nilov-Stolbensky Monastery, sources at the regional administration and the Sports Ministry told Izvestia.
Construction, which is expected to start in 2013 if not earlier, would cost just 125 million rubles. No information about the development project has been revealed so far but the funding seems to be rather modest, given that 200 million roubles have been allocated from the state budget for this year's forum.
The news about the looming construction has caused a stir in the region. "Local residents have become worried about the situation. That's why we've asked officials to give us with a clear answer about the monastery's lands," A Just Russia Duma Deputy Alexei Chepa,said. Chepa is drawing up a request to official bodies to check the legal grounds of the project.
The representatives of the monastery, however, don't seem to have a shared opinion on the matter. "We know nothing about it. Officially we haven't given the lands away," Father Pyotr, the monastery's spokesman told.
The head of the monastery, Father Arkady, told Izvestia that the territory could be passed to another owner.
"I have no concerns about it. I've always supported [the Seliger forum]. We've agreed to transfer the lands," he said.
Chepa was suspicious about the monks' position. "They are far from the political background of the story, in the first place. And secondly, it's likely that they have been pressured by the local authorities,"
A letter to the governor of the Tver region, where the agency has been holding its annual summer forum since 2000, has been endorsed by Sports, Tourism and Youth Policy Minister Vitaly Mutko.
"The camp is developing, they want to tidy it up and stop living in tents,"
Hordes of young people have been descending on Lake Seliger's vicinity since 2000. And their numbers grew dramatically after gatherings of Kremlin-supporters from the Nashi and Idushchiye Vmeste movements were transformed into the All-Russian Educational Forum in 2009.
But camp-like gathering are soon to become history, as permanent facilities might be erected on an 18.76 hectare site, which was previously owned by the Nilov-Stolbensky Monastery, sources at the regional administration and the Sports Ministry told Izvestia.
Construction, which is expected to start in 2013 if not earlier, would cost just 125 million rubles. No information about the development project has been revealed so far but the funding seems to be rather modest, given that 200 million roubles have been allocated from the state budget for this year's forum.
The news about the looming construction has caused a stir in the region. "Local residents have become worried about the situation. That's why we've asked officials to give us with a clear answer about the monastery's lands," A Just Russia Duma Deputy Alexei Chepa,said. Chepa is drawing up a request to official bodies to check the legal grounds of the project.
The representatives of the monastery, however, don't seem to have a shared opinion on the matter. "We know nothing about it. Officially we haven't given the lands away," Father Pyotr, the monastery's spokesman told.
The head of the monastery, Father Arkady, told Izvestia that the territory could be passed to another owner.
"I have no concerns about it. I've always supported [the Seliger forum]. We've agreed to transfer the lands," he said.
Chepa was suspicious about the monks' position. "They are far from the political background of the story, in the first place. And secondly, it's likely that they have been pressured by the local authorities,"
Avtovaz to stop making Lada Riva AKA the Semyorka
Russia’s biggest car-maker plans to stop making the classic Lada Riva, after demand fell by 76 percent compared to last year.
“It’s all going according to plan,” Avtovaz communications director Igor Burenkov was quoted as saying. “Demand for the classics fell significantly. It is time to say goodbye.”
The car-maker did not say when the last Lada 2107 will roll off the conveyor belt, but added that newer models Lada Kalina, Lada Priora and Lada Granta had become more popular.
The Izhavto plant in Udmurtia will be reorganized to make the newer models instead of the Riva. Work on taking it off the production line will begin next week.
Lada Riva was exported into Western European markets, and became a target of numerous jokes for its poor quality.
“It’s all going according to plan,” Avtovaz communications director Igor Burenkov was quoted as saying. “Demand for the classics fell significantly. It is time to say goodbye.”
The car-maker did not say when the last Lada 2107 will roll off the conveyor belt, but added that newer models Lada Kalina, Lada Priora and Lada Granta had become more popular.
The Izhavto plant in Udmurtia will be reorganized to make the newer models instead of the Riva. Work on taking it off the production line will begin next week.
Lada Riva was exported into Western European markets, and became a target of numerous jokes for its poor quality.
Siberian village devastated by wildfire inferno
Twenty out of 35 houses were consumed by flames in the Russian village of Bayan-Bulak on Thursday night.
The steppe fire roared into the village, located 200 km from Chita, at 9 pm local time on Thursday due to strong winds. The fire took more than 12 hours to extinguish.
All 60 residents were evacuated to the neighboring village Tsokto-Khangil, where they were placed in a school and a cultural center. One woman broke her leg during the evacuation.
An investigation was opened on the accidental destruction of property.
Zabaikalsky region authorities promised to start reconstruction in May.
“It is necessary to sort out the issue of housing construction with everyone personally and start building no later than May. It is also necessary to tally the damage and process all the documents. We plan to open a charity account, organize a collection of clothes and money. We will build the houses. We will not leave anyone in strife,” said the spokesperson for Zabaikalsky Governor Ravil Geniatulin.
He promised Prime Minister Vladimir Putin that people would be able to move into their new houses by the start of heating season in autumn.
The governor visited the devastated village on Friday and held a special meeting with the local council.
Those whose houses burned down will be allocated money for immediate needs and provided with assistance in restoring their documents.
There is a storm warning in the region, and the steppe fire could strike other villages. More than 100 people and 26 fire-fighting units are battling the flames. Thousands of hectares of forest are on fire in Siberia in 34 locations.
Russian forest authorities will also send 200 fire-fighting paratroopers from the Moscow region, Karelia and Krasnoyarsk region.
The region is in the state of emergency because of dry weather with high winds and numerous fires. Grass burning is thought to be the cause of many fires. The authorities banned it, but locals still use it to remove old grass on hayfields and pastures.
Russia is plagued by wildfires every year. In 2010, burning peat bogs near Moscow covered the city in thick smoke, forcing many residents to flee the city.
The steppe fire roared into the village, located 200 km from Chita, at 9 pm local time on Thursday due to strong winds. The fire took more than 12 hours to extinguish.
All 60 residents were evacuated to the neighboring village Tsokto-Khangil, where they were placed in a school and a cultural center. One woman broke her leg during the evacuation.
An investigation was opened on the accidental destruction of property.
Zabaikalsky region authorities promised to start reconstruction in May.
“It is necessary to sort out the issue of housing construction with everyone personally and start building no later than May. It is also necessary to tally the damage and process all the documents. We plan to open a charity account, organize a collection of clothes and money. We will build the houses. We will not leave anyone in strife,” said the spokesperson for Zabaikalsky Governor Ravil Geniatulin.
He promised Prime Minister Vladimir Putin that people would be able to move into their new houses by the start of heating season in autumn.
The governor visited the devastated village on Friday and held a special meeting with the local council.
Those whose houses burned down will be allocated money for immediate needs and provided with assistance in restoring their documents.
There is a storm warning in the region, and the steppe fire could strike other villages. More than 100 people and 26 fire-fighting units are battling the flames. Thousands of hectares of forest are on fire in Siberia in 34 locations.
Russian forest authorities will also send 200 fire-fighting paratroopers from the Moscow region, Karelia and Krasnoyarsk region.
The region is in the state of emergency because of dry weather with high winds and numerous fires. Grass burning is thought to be the cause of many fires. The authorities banned it, but locals still use it to remove old grass on hayfields and pastures.
Russia is plagued by wildfires every year. In 2010, burning peat bogs near Moscow covered the city in thick smoke, forcing many residents to flee the city.
Sunday, 18 March 2012
European Parliament demands perfect democracy from Russia
The European Parliament adopted an ambiguous resolution on the presidential elections in Russia. The resolution serves two masters, as they say. On the one hand, the European Parliament described the electoral process in Russia as "not free and unfair." On the other hand, the parliament is optimistic about the future and the further dialogue with Russia.
However, Russia could expect nothing else from Strasburg, which has been trying to put pressure on Moscow over its stance on Syria. Practically all world leaders - from Merkel and Cameron to Obama - congratulated Vladimir Putin on his victory.
The European officials particularly believe that the Russian voters had been given a "limited choice," because the Central Electoral Commission refused to register the candidate of Yabloko party, Grigory Yavlinsky. The Commission denied registration to Yavlinsky after it had rejected, about 25% of signature sheets in his support (that were actually photocopies).
European MPs called on the Russian authorities to "thoroughly and openly" investigate the violations, which observers, including OSCE/ODIHR representatives, pointed out. However, the MPs called upon themselves to look into the future, rather than the past. The European deputies also stated that the European Union was determined to continue the development of the strategic partnership with Russia.
The European resolution pleased the co-chairman of People's Freedom Party (known for the Russian initials as PARNAS), Mikhail Kasyanov. Upon his return from Strasbourg, the politician told Interfax that he was "satisfied with the fact that European politicians open their eyes wider to the deteriorating situation with human rights and political freedoms in Russia. This political assessment coincides with both my position and that of PARNAS," the opposition politician stated. It appears that Mr. Kasyanov has decided to ignore the other side of the story.
The Executive Director of the Russian Foundation for Free Elections, Igor Bogdanov, expressed his opinion about the European resolution in an interview with Pravda.Ru. According to him, "the Russians elected their new president in a unique, well-organized and well-conducted election." "It was unique because so many web-cameras have never been used at poll stations anywhere in the world before," he added.
According to the expert, the presidential election campaign had certain violations and drawbacks. "But it's a natural process that accompanies any election campaign," said Bogdanov. "Assessing any campaign in Europe or in the U.S., one can find even a larger number of drawbacks," he said. "And it is not objective to question the election, which took place in our country, especially if it is being done by the people, who have never been here, but who instead listen those who scream and shout about mass violations," says Bogdanov.
A recent poll conducted by the All-Russian Public Opinion Center showed that only a third of respondents admitted "minor fraud" which did not eventually affect the outcome of the vote (34%). Those who do not believe in the announced victory of Vladimir Putin are in the minority (14%). Moreover, according to sociologists, only 2 percent of respondents said that they had noticed violations with their own eyes. On the whole, 78 percent of voters do not doubt the legitimacy of the elected president.
The head of the Russian Public Institute of the Electoral Law, Igor Borisov, said that the European Parliament resolution "had nothing to do with reality." "Official representatives of the European Parliament (it goes about the delegation), were not observing the elections in Russia. They make their statements from the words of Russian politicians - the losers, who reside in Europe and who constantly tell some sort of horrible things about the Russian elections," Borisov told Pravda.Ru.
"We had five European MPs working at the independent group of international observers. They were present here and could personally observe all of the voting and counting procedures," Igor Borisov added. "All of them highly estimated the voting process and the counting of votes. Moreover, they recommended to use some elements of the electoral system for the elections to the European Parliament. I would like to see the transparency of the procedures, through which the European Parliament is formed," concluded the expert.
Indeed, one may assume that the elections in the EU or in the United States are perfect in contrast to the "dirty Russia." In France, for example, the candidate of the National Front far-right party, Marine Le Pen, did not have the right to participate in the presidential campaign just before March 15. And all of her appeals to the Constitutional Court were wasted. In Estonia and Latvia, the so-called non-citizens have no voting rights at all.
Do we need to say anything about the manipulations with voting lists or about the use of administrative resources in the United States? Democrats still accuse Florida governor Jeb Bush of giving decisive help to his brother during the presidential campaign in 2000.
There are no perfect democracy role models. However, the European Parliament does not want to understand that.
However, Russia could expect nothing else from Strasburg, which has been trying to put pressure on Moscow over its stance on Syria. Practically all world leaders - from Merkel and Cameron to Obama - congratulated Vladimir Putin on his victory.
The European officials particularly believe that the Russian voters had been given a "limited choice," because the Central Electoral Commission refused to register the candidate of Yabloko party, Grigory Yavlinsky. The Commission denied registration to Yavlinsky after it had rejected, about 25% of signature sheets in his support (that were actually photocopies).
European MPs called on the Russian authorities to "thoroughly and openly" investigate the violations, which observers, including OSCE/ODIHR representatives, pointed out. However, the MPs called upon themselves to look into the future, rather than the past. The European deputies also stated that the European Union was determined to continue the development of the strategic partnership with Russia.
The European resolution pleased the co-chairman of People's Freedom Party (known for the Russian initials as PARNAS), Mikhail Kasyanov. Upon his return from Strasbourg, the politician told Interfax that he was "satisfied with the fact that European politicians open their eyes wider to the deteriorating situation with human rights and political freedoms in Russia. This political assessment coincides with both my position and that of PARNAS," the opposition politician stated. It appears that Mr. Kasyanov has decided to ignore the other side of the story.
The Executive Director of the Russian Foundation for Free Elections, Igor Bogdanov, expressed his opinion about the European resolution in an interview with Pravda.Ru. According to him, "the Russians elected their new president in a unique, well-organized and well-conducted election." "It was unique because so many web-cameras have never been used at poll stations anywhere in the world before," he added.
According to the expert, the presidential election campaign had certain violations and drawbacks. "But it's a natural process that accompanies any election campaign," said Bogdanov. "Assessing any campaign in Europe or in the U.S., one can find even a larger number of drawbacks," he said. "And it is not objective to question the election, which took place in our country, especially if it is being done by the people, who have never been here, but who instead listen those who scream and shout about mass violations," says Bogdanov.
A recent poll conducted by the All-Russian Public Opinion Center showed that only a third of respondents admitted "minor fraud" which did not eventually affect the outcome of the vote (34%). Those who do not believe in the announced victory of Vladimir Putin are in the minority (14%). Moreover, according to sociologists, only 2 percent of respondents said that they had noticed violations with their own eyes. On the whole, 78 percent of voters do not doubt the legitimacy of the elected president.
The head of the Russian Public Institute of the Electoral Law, Igor Borisov, said that the European Parliament resolution "had nothing to do with reality." "Official representatives of the European Parliament (it goes about the delegation), were not observing the elections in Russia. They make their statements from the words of Russian politicians - the losers, who reside in Europe and who constantly tell some sort of horrible things about the Russian elections," Borisov told Pravda.Ru.
"We had five European MPs working at the independent group of international observers. They were present here and could personally observe all of the voting and counting procedures," Igor Borisov added. "All of them highly estimated the voting process and the counting of votes. Moreover, they recommended to use some elements of the electoral system for the elections to the European Parliament. I would like to see the transparency of the procedures, through which the European Parliament is formed," concluded the expert.
Indeed, one may assume that the elections in the EU or in the United States are perfect in contrast to the "dirty Russia." In France, for example, the candidate of the National Front far-right party, Marine Le Pen, did not have the right to participate in the presidential campaign just before March 15. And all of her appeals to the Constitutional Court were wasted. In Estonia and Latvia, the so-called non-citizens have no voting rights at all.
Do we need to say anything about the manipulations with voting lists or about the use of administrative resources in the United States? Democrats still accuse Florida governor Jeb Bush of giving decisive help to his brother during the presidential campaign in 2000.
There are no perfect democracy role models. However, the European Parliament does not want to understand that.
Russians come to Tokyo for new iPads
As with most Apple gadget launches, there are sure to be early morning crowds outside the company's big city stores Friday - but not everyone will be there to buy a new iPad.
At Apple stores in New York, San Francisco and Washington, dozens of protesters are expected to show up for the 8 a.m. launch of the company's third-generation tablet computer, stepping into the iPad's limelight to bring attention to concerns about the welfare of the Chinese factory workers who churn out the devices to satisfy a growing global demand,
At Apple stores in New York, San Francisco and Washington, dozens of protesters are expected to show up for the 8 a.m. launch of the company's third-generation tablet computer, stepping into the iPad's limelight to bring attention to concerns about the welfare of the Chinese factory workers who churn out the devices to satisfy a growing global demand,
Ukraine: Running Short Of Funds
KIEV, Ukraine -- Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich is off to Moscow next week in his latest effort to secure economic support from his powerful neighbour, with a discount gas supply deal near the top of his list.
It’s a regular trip.
But Kiev’s financial needs are pressing: S&P on Thursday downgraded the credit outlook on Ukraine to “negative” while ministers talked of rescheduling $3bn in debts owed to the International Monetary Fund under a 2008 programme, even as Ukraine’s current programme has been suspended.
No wonder Yanukovich needs Russia.
With Ukraine heading for a balance of payments crunch, S&P’s downgrade came as little surprise.
Ukraine is this year scrambling to cover or rollover nearly $6bn in external and about $3bn in domestic debt obligations.
S&P revised its outlook on long-term foreign currency government bond rating to negative from stable, confirming the rating at B+.
The credit agency said:
"We are revising the outlook on our long-term sovereign ratings on Ukraine to negative, reflecting our opinion that ongoing uncertainty about the Ukraine government’s negotiations with the IMF and Gazprom is increasing refinancing risks."
"In our view, increased risk aversion toward Ukraine’s funding needs has been fuelled by the lack of clarity over the ultimate direction of government policy in relation to ongoing negotiations with the IMF and Russian gas company, OAO Gazprom."
A responsible administration would be working for a resumption of the current $15.5bn IMF programme that was frozen last year due to lack of fiscal reforms.
But instead, Yanukovich has recently announced $3bn in populist pension increases and other social handouts.
It’s an obvious bid to win back voter support before the October parliamentary election.
Alexander Valchyshen, head of research at Kiev-based investment bank ICU, said: “Surely this is pure populism and quite a sizable addition on the expenditures side.”
The added spending could increase the total national budget deficit (including the deficit of state gas company Naftogaz) from 5.2 per cent of GDP in 2011 to 8.5 per cent this year.
That’s a big shift in the wrong direction at a time when other European countries are trying to trim deficits expanding in responding to the 2008 crisis.
But boosting public borrowing doesn’t appear to be troubling Yanukovich, when the number he’s watching closely is his approval rating which has plunged towards single digit percentage levels since he narrowly beat Yulia Tymoshenko in a 2010 presidential contest.
Despite the recent jailing of Tymoshenko on charges widely deemed to be politically-motivated, Yanukovich’s grip on voter support may be weak.
Tymoshenko’s Fatherland party is out-polling his Party of Regions.
But it remains unclear how Yanukovich will fund these social expenditure increases given that he has increasingly alienated the IMF, the European Union ( a potential source of financial aid as well as a trade partner), and Russia.
None of the options are good.
Yanukovich could squeeze more taxes and fines out of businesses, something done in the past.
But this would also hurt him in the polls.
He could borrow on international markets, but it would be expensive.
During his first two years in power, Yanukovich has failed to broker a deal with Russia’s Gazprom that would bring lower gas prices.
Sensing Kiev’s weakness, Gazprom has, in return for cutting prices, demanded control over Ukraine’s strategic gas transit pipeline.
But handing it over could be political suicide.
The IMF wants Ukraine to increase gas prices on households to compensate for the higher prices and bring more transparency to the nation’s murky gas sector.
But such an increase would hurt voter support, and Yanukovich has recently declared prices won’t be raised.
“An increasingly desperate government is looking for other short-term fixes,” London-based Capital Economics wrote in a March 15 note.
Ukrainian officials this week admitted that talks on unfreezing additional IMF billion-dollar loans are at an “impasse.”
But, in a sign of desperation, they said the country would ask the Fund to restructure, or refinance more than $3bn in IMF loan payments that have to be covered this year on previous borrowings.
The IMF and market isn’t likely to agree.
“The IMF is highly unlikely to approve Ukraine’s [recent] request to restructure $3bn of loan repayments due this year, but the fact that the government is even considering such a move demonstrates the extent to which it is running out of options,” said Capital Economics.
With about $30bn in central bank reserves, the immediate risk of default is low.
The public debt-to-GDP is ratio is not high – 38.9 per cent at end-2011.
But populist policies means it is rising rapidly, with 43.5 per cent prospect by the year-end, according to JP Morgan.
External debt redemptions will increase in 2013 and stay high over the follwoing two years.
This is not a sustainable course.
It’s a regular trip.
But Kiev’s financial needs are pressing: S&P on Thursday downgraded the credit outlook on Ukraine to “negative” while ministers talked of rescheduling $3bn in debts owed to the International Monetary Fund under a 2008 programme, even as Ukraine’s current programme has been suspended.
No wonder Yanukovich needs Russia.
With Ukraine heading for a balance of payments crunch, S&P’s downgrade came as little surprise.
Ukraine is this year scrambling to cover or rollover nearly $6bn in external and about $3bn in domestic debt obligations.
S&P revised its outlook on long-term foreign currency government bond rating to negative from stable, confirming the rating at B+.
The credit agency said:
"We are revising the outlook on our long-term sovereign ratings on Ukraine to negative, reflecting our opinion that ongoing uncertainty about the Ukraine government’s negotiations with the IMF and Gazprom is increasing refinancing risks."
"In our view, increased risk aversion toward Ukraine’s funding needs has been fuelled by the lack of clarity over the ultimate direction of government policy in relation to ongoing negotiations with the IMF and Russian gas company, OAO Gazprom."
A responsible administration would be working for a resumption of the current $15.5bn IMF programme that was frozen last year due to lack of fiscal reforms.
But instead, Yanukovich has recently announced $3bn in populist pension increases and other social handouts.
It’s an obvious bid to win back voter support before the October parliamentary election.
Alexander Valchyshen, head of research at Kiev-based investment bank ICU, said: “Surely this is pure populism and quite a sizable addition on the expenditures side.”
The added spending could increase the total national budget deficit (including the deficit of state gas company Naftogaz) from 5.2 per cent of GDP in 2011 to 8.5 per cent this year.
That’s a big shift in the wrong direction at a time when other European countries are trying to trim deficits expanding in responding to the 2008 crisis.
But boosting public borrowing doesn’t appear to be troubling Yanukovich, when the number he’s watching closely is his approval rating which has plunged towards single digit percentage levels since he narrowly beat Yulia Tymoshenko in a 2010 presidential contest.
Despite the recent jailing of Tymoshenko on charges widely deemed to be politically-motivated, Yanukovich’s grip on voter support may be weak.
Tymoshenko’s Fatherland party is out-polling his Party of Regions.
But it remains unclear how Yanukovich will fund these social expenditure increases given that he has increasingly alienated the IMF, the European Union ( a potential source of financial aid as well as a trade partner), and Russia.
None of the options are good.
Yanukovich could squeeze more taxes and fines out of businesses, something done in the past.
But this would also hurt him in the polls.
He could borrow on international markets, but it would be expensive.
During his first two years in power, Yanukovich has failed to broker a deal with Russia’s Gazprom that would bring lower gas prices.
Sensing Kiev’s weakness, Gazprom has, in return for cutting prices, demanded control over Ukraine’s strategic gas transit pipeline.
But handing it over could be political suicide.
The IMF wants Ukraine to increase gas prices on households to compensate for the higher prices and bring more transparency to the nation’s murky gas sector.
But such an increase would hurt voter support, and Yanukovich has recently declared prices won’t be raised.
“An increasingly desperate government is looking for other short-term fixes,” London-based Capital Economics wrote in a March 15 note.
Ukrainian officials this week admitted that talks on unfreezing additional IMF billion-dollar loans are at an “impasse.”
But, in a sign of desperation, they said the country would ask the Fund to restructure, or refinance more than $3bn in IMF loan payments that have to be covered this year on previous borrowings.
The IMF and market isn’t likely to agree.
“The IMF is highly unlikely to approve Ukraine’s [recent] request to restructure $3bn of loan repayments due this year, but the fact that the government is even considering such a move demonstrates the extent to which it is running out of options,” said Capital Economics.
With about $30bn in central bank reserves, the immediate risk of default is low.
The public debt-to-GDP is ratio is not high – 38.9 per cent at end-2011.
But populist policies means it is rising rapidly, with 43.5 per cent prospect by the year-end, according to JP Morgan.
External debt redemptions will increase in 2013 and stay high over the follwoing two years.
This is not a sustainable course.
Sunday, 11 March 2012
Putin vote inflated – watchdogs
Independent monitors and election experts allege that voter fraud and new tricks added 10 to 16 percent to Vladimir Putin’s official result of 63.6 percent in Sunday’s election, a finding that prompted some watchdogs to refuse to recognize the elections as legitimate.
Based on voting protocols from monitors, the independent Golos watchdog put Putin’s national result at 54 percent, while Alexei Navalny’s RosVybory group estimated his real vote at 49 percent – a result that would have sent the election into a second round. Another watchdog, Citizen Observer put Putin’s real vote at 48 percent.
Meanwhile, the League of Voters, a watchdog of opposition activists and celebrities, presented a report Wednesday based on copies of voting protocols from over 5,000 observers from 23 regions.Experts say different types of falsifications were used to greater or lesser extent depending on the region.
“In Moscow, which was covered by election observers better than any other Russian region, nighttime falsifications [rewriting of protocols] accounted for only around 2 percent of Putin’s poll, because forgers knew that observers were watching,” political analyst and election expert Dmitry Oreshkin told .
Across the country, the share of this kind of falsification is at least 10 percent, the League of Voters claimed.
Forgers have resorted to new methods in addition to traditional tricks like rewriting protocols, ballot stuffing and forced voting through absentee ballots, election experts said.
For instance, many people voted as employees of enterprises with so-called continuous production cycles – which meant that they could vote anywhere without an absentee ballot. According to Oreshkin, this allowed the same group of workers to vote several times at several polling stations.
“All of a sudden, a lot of enterprises turned out to have continuous production cycles in Moscow, for example Tekhnosila [a retail chain of household appliances],” Oreshkin said. Its employees voted at several polling stations, each claiming that they work in the vicinity and showing respective documents signed by their enterprise’s director. “This cannot be controlled because they don’t even have absentee ballots or other documents that can be tracked,” Oreshkin said.
Another method appeared to be creating new polling stations at the last minute, making it difficult for observers to prepare.
Monitor Ksenia Vinkova reported that an additional polling station was formed ahead of the elections in her district of Strogino. “The polling station covered only one block of flats with 300 residents, while another 1,087 people voted by additional lists as employees of enterprises with a continuous production cycle,” Vinkova wrote in her report. “Strogino is a residential community and there are no such enterprises here.”
Nina Ostanina, a State Duma deputy for the Communist Party, the only parliamentary party that has so far refused to recognize the election results, told Ekho Moskvy radio on Monday that just two days before the election, six additional polling stations were created in the town of Rybinsk in the Yaroslavl region, where United Russia polled less than 30 percent on December 4.
There March 4 was announced as a working day in all state-funded organizations, she said.
“Parties just had no time to prepare monitors or delegate commission members to these precincts,” Ostanina said.
Journalist and publisher Sergei Parkhomenko, a founder of the League of Voters, told The Moscow News that in his precinct of 3,007 voters over 500 people voted by additional lists. “We found they all came from three organizations, namely the Federal Road Agency and two theater colleges,” he said.
These new rigging methods could account for as many as 10 to 20 additional percentage points for Putin, according to Georgy Alburov, a coordinator of the RosVybory election monitoring project, through which over 17,000 volunteers worked as monitors in 81 regions.
“Most of our monitors reported that they had detected carousel voting, which was usually carried out by additional lists from enterprises,” Alburov said.
People were brought to precincts by car or in tour buses. Dmitry Oreshkin said that the League of Voters found that at least 30 buses with voters from the Tver region alone cruised across Moscow and the Moscow region on March 4.
In Russia’s second largest city, St. Petersburg, nighttime falsifications were used more widely than in Moscow, the League of Voters claimed. Protocols were allegedly rewritten at 28 polling stations, where watchdogs estimate that about 44 percent of votes were added to Putin. His official vote tally in St. Petersburg stands at 59 percent.
Election experts admit that it is almost impossible to tell what is going on in Russia’s blind spots, where Putin has received 90 percent or more of the vote. Two out of 16 RosVybory monitors were beaten up in Chechnya, where Putin received 99.8 percent.
“In Chechnya and Dagestan they fill out protocols in whatever way they want, regardless of the real results,” Oreshkin said.
Parkhomenko said that it was extremely unlikely that the results will be canceled. “The only opportunity to prove in court that the vote was rigged is to show a forged protocol. Courts do not consider videos, photos, audio records and copies of protocols as evidence, only original protocols. But who would give them to a monitor?”
Parkhomenko added that he does not know of a single observer or watchdog winning a lawsuit against forgers after the Dec. 4 parliamentary vote, which was also widely alleged to be rigged.
According to Moscow’s Election Commission, there was not a single instance of so-called “carousel voting” in Moscow.
But pro-government experts insisted the official vote count was a pretty accurate reflection of people’s preferences.
“Putin clearly is supported by the majority,” political analyst Sergei Markov, a member of United Russia, told The Moscow News. He added that Putin’s electorate was mobilized ahead of March 4 because many believed in the possibility of an Orange revolution.
According to Markov’s estimate, only about 2 percentage points may have been added to Putin’s vote count by overzealous election officials in the regions.
“I call this phenomenon a selftwisting spring of bureaucratic hyper-loyalty,” Markov said. “I think the role of carousel voting on March 4 is exaggerated because the opposition reported all the buses they saw as carousel buses. But those were mostly people that came to Moscow for a pro-Putin rally from other regions, and they voted with absentee ballots.”
Based on voting protocols from monitors, the independent Golos watchdog put Putin’s national result at 54 percent, while Alexei Navalny’s RosVybory group estimated his real vote at 49 percent – a result that would have sent the election into a second round. Another watchdog, Citizen Observer put Putin’s real vote at 48 percent.
Meanwhile, the League of Voters, a watchdog of opposition activists and celebrities, presented a report Wednesday based on copies of voting protocols from over 5,000 observers from 23 regions.Experts say different types of falsifications were used to greater or lesser extent depending on the region.
“In Moscow, which was covered by election observers better than any other Russian region, nighttime falsifications [rewriting of protocols] accounted for only around 2 percent of Putin’s poll, because forgers knew that observers were watching,” political analyst and election expert Dmitry Oreshkin told .
Across the country, the share of this kind of falsification is at least 10 percent, the League of Voters claimed.
Forgers have resorted to new methods in addition to traditional tricks like rewriting protocols, ballot stuffing and forced voting through absentee ballots, election experts said.
For instance, many people voted as employees of enterprises with so-called continuous production cycles – which meant that they could vote anywhere without an absentee ballot. According to Oreshkin, this allowed the same group of workers to vote several times at several polling stations.
“All of a sudden, a lot of enterprises turned out to have continuous production cycles in Moscow, for example Tekhnosila [a retail chain of household appliances],” Oreshkin said. Its employees voted at several polling stations, each claiming that they work in the vicinity and showing respective documents signed by their enterprise’s director. “This cannot be controlled because they don’t even have absentee ballots or other documents that can be tracked,” Oreshkin said.
Another method appeared to be creating new polling stations at the last minute, making it difficult for observers to prepare.
Monitor Ksenia Vinkova reported that an additional polling station was formed ahead of the elections in her district of Strogino. “The polling station covered only one block of flats with 300 residents, while another 1,087 people voted by additional lists as employees of enterprises with a continuous production cycle,” Vinkova wrote in her report. “Strogino is a residential community and there are no such enterprises here.”
Nina Ostanina, a State Duma deputy for the Communist Party, the only parliamentary party that has so far refused to recognize the election results, told Ekho Moskvy radio on Monday that just two days before the election, six additional polling stations were created in the town of Rybinsk in the Yaroslavl region, where United Russia polled less than 30 percent on December 4.
There March 4 was announced as a working day in all state-funded organizations, she said.
“Parties just had no time to prepare monitors or delegate commission members to these precincts,” Ostanina said.
Journalist and publisher Sergei Parkhomenko, a founder of the League of Voters, told The Moscow News that in his precinct of 3,007 voters over 500 people voted by additional lists. “We found they all came from three organizations, namely the Federal Road Agency and two theater colleges,” he said.
These new rigging methods could account for as many as 10 to 20 additional percentage points for Putin, according to Georgy Alburov, a coordinator of the RosVybory election monitoring project, through which over 17,000 volunteers worked as monitors in 81 regions.
“Most of our monitors reported that they had detected carousel voting, which was usually carried out by additional lists from enterprises,” Alburov said.
People were brought to precincts by car or in tour buses. Dmitry Oreshkin said that the League of Voters found that at least 30 buses with voters from the Tver region alone cruised across Moscow and the Moscow region on March 4.
In Russia’s second largest city, St. Petersburg, nighttime falsifications were used more widely than in Moscow, the League of Voters claimed. Protocols were allegedly rewritten at 28 polling stations, where watchdogs estimate that about 44 percent of votes were added to Putin. His official vote tally in St. Petersburg stands at 59 percent.
Election experts admit that it is almost impossible to tell what is going on in Russia’s blind spots, where Putin has received 90 percent or more of the vote. Two out of 16 RosVybory monitors were beaten up in Chechnya, where Putin received 99.8 percent.
“In Chechnya and Dagestan they fill out protocols in whatever way they want, regardless of the real results,” Oreshkin said.
Parkhomenko said that it was extremely unlikely that the results will be canceled. “The only opportunity to prove in court that the vote was rigged is to show a forged protocol. Courts do not consider videos, photos, audio records and copies of protocols as evidence, only original protocols. But who would give them to a monitor?”
Parkhomenko added that he does not know of a single observer or watchdog winning a lawsuit against forgers after the Dec. 4 parliamentary vote, which was also widely alleged to be rigged.
According to Moscow’s Election Commission, there was not a single instance of so-called “carousel voting” in Moscow.
But pro-government experts insisted the official vote count was a pretty accurate reflection of people’s preferences.
“Putin clearly is supported by the majority,” political analyst Sergei Markov, a member of United Russia, told The Moscow News. He added that Putin’s electorate was mobilized ahead of March 4 because many believed in the possibility of an Orange revolution.
According to Markov’s estimate, only about 2 percentage points may have been added to Putin’s vote count by overzealous election officials in the regions.
“I call this phenomenon a selftwisting spring of bureaucratic hyper-loyalty,” Markov said. “I think the role of carousel voting on March 4 is exaggerated because the opposition reported all the buses they saw as carousel buses. But those were mostly people that came to Moscow for a pro-Putin rally from other regions, and they voted with absentee ballots.”
Anti-Putin movement sees sharp drop in support
ome 20,000 people gathered on a central Moscow avenue Saturday to contest Vladimir Putin’s sweeping victory in presidential elections last weekend.
But the turnout, while unheard of for an opposition protest in Russia just four months ago, marks a sharp drop in support for the country’s newly formed protest movement, used to gathering crowds of up to 100,000.
Lining the entire stretch of a broad, kilometer-long forecourt on downtown Moscow’s Novy Arbat street, demonstrators waved white ribbons – the symbol of the protest movement – and brandished colorful placards bearing anti-Putin slogans.
The organizers of the demonstration called for fresh elections and deep political reform during two hours of speeches to muted cheering from the crowd.
“These authorities are illegitimate. The same people are in power, the same people who took away our right to choose, the same people who destroyed freedom of speech and political competition,” said protest organizer Vladimir Ryzhkov.
While most of the speeches focused on the violations recorded by monitors in last Sunday’s presidential elections, when Putin won nearly 64 percent of the vote, some attempted to clarify a question that troubles many protestors: where the movement will go now that it has failed to stop Putin securing another term.
“We need to quickly establish what we are protesting for - for judicial reform, for social improvements for youth, for free media, and for comprehensive political reform,” said popular TV host Ksenia Sobchak.
There was a deflated air to the event, with many protestors admitting that the movement had lost its focus now that the elections are over.
“There is certainly a trend towards diminishing numbers. I think people are starting to give up hope that anything can be achieved,” Lidia Mishenka, a student in her early 20s told The Moscow News. “I sincerely hope the movement won’t die out but, honestly, I’m not convinced it can achieve anything now.”
The last big sanctioned weekend protest by the opposition in Moscow attracted a crowd of over 100,000 people, despite temperatures around minus 20. Saturday’s weather was around zero.
Police put the turnout this time at around 10,000, while opposition leaders estimated 25,000. Moscow authorities had sanctioned some 50,000 people to take part.
In contrast to a small opposition protest Monday, where some 250 people were arrested, Saturday’s demonstration passed off peacefully without a single arrest. However, Left Front Leader Sergei Udaltsov was arrested after the event along with a dozen protesters when he attempted to hold an impromptu meeting on Pushkin Square.
Protestor Mikhail Tyoplenky said he felt the public were less angered by alleged violations in last weekend’s elections than they were following parliamentary elections in December.
“During the parliamentary elections there were a lot of obvious violations, which angered the whole population,” Tyoplenky said “This time round they [the authorities] made it look a lot cleaner – the violations were less obvious.”
How the movement will proceed now is as yet unclear. Udaltsov, of the Left Front, called for a mass protest on May Day, ahead of Putin’s inauguration - which is scheduled for May 7.
“Now it is up to the people on the street to decide what will happen,” Udaltsov told journalists as he left Novy Arbat. “If we don’t want to put up with crooks and thieves for the next six years, we need to solve this problem no later than May 1.
But the turnout, while unheard of for an opposition protest in Russia just four months ago, marks a sharp drop in support for the country’s newly formed protest movement, used to gathering crowds of up to 100,000.
Lining the entire stretch of a broad, kilometer-long forecourt on downtown Moscow’s Novy Arbat street, demonstrators waved white ribbons – the symbol of the protest movement – and brandished colorful placards bearing anti-Putin slogans.
The organizers of the demonstration called for fresh elections and deep political reform during two hours of speeches to muted cheering from the crowd.
“These authorities are illegitimate. The same people are in power, the same people who took away our right to choose, the same people who destroyed freedom of speech and political competition,” said protest organizer Vladimir Ryzhkov.
While most of the speeches focused on the violations recorded by monitors in last Sunday’s presidential elections, when Putin won nearly 64 percent of the vote, some attempted to clarify a question that troubles many protestors: where the movement will go now that it has failed to stop Putin securing another term.
“We need to quickly establish what we are protesting for - for judicial reform, for social improvements for youth, for free media, and for comprehensive political reform,” said popular TV host Ksenia Sobchak.
There was a deflated air to the event, with many protestors admitting that the movement had lost its focus now that the elections are over.
“There is certainly a trend towards diminishing numbers. I think people are starting to give up hope that anything can be achieved,” Lidia Mishenka, a student in her early 20s told The Moscow News. “I sincerely hope the movement won’t die out but, honestly, I’m not convinced it can achieve anything now.”
The last big sanctioned weekend protest by the opposition in Moscow attracted a crowd of over 100,000 people, despite temperatures around minus 20. Saturday’s weather was around zero.
Police put the turnout this time at around 10,000, while opposition leaders estimated 25,000. Moscow authorities had sanctioned some 50,000 people to take part.
In contrast to a small opposition protest Monday, where some 250 people were arrested, Saturday’s demonstration passed off peacefully without a single arrest. However, Left Front Leader Sergei Udaltsov was arrested after the event along with a dozen protesters when he attempted to hold an impromptu meeting on Pushkin Square.
Protestor Mikhail Tyoplenky said he felt the public were less angered by alleged violations in last weekend’s elections than they were following parliamentary elections in December.
“During the parliamentary elections there were a lot of obvious violations, which angered the whole population,” Tyoplenky said “This time round they [the authorities] made it look a lot cleaner – the violations were less obvious.”
How the movement will proceed now is as yet unclear. Udaltsov, of the Left Front, called for a mass protest on May Day, ahead of Putin’s inauguration - which is scheduled for May 7.
“Now it is up to the people on the street to decide what will happen,” Udaltsov told journalists as he left Novy Arbat. “If we don’t want to put up with crooks and thieves for the next six years, we need to solve this problem no later than May 1.
Ukraine: The Dangers Of Putin 2.0
KIEV, Ukraine -- Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich’s administration is bracing itself for the return of Vladimir Putin as president.
It’s hoping the powerful Russian leader won’t kick off a third term by flexing his political muscle against its increasingly isolated and vulnerable neighbor.
Putin may not be as strong at home as he was in prior years.
He faces the challenge of opposition forces seeking change and reforms.
But even his domestic political foes are likely to back his main foreign policy agenda: asserting Moscow’s regional influence.
“We should get ready for Putin’s tough style, to the style of constant pressure,” Ukrainian political analyst Volodymyr Fesenko is quoted as saying in a report published in the English-language Kyiv Post.
In recent years, Putin has made successful strides in luring Belarus and Central Asian countries towards closer economic relations through investment and economic assistance, as well as a CIS-free trade agreement and a joint customs union.
The trade deals are seen as steps towards a broader Eurasian Union.
Kiev has so far resisted, insisting its strategic aim remains European Union membership.
But its fragile economy is stressed, in part due to increasingly high Russian natural gas import prices.
Kiev is now paying about $416 per 1,000 cubic meters for gas imported, compared to an average of $235 in 2009.
Yanukovich claims his country overpaid by some $3bn last year, when it’s annual gas bill stood at nearly $12.4bn.
Since replacing the western-oriented Viktor Yushchenko in 2010, Yanukovich has repeatedly called upon Moscow to lower prices to a “European” price of about $250 per 1,000 cubic meters.
That is Ukraine’s estimate of the west European price, minus transport costs and minus $100 discount, negotiated in 2010 in return for during which Ukraine agreed to prolong the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s stay in Sevastopol in return for a gas price reduction.
But Russia has held firm, insisting that a sharp decrease on prices will only come if Kiev joins the customs union (incompatible with EU integration) and yields control over its strategic gas transit pipeline system.
The latter pumps the lion’s share of Russian gas exports to Europe.
If Yanukovich refuses to hand it over, Russia is threatening to bypass Ukraine by building the multi-billion-dollar South Stream gas pipeline stretching across the Black Sea bed to the Balkans.
Russia has long desired to pull Ukraine back into its orbit of influence, but Kiev’s position is seen as particularly weak now.
Yanukovich started his presidency two years ago on good terms with both Moscow and Brussels.
But he has since irritated Moscow by resisting rapproachment, and Brussels by allegedly persecuting political opponents, notably former premier Yulia Tymoshenko.
Tymoshenko is serving a jail sentence after being convicted of exceeding authority in brokering a 2009 gas agreement with Putin that Yanukovich claims introduced onerous prices.
She denies wrong-doing and says she is the victim of a political attack.
Officials in Kiev have yet to deliver on market-oriented energy reforms that Brussels has said are necessary for loans and financial support.
The International Monetary fund has held up disbursements on a $15.6 bn loan programme, because of Ukraine’s failure to raise domestic gas prices.
Kiev officials say they are working hard to swiftly unbundle state gas behemoth Naftogaz, boost market transparency and competition.
But they are in the near-term desperate for some minimal support from Brussels in their tough negotiations with Moscow.
They are also starting to complain that EU countries are unfairly joining Moscow – and going against Ukraine’s interests – by unilaterally supporting the South Stream project.
Earlier this month, Ukrainian officials revealed that they had appealed to the director of European Energy Community to protest over Slovenia’s decision to unilaterally join other countries in the region supporting Russia’s South Stream, which Moscow’s critics see as a “political” rather than economic project.
Both Kiev and Slovenia are members of the European Energy Community, a EU-backed cooperation agreement.
Such unilateral decisions have frustrated Ukraine, which considers South Stream a threat to its and Europe’s interests by further strengthening Russia’s grip over the region’s energy supply.
“When Ukraine joined the Energy Community, we expected that the EU will support us as a member and take into consideration our interest,” Volodymyr Makukha, Ukraine’s deputy energy minister told the Financial Times.
“Separate country members of the Energy Community, such as Serbia, are in talk with Russia’s Gazprom, making agreements and opening up their gas storage facilities to become a central part of South Stream.”
Confused by silence on matter from the EU, which officially opposes South Stream, Makukha added: “The energy security of Ukraine is a step towards Europe’s energy security.”
But having irritated the EU so many times, Yanukovich is struggling to win friends in Brussels just when he may need them more than ever.
Putin has often shown his annoyance with Kiev in general – and Yanukovich in particular.
Once he is back in the Kremlin and again in direct charge of Russian foreign policy, he is more than likely to tighten the screws on Kiev.
He knows that the EU has bigger problems on its plate than Ukraine and Washington is increasingly focused on its own presidential election.
“Ukraine will face increasing pressure from the side of the Russian Federation,” predicted Ostap Semerak, a Ukrainian lawmaker allied with Tymoshenko.
“Yanukovich is increasingly becoming isolated with respect to relations with the EU. Clearly, Yanukovich will be in a weak position in talks [with Putin].”
Safely back in the presidency, Putin has the upper hand and no reason to “rush” into striking deal with Ukraine, according to Ukrainian energy analyst Yuriy Korolchuk.
After all, Kiev is already paying a lot for its gas.
In a nutshell, time, money and power is on Putin’s side.
Yanukovich has his work cut out.
It’s hoping the powerful Russian leader won’t kick off a third term by flexing his political muscle against its increasingly isolated and vulnerable neighbor.
Putin may not be as strong at home as he was in prior years.
He faces the challenge of opposition forces seeking change and reforms.
But even his domestic political foes are likely to back his main foreign policy agenda: asserting Moscow’s regional influence.
“We should get ready for Putin’s tough style, to the style of constant pressure,” Ukrainian political analyst Volodymyr Fesenko is quoted as saying in a report published in the English-language Kyiv Post.
In recent years, Putin has made successful strides in luring Belarus and Central Asian countries towards closer economic relations through investment and economic assistance, as well as a CIS-free trade agreement and a joint customs union.
The trade deals are seen as steps towards a broader Eurasian Union.
Kiev has so far resisted, insisting its strategic aim remains European Union membership.
But its fragile economy is stressed, in part due to increasingly high Russian natural gas import prices.
Kiev is now paying about $416 per 1,000 cubic meters for gas imported, compared to an average of $235 in 2009.
Yanukovich claims his country overpaid by some $3bn last year, when it’s annual gas bill stood at nearly $12.4bn.
Since replacing the western-oriented Viktor Yushchenko in 2010, Yanukovich has repeatedly called upon Moscow to lower prices to a “European” price of about $250 per 1,000 cubic meters.
That is Ukraine’s estimate of the west European price, minus transport costs and minus $100 discount, negotiated in 2010 in return for during which Ukraine agreed to prolong the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s stay in Sevastopol in return for a gas price reduction.
But Russia has held firm, insisting that a sharp decrease on prices will only come if Kiev joins the customs union (incompatible with EU integration) and yields control over its strategic gas transit pipeline system.
The latter pumps the lion’s share of Russian gas exports to Europe.
If Yanukovich refuses to hand it over, Russia is threatening to bypass Ukraine by building the multi-billion-dollar South Stream gas pipeline stretching across the Black Sea bed to the Balkans.
Russia has long desired to pull Ukraine back into its orbit of influence, but Kiev’s position is seen as particularly weak now.
Yanukovich started his presidency two years ago on good terms with both Moscow and Brussels.
But he has since irritated Moscow by resisting rapproachment, and Brussels by allegedly persecuting political opponents, notably former premier Yulia Tymoshenko.
Tymoshenko is serving a jail sentence after being convicted of exceeding authority in brokering a 2009 gas agreement with Putin that Yanukovich claims introduced onerous prices.
She denies wrong-doing and says she is the victim of a political attack.
Officials in Kiev have yet to deliver on market-oriented energy reforms that Brussels has said are necessary for loans and financial support.
The International Monetary fund has held up disbursements on a $15.6 bn loan programme, because of Ukraine’s failure to raise domestic gas prices.
Kiev officials say they are working hard to swiftly unbundle state gas behemoth Naftogaz, boost market transparency and competition.
But they are in the near-term desperate for some minimal support from Brussels in their tough negotiations with Moscow.
They are also starting to complain that EU countries are unfairly joining Moscow – and going against Ukraine’s interests – by unilaterally supporting the South Stream project.
Earlier this month, Ukrainian officials revealed that they had appealed to the director of European Energy Community to protest over Slovenia’s decision to unilaterally join other countries in the region supporting Russia’s South Stream, which Moscow’s critics see as a “political” rather than economic project.
Both Kiev and Slovenia are members of the European Energy Community, a EU-backed cooperation agreement.
Such unilateral decisions have frustrated Ukraine, which considers South Stream a threat to its and Europe’s interests by further strengthening Russia’s grip over the region’s energy supply.
“When Ukraine joined the Energy Community, we expected that the EU will support us as a member and take into consideration our interest,” Volodymyr Makukha, Ukraine’s deputy energy minister told the Financial Times.
“Separate country members of the Energy Community, such as Serbia, are in talk with Russia’s Gazprom, making agreements and opening up their gas storage facilities to become a central part of South Stream.”
Confused by silence on matter from the EU, which officially opposes South Stream, Makukha added: “The energy security of Ukraine is a step towards Europe’s energy security.”
But having irritated the EU so many times, Yanukovich is struggling to win friends in Brussels just when he may need them more than ever.
Putin has often shown his annoyance with Kiev in general – and Yanukovich in particular.
Once he is back in the Kremlin and again in direct charge of Russian foreign policy, he is more than likely to tighten the screws on Kiev.
He knows that the EU has bigger problems on its plate than Ukraine and Washington is increasingly focused on its own presidential election.
“Ukraine will face increasing pressure from the side of the Russian Federation,” predicted Ostap Semerak, a Ukrainian lawmaker allied with Tymoshenko.
“Yanukovich is increasingly becoming isolated with respect to relations with the EU. Clearly, Yanukovich will be in a weak position in talks [with Putin].”
Safely back in the presidency, Putin has the upper hand and no reason to “rush” into striking deal with Ukraine, according to Ukrainian energy analyst Yuriy Korolchuk.
After all, Kiev is already paying a lot for its gas.
In a nutshell, time, money and power is on Putin’s side.
Yanukovich has his work cut out.
Saturday, 3 March 2012
Paid-for parking possible – Moscow mayor
Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin has announced in an interview with Komsomsolskaya Pravda that the city could see paid-for parking make a return in an experimental form.
“This year, a fee for parking is not likely to be introduced. And if it will be, it will be in an experimental mode. The task for this year – is to introduce some order with car parking. At present they are parked in rows of two and three. And right under no parking signs, anywhere,” said the mayor. “So this will be the year when the first steps are made to restore order to car parking.”
“This year, a fee for parking is not likely to be introduced. And if it will be, it will be in an experimental mode. The task for this year – is to introduce some order with car parking. At present they are parked in rows of two and three. And right under no parking signs, anywhere,” said the mayor. “So this will be the year when the first steps are made to restore order to car parking.”
Ukraine receives Putin alleged plotter extradition request
Ukraine’s General Prosecutors Office has acknowledged receiving Russia’s extradition request for alleged conspirator in the Putin assassination plan, Adam Osmayev.
“At present, Ukraine's Prosecutor General's Office has authorized the Odessa prosecutor to conduct the extradition review,” RIA Novosti quoted Yury Boichenko, head of the press office for Ukraine’s General Prosecutors Office, as saying.
“At present, Ukraine's Prosecutor General's Office has authorized the Odessa prosecutor to conduct the extradition review,” RIA Novosti quoted Yury Boichenko, head of the press office for Ukraine’s General Prosecutors Office, as saying.
Protesting Moscow
Moscow will see mass protests both for and against the authorities staged over the upcoming days. All the possible rallying points immediately next to the Kremlin have been given to pro-Kremlin youth groups, who will man their stations starting late on Sunday, March 4.
The opposition, meanwhile, will meet the following evening a little further from the Kremlin on Pushkin Square, while Eduard Limonov promises to rally his supporters outside the Central Election Committee building.
On March 4, Moscow will see night-time rallies, something that has not happened in Russia since early 90s. Pro-Putin Duma deputies will gather on Ploshchad Revolutsii at 9 pm on Sunday, and with Nashi on the neighboring Manezh Square, all of the very center of the city will be occupied.
In total, City Hall has given permission for 13 rallies on March 4, all of them to pro-Kremlin youth groups and all for the same time – 3-11 pm.
On March 5, the same groups have permission for rallies in the same areas.
Tverskaya Ulitsa may be blocked depending on the situation, the police have said that if there are a lot of people, they will close at least one lane, or maybe even all of it.
Law enforcement officials were given orders to strictly prevent any violations from protesters, Kommersant reported. Any attempts to put tents up will be prevented, police said.
Since March 1, all Moscow police are on alert until further notice. Moscow police will get reinforcements from Tula and Moscow regions. There are also rumors about a special forces “Chechen regiment,” being brought in, which are vehemently denied by Ramzan Kadyrov.
Pro-Kremlin youth will take-over Moscow
Pro-Kremlin protests were allowed on all the squares that the opposition applied for, Vedomosti reported. Nashi said they will not only to cheer for Putin, but also not to allow the opposition to use the areas.
“They will start a fight on Sunday night. They will do what was done after the Duma elections on Triumfalnaya. But if they want to take over the squares, they will not succeed – the squares will already be taken,” Nashi senior member Andrei Osipov told Izvestia.
“Every second blog from them is close to calling for a coup d’état. They even write that they will carjack snow ploughs that will break into the center,” he said.
Vladimir Putin could attend a rally on Manezhnaya
President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin could make an appearance on Manezh Square, the media has reported.
Dmitry Peskov, Putin’s spokesman, said that it was not clear whether Putin would appear, however.
The opposition, meanwhile, will meet the following evening a little further from the Kremlin on Pushkin Square, while Eduard Limonov promises to rally his supporters outside the Central Election Committee building.
On March 4, Moscow will see night-time rallies, something that has not happened in Russia since early 90s. Pro-Putin Duma deputies will gather on Ploshchad Revolutsii at 9 pm on Sunday, and with Nashi on the neighboring Manezh Square, all of the very center of the city will be occupied.
In total, City Hall has given permission for 13 rallies on March 4, all of them to pro-Kremlin youth groups and all for the same time – 3-11 pm.
On March 5, the same groups have permission for rallies in the same areas.
Tverskaya Ulitsa may be blocked depending on the situation, the police have said that if there are a lot of people, they will close at least one lane, or maybe even all of it.
Law enforcement officials were given orders to strictly prevent any violations from protesters, Kommersant reported. Any attempts to put tents up will be prevented, police said.
Since March 1, all Moscow police are on alert until further notice. Moscow police will get reinforcements from Tula and Moscow regions. There are also rumors about a special forces “Chechen regiment,” being brought in, which are vehemently denied by Ramzan Kadyrov.
Pro-Kremlin youth will take-over Moscow
Pro-Kremlin protests were allowed on all the squares that the opposition applied for, Vedomosti reported. Nashi said they will not only to cheer for Putin, but also not to allow the opposition to use the areas.
“They will start a fight on Sunday night. They will do what was done after the Duma elections on Triumfalnaya. But if they want to take over the squares, they will not succeed – the squares will already be taken,” Nashi senior member Andrei Osipov told Izvestia.
“Every second blog from them is close to calling for a coup d’état. They even write that they will carjack snow ploughs that will break into the center,” he said.
Vladimir Putin could attend a rally on Manezhnaya
President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin could make an appearance on Manezh Square, the media has reported.
Dmitry Peskov, Putin’s spokesman, said that it was not clear whether Putin would appear, however.
Putin Billboards Appear On Streets Of Ukrainian City
KIEV, Ukraine -- Billboards bearing a picture of Russian Prime Minister and presidential candidate Vladimir Putin have appeared on the streets of the southern Ukrainian city of Zaporozhye, the Unian news agency reported on Wednesday.
Twenty posters with the inscription “Stable Russia - Stable Ukraine” appeared in the run up to presidential elections in Russia slated for March 4.
The billboards were made upon order and paid for by Ukraine’s Slavyanskaya Gvardiya (Slavic Guard) youth movement.
Volodymyr Rohov, the head of the movement, said the move was a reaction to the events in Russia, where thousands of people have been recently protesting against Putin’s rule demanding fair elections.
“We are not urging a vote for Putin, although Russia became a strong country once again with his arrival [as president]. We are expressing our opposition to instability in Russia and Ukraine,” he said.
Rohov said that the recent events in Russia were an attempt to stage another ‘color revolution’ that “will result in nothing but instability in Russia and consequently in Ukraine, which is tied to Russia in many ways besides the economy, more so than with other countries.”
Prime Minister Putin goes to the polls next Sunday as one of five candidates for the presidency in Russia.
The winner will serve a six-year term.
Twenty posters with the inscription “Stable Russia - Stable Ukraine” appeared in the run up to presidential elections in Russia slated for March 4.
The billboards were made upon order and paid for by Ukraine’s Slavyanskaya Gvardiya (Slavic Guard) youth movement.
Volodymyr Rohov, the head of the movement, said the move was a reaction to the events in Russia, where thousands of people have been recently protesting against Putin’s rule demanding fair elections.
“We are not urging a vote for Putin, although Russia became a strong country once again with his arrival [as president]. We are expressing our opposition to instability in Russia and Ukraine,” he said.
Rohov said that the recent events in Russia were an attempt to stage another ‘color revolution’ that “will result in nothing but instability in Russia and consequently in Ukraine, which is tied to Russia in many ways besides the economy, more so than with other countries.”
Prime Minister Putin goes to the polls next Sunday as one of five candidates for the presidency in Russia.
The winner will serve a six-year term.
Saturday, 25 February 2012
Gazprom wants to end gas transit via Ukraine
Russian gas giant Gazprom said on Feb. 22 it would aim to completely stop gas transit via Ukraine when it builds new pipelines later this decade as tensions between the two countries over gas prices and transit escalated.
Gazprom blamed Ukraine for shortages reported by its customers in Europe at the peak of a cold spell this month.
“Significant volumes of gas transhipped through Ukraine failed to reach Europe,” Gazprom Chief Executive Alexei Miller said at a meeting with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, according to Medvedev’s office.
“On certain days, up to 40 million cubic meters of gas was kept in Ukraine and this, without doubt, incurred both financial and reputational losses on Gazprom.”
Ukrainian state energy company Naftogaz denied that. “Since the beginning of 2012, Naftogaz has not taken a single cubic metre of gas from the volumes that were shipped by Gazprom to Europe,” it said in a statement.
But citing worries over the security of transit, Medvedev ordered Gazprom to maximise the capacity of the planned South Stream pipeline across the Black Sea which will bypass Ukraine.
Gazprom plans to launch South Stream in 2015 with a capacity of 63 billion cubic metres (bcm) a year.
Coupled with Nord Stream, a pipeline through the Baltic Sea that Gazprom launched last year with plans to eventually double its capacity to 55 bcm a year, South Stream could allow Gazprom to drop Ukraine as a transit nation.
Russia shipped 104 bcm of gas through Ukrainian pipelines last year.
Moscow has accused Kyiv of siphoning gas bound for Europe in the past, most recently in early 2009, when the two ex-Soviet nations were locked in a bitter dispute over supply prices which briefly disrupted supplies to Europe.
Ukraine is also unhappy with the price of Russian gas it imports and has sought to renegotiate the price for over a year but the talks appear to have stalled.
This month, Russia said it had offered Ukraine a new gas deal, which according to media reports provides for a 10-percent price discount.
But Kyiv, which sees a fair price at $250 per thousand cubic meters, down from $416 it currently pays, has not commented on the offer.
Gazprom blamed Ukraine for shortages reported by its customers in Europe at the peak of a cold spell this month.
“Significant volumes of gas transhipped through Ukraine failed to reach Europe,” Gazprom Chief Executive Alexei Miller said at a meeting with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, according to Medvedev’s office.
“On certain days, up to 40 million cubic meters of gas was kept in Ukraine and this, without doubt, incurred both financial and reputational losses on Gazprom.”
Ukrainian state energy company Naftogaz denied that. “Since the beginning of 2012, Naftogaz has not taken a single cubic metre of gas from the volumes that were shipped by Gazprom to Europe,” it said in a statement.
But citing worries over the security of transit, Medvedev ordered Gazprom to maximise the capacity of the planned South Stream pipeline across the Black Sea which will bypass Ukraine.
Gazprom plans to launch South Stream in 2015 with a capacity of 63 billion cubic metres (bcm) a year.
Coupled with Nord Stream, a pipeline through the Baltic Sea that Gazprom launched last year with plans to eventually double its capacity to 55 bcm a year, South Stream could allow Gazprom to drop Ukraine as a transit nation.
Russia shipped 104 bcm of gas through Ukrainian pipelines last year.
Moscow has accused Kyiv of siphoning gas bound for Europe in the past, most recently in early 2009, when the two ex-Soviet nations were locked in a bitter dispute over supply prices which briefly disrupted supplies to Europe.
Ukraine is also unhappy with the price of Russian gas it imports and has sought to renegotiate the price for over a year but the talks appear to have stalled.
This month, Russia said it had offered Ukraine a new gas deal, which according to media reports provides for a 10-percent price discount.
But Kyiv, which sees a fair price at $250 per thousand cubic meters, down from $416 it currently pays, has not commented on the offer.
Saturday, 18 February 2012
Moscow ranks 37th best student city – study
Quacquarelli Symonds has released its annual QS Best Student Cities in the World rankings. The study has two requirements for city’s to be included in the rankings, a minimum population of 250,000 and at least two ranked institutions. Five categories were used to rate the cities: university rankings, student mix, quality of living, employer activity and affordability. According to the ranking, Moscow came in at 37th place one step behind Amsterdam but ahead one place of Brussels. Paris took first place.
Audit Chamber head says Putin’s proposed privatization fee is doable
The head of the Audit Chamber, Sergei Stepashin, says he knows how to calculate what the so-called oligarchs still owe the state after the controversial and murky privatization of the 1990s.
Last week at a meeting with the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, Prime Minster Vladimir Putin called the privatizations’ results “unfair.”
“Of course, this page must be turned. We must end this period, there are different options being offered, of course, we must discuss it with experts. But it must be done in such a way that society will accept the closing of this problem from the 1990s, of the, let’s just say it, unfair privatization,”
Putin proposed a one-off payment to compensate for their dubious gains, in a proposal that resembled Britain’s 1997 Windfall Tax.
“It must be either a one-time fee, or something else. We must think about it together. I think in the first place, society in general and entrepreneurs are interested in this.”
Stepashin said in an interview said today that while difficult, it would not be impossible to determine who owes what.
“In principle, one can calculate the difference in the price of those assets – from what they were purchased in the ’90s and what they were actually worth. But I must warn you, to do it will be difficult. If there is a need, we can solve the issue through legal procedures, bring in independent financial supervisors, including the Audit Chamber.”
“I recall that in 2003, the Audit Chamber finished its study of Russia’s privatizations in the 1990s,” Stepashin said. “Analyzing the results of the privatizations, we openly and honestly said that it ‘was conducted the worst possible way out of all European countries.’ This I quote verbatim from a member of the expert group, which worked together with the Audit Chamber, the Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz, an American professor. He is impartial, he grew up in a market economy. In not one country in the world, including Eastern European countries – Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, I am already not taking into account China, Vietnam -- was this kind of privatization carried out.”
Last week at a meeting with the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, Prime Minster Vladimir Putin called the privatizations’ results “unfair.”
“Of course, this page must be turned. We must end this period, there are different options being offered, of course, we must discuss it with experts. But it must be done in such a way that society will accept the closing of this problem from the 1990s, of the, let’s just say it, unfair privatization,”
Putin proposed a one-off payment to compensate for their dubious gains, in a proposal that resembled Britain’s 1997 Windfall Tax.
“It must be either a one-time fee, or something else. We must think about it together. I think in the first place, society in general and entrepreneurs are interested in this.”
Stepashin said in an interview said today that while difficult, it would not be impossible to determine who owes what.
“In principle, one can calculate the difference in the price of those assets – from what they were purchased in the ’90s and what they were actually worth. But I must warn you, to do it will be difficult. If there is a need, we can solve the issue through legal procedures, bring in independent financial supervisors, including the Audit Chamber.”
“I recall that in 2003, the Audit Chamber finished its study of Russia’s privatizations in the 1990s,” Stepashin said. “Analyzing the results of the privatizations, we openly and honestly said that it ‘was conducted the worst possible way out of all European countries.’ This I quote verbatim from a member of the expert group, which worked together with the Audit Chamber, the Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz, an American professor. He is impartial, he grew up in a market economy. In not one country in the world, including Eastern European countries – Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, I am already not taking into account China, Vietnam -- was this kind of privatization carried out.”
Putin’s social projects to cost $170 billion - research
A range of social spending pledges outlined by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in a newspaper article earlier this week could cost the Russian budget 5.1 trillion rubles ($170 billion) over the next six years, the Sberbank Center of Macroeconomic Research has found.
The research note published this week analyses the cost to the government of projects to increase public sector pay, raise social benefit payments and reduce the cost of housing.
All were policies laid out in an election campaign article by Putin, the leading presidential candidate, in an article published in Kommsomolskay Pravda Monday.
The research found that spending on the specific pledges in Monday’s article would constitute an annual average of 0.84 percent of GDP annually. The figure could be higher if added to other social spending projects proposed by the government.
The Sberbank figure also does not include some of the vaguer policies pitched by Putin in the article that were too difficult to quantify in financial terms, such as those to bridge social divides and lowering alcohol consumption.
“Unfortunately, a lack of detailed statistical data and detail in the measures outlined in the article, doesn’t allow us to accurately calculate the volume of spending required for their realization,” the report said.
The most expensive pledge, the research center found, was a promise to raise the pay of doctors, school teachers and university lecturers, which will cost 3.5 trillion rubles ($117 billion) over six years.
In his article, Putin put the price tag on the pay increases at around $30 billion, or 1.5 percent of GDP.
Many economists and political analysts described Putin’s article as populist and questioned how realistic the proposals were in the current economic uncertainty.
“There is a lot of discussion now about how to balance the budget given all these obligations,” Citibank strategist Andrei Kuznetsov told The Moscow News. “Now the government is discussing either which areas of spending to cut or which areas of taxation to increase.”
He said that increasing social taxes – currently the government’s preferred policy – would only raise a limited amount of funds because previous attempts have only led to a growth in the shadow economy.
Currently the government is also discussing cuts to military and defense spending, a policy popular with former Russian finance minister, Alexei Kudrin, who quit the government last fall over a dispute about spending policies.
Alexei Devyatov, chief economist at the Uralsib investment bank, said that a more effective way to create funds for increased social spending would be to increase budge spending efficiency by clamping down on corruption.
“Medvedev said in late 2010 that his estimate of corruption in the state procurement system was about 1 trillion rubles [$33 billion] per year,” Devyatov told The Moscow News “It think the real figure is more than that, but even at this level, over the next five years, it would be enough to finance social spending.”
The research note published this week analyses the cost to the government of projects to increase public sector pay, raise social benefit payments and reduce the cost of housing.
All were policies laid out in an election campaign article by Putin, the leading presidential candidate, in an article published in Kommsomolskay Pravda Monday.
The research found that spending on the specific pledges in Monday’s article would constitute an annual average of 0.84 percent of GDP annually. The figure could be higher if added to other social spending projects proposed by the government.
The Sberbank figure also does not include some of the vaguer policies pitched by Putin in the article that were too difficult to quantify in financial terms, such as those to bridge social divides and lowering alcohol consumption.
“Unfortunately, a lack of detailed statistical data and detail in the measures outlined in the article, doesn’t allow us to accurately calculate the volume of spending required for their realization,” the report said.
The most expensive pledge, the research center found, was a promise to raise the pay of doctors, school teachers and university lecturers, which will cost 3.5 trillion rubles ($117 billion) over six years.
In his article, Putin put the price tag on the pay increases at around $30 billion, or 1.5 percent of GDP.
Many economists and political analysts described Putin’s article as populist and questioned how realistic the proposals were in the current economic uncertainty.
“There is a lot of discussion now about how to balance the budget given all these obligations,” Citibank strategist Andrei Kuznetsov told The Moscow News. “Now the government is discussing either which areas of spending to cut or which areas of taxation to increase.”
He said that increasing social taxes – currently the government’s preferred policy – would only raise a limited amount of funds because previous attempts have only led to a growth in the shadow economy.
Currently the government is also discussing cuts to military and defense spending, a policy popular with former Russian finance minister, Alexei Kudrin, who quit the government last fall over a dispute about spending policies.
Alexei Devyatov, chief economist at the Uralsib investment bank, said that a more effective way to create funds for increased social spending would be to increase budge spending efficiency by clamping down on corruption.
“Medvedev said in late 2010 that his estimate of corruption in the state procurement system was about 1 trillion rubles [$33 billion] per year,” Devyatov told The Moscow News “It think the real figure is more than that, but even at this level, over the next five years, it would be enough to finance social spending.”
Russia’s ‘Snow Revolution’ Protesters Must Avoid Ukraine’s Mistakes
MOSCOW, Russia -- Vladimir Putin’s regime is warning Russians that their budding “Snow Revolution” will be as big a mistake as Ukraine’s Orange Revolution of 2004.
But, while the similarities between these two popular movements are palpable, their differences are essential, so comparing them might help the Russian opposition to avoid some mistakes.
Like the Snow Revolution, the Orange Revolution was a broad middle-class reaction against corruption and the absence of the rule of law.
In contrast to the Arab Spring, the Orange Revolution was entirely peaceful, as the Snow Revolution has been, and neither was triggered by economic or social crisis.
But there are also significant differences.
Ukraine has a big ethnic divide between Russian speakers and Ukrainian speakers.
The Ukrainian opposition was well entrenched in the parliament and media, rendering it part of the system.
The outstanding achievement of the Orange Revolution was political and civil freedom.
But its ultimate flaw was a nearly complete political stalemate, which led to even worse corruption and authoritarianism.
Having been in Ukraine during and after the Orange Revolution, and having just spent time in Moscow, some pitfalls facing the Snow Revolution seem evident to me.
The Orange Revolution was peaceful because a sufficiently large number of people took to the streets.
The Russian opposition has already absorbed that insight, minimizing the risk of violence.
But it might have been a mistake in 2004 to occupy central Kiev and pursue persistent demonstrations that forced a quick resolution of the crisis, because it prompted a flawed compromise with the old regime.
The sudden relief caused dangerous euphoria and hubris among the Orange revolutionaries.
For this reason, the Russian opposition is probably being sensible by holding large demonstrations from time to time, showing the regime its strength but not forcing an instant solution.
Indeed, the sudden resolution of the Orange Revolution led to the adoption of a dysfunctional constitution with a confusing and unwieldy division of powers.
It looked like a trap set by the old regime’s operators.
There is no reason for anybody to repeat such a mistake.
A constitution requires serious consideration.
The old regime’s adherents can more easily trick the newcomers into dangerous compromises if the process is exceedingly fast.
The other major shortcoming was that the leader of the Orange Revolution, Viktor Yushchenko, turned out to be a feckless and irresponsible president.
Initially, he traveled the world for months to celebrate his victory, ignoring the chaos back home.
Then he began vetoing virtually all decisions by the government, causing a political stalemate, and, toward the end of his presidency, tacitly joined with the old guard (now back in power) against then-Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko – whose party, to its credit, had voted against the Constitution.
But, while Yushchenko serves as a warning to Russians not to elect an accidental president with excessive powers, an underlying cause of the Orange government’s breakdown was that most of its ministers (Yushchenko appointees) were defectors from the old regime.
Most had never opposed its corruption, and the prominent businessmen who funded the Orange Revolution expected to profit handsomely from their political investments.
As a result, there was no cleansing of the old cadres, and corruption declined only temporarily.
By contrast Georgia’s Rose Revolution of 2003 carried out a wholesale change of senior officials, bringing in young and well-educated leaders with Western educations.
Russia needs to follow the example set by Georgia – and Estonia – by promoting a new generation of young, skilled and untainted professionals.
The Orange Revolution’s greatest policy mistake was its early focus on “re-privatization” – the renationalization and resale of enterprises that had been privatized at exceedingly low prices.
The Orange government spent its first half-year discussing which enterprises should be re-privatized and how.
Meanwhile production slowed every month, as uncertainty about property rights scared businessmen.
In the end, only one big metallurgical enterprise, Krivoryzhstal, was re-privatized; by then, the Orange coalition had already fallen apart.
For Russian politicians, reprivatization is a great political temptation.
Indeed, all three opposition parties in the Duma call for far-reaching re-nationalization, though it would be politically and economically devastating.
Instead, a new democratic government could call for higher property taxation and prosecution of corrupt officials.
In comparison with Ukraine, Russia has quite decent legislation, and its economic courts enjoy some respect.
The ultimate reason to expect a more successful democratic breakthrough in Russia today than in Ukraine in 2004 is that Russia is so much richer and more developed than Ukraine, with per capita GDP (at current exchange rates) four times higher.
As modernization theorists like Seymour Martin Lipset and Samuel Huntington would have noted, Russia is simply too wealthy, well-educated and open to be so authoritarian.
According to the non-governmental organization Freedom House, only seven small oil-exporting states and Singapore are wealthier than Russia and still authoritarian.
Russia should draw four major lessons from the Orange Revolution as its own Snow Revolution proceeds.
First, the new democrats must avoid being tricked into a dysfunctional compromise with the old regime.
Second, leaders are critical to a sustainable democratic breakthrough, and this choice will be as vital as it is difficult.
Third, Russia needs a cleansing of corrupt officials, and it should draw from its wealth of young and well-trained talent.
Finally, reprivatization is a poison pill that must be avoided.
The Orange Revolution was no mistake, but a just cause is no guarantee of victory.
Russia’s Snow revolutionaries must make sure that the good fight is also a smart fight.
But, while the similarities between these two popular movements are palpable, their differences are essential, so comparing them might help the Russian opposition to avoid some mistakes.
Like the Snow Revolution, the Orange Revolution was a broad middle-class reaction against corruption and the absence of the rule of law.
In contrast to the Arab Spring, the Orange Revolution was entirely peaceful, as the Snow Revolution has been, and neither was triggered by economic or social crisis.
But there are also significant differences.
Ukraine has a big ethnic divide between Russian speakers and Ukrainian speakers.
The Ukrainian opposition was well entrenched in the parliament and media, rendering it part of the system.
The outstanding achievement of the Orange Revolution was political and civil freedom.
But its ultimate flaw was a nearly complete political stalemate, which led to even worse corruption and authoritarianism.
Having been in Ukraine during and after the Orange Revolution, and having just spent time in Moscow, some pitfalls facing the Snow Revolution seem evident to me.
The Orange Revolution was peaceful because a sufficiently large number of people took to the streets.
The Russian opposition has already absorbed that insight, minimizing the risk of violence.
But it might have been a mistake in 2004 to occupy central Kiev and pursue persistent demonstrations that forced a quick resolution of the crisis, because it prompted a flawed compromise with the old regime.
The sudden relief caused dangerous euphoria and hubris among the Orange revolutionaries.
For this reason, the Russian opposition is probably being sensible by holding large demonstrations from time to time, showing the regime its strength but not forcing an instant solution.
Indeed, the sudden resolution of the Orange Revolution led to the adoption of a dysfunctional constitution with a confusing and unwieldy division of powers.
It looked like a trap set by the old regime’s operators.
There is no reason for anybody to repeat such a mistake.
A constitution requires serious consideration.
The old regime’s adherents can more easily trick the newcomers into dangerous compromises if the process is exceedingly fast.
The other major shortcoming was that the leader of the Orange Revolution, Viktor Yushchenko, turned out to be a feckless and irresponsible president.
Initially, he traveled the world for months to celebrate his victory, ignoring the chaos back home.
Then he began vetoing virtually all decisions by the government, causing a political stalemate, and, toward the end of his presidency, tacitly joined with the old guard (now back in power) against then-Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko – whose party, to its credit, had voted against the Constitution.
But, while Yushchenko serves as a warning to Russians not to elect an accidental president with excessive powers, an underlying cause of the Orange government’s breakdown was that most of its ministers (Yushchenko appointees) were defectors from the old regime.
Most had never opposed its corruption, and the prominent businessmen who funded the Orange Revolution expected to profit handsomely from their political investments.
As a result, there was no cleansing of the old cadres, and corruption declined only temporarily.
By contrast Georgia’s Rose Revolution of 2003 carried out a wholesale change of senior officials, bringing in young and well-educated leaders with Western educations.
Russia needs to follow the example set by Georgia – and Estonia – by promoting a new generation of young, skilled and untainted professionals.
The Orange Revolution’s greatest policy mistake was its early focus on “re-privatization” – the renationalization and resale of enterprises that had been privatized at exceedingly low prices.
The Orange government spent its first half-year discussing which enterprises should be re-privatized and how.
Meanwhile production slowed every month, as uncertainty about property rights scared businessmen.
In the end, only one big metallurgical enterprise, Krivoryzhstal, was re-privatized; by then, the Orange coalition had already fallen apart.
For Russian politicians, reprivatization is a great political temptation.
Indeed, all three opposition parties in the Duma call for far-reaching re-nationalization, though it would be politically and economically devastating.
Instead, a new democratic government could call for higher property taxation and prosecution of corrupt officials.
In comparison with Ukraine, Russia has quite decent legislation, and its economic courts enjoy some respect.
The ultimate reason to expect a more successful democratic breakthrough in Russia today than in Ukraine in 2004 is that Russia is so much richer and more developed than Ukraine, with per capita GDP (at current exchange rates) four times higher.
As modernization theorists like Seymour Martin Lipset and Samuel Huntington would have noted, Russia is simply too wealthy, well-educated and open to be so authoritarian.
According to the non-governmental organization Freedom House, only seven small oil-exporting states and Singapore are wealthier than Russia and still authoritarian.
Russia should draw four major lessons from the Orange Revolution as its own Snow Revolution proceeds.
First, the new democrats must avoid being tricked into a dysfunctional compromise with the old regime.
Second, leaders are critical to a sustainable democratic breakthrough, and this choice will be as vital as it is difficult.
Third, Russia needs a cleansing of corrupt officials, and it should draw from its wealth of young and well-trained talent.
Finally, reprivatization is a poison pill that must be avoided.
The Orange Revolution was no mistake, but a just cause is no guarantee of victory.
Russia’s Snow revolutionaries must make sure that the good fight is also a smart fight.
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