In February 2007, then-President Vladimir Putin made a strongly-worded statement at the Munich Security Conference, where he outlined the basic problems existing between Russia and NATO at that time, and stated that in the modern world a unipolar security model is both unacceptable and impossible.
Has anything improved in Russia-NATO relationships since then? Nothing appears to have changed for the better. On the contrary, ties have worsened due to a number of miscalculations made by NATO leaders since the Munich conference two years ago.
Russia is now explicitly in favour of improving relations with NATO, especially after last month's inauguration of President Barack Obama - who has already beamed positive signals to Moscow with hints of action to follow. Yet the Kremlin is still pointing out that the process can take place only on a selective basis and in carefully calibrated stages.
While a potential resumption of dialogue might be implemented in areas where both sides share the same key interests - e.g. in combating terrorism and marine piracy, drug trafficking, preventing epidemics and the negative consequences of climate change - there are some areas where the Kremlin and NATO are still at loggerheads. Here, there are very few chances to find quick and reliable ways to avoid these problems or minimise their alarming impact.
The first outstanding issue is still the possibility to field a third U.S. Ballistic Missile Defence, or BMD, site in Eastern Europe and to link it with the respective NATO anti-missile system.
Obama's statement, that he would "make sure any missile defence, including the one proposed for Europe, has been proven to work and has our allies' support before we deploy it," has been welcomed by Moscow.
Yet Russian leaders claim that Washington has not yet started military and technical feasibility studies of the intended BMD facilities in Poland and the Czech Republic. Moscow also asserts that the United States and NATO have not reconsidered their April 2007 decision that their BMD assets should be bolted onto each other.
Russia is concerned that the proposed U.S. missile facilities in Europe, complemented and enhanced by a multifaceted NATO anti-ballistic missile shield, could constitute a grave threat to its supreme national security interests.
Secondly, six NATO countries still hold tactical nuclear weapons on the European continent under the U.S. and NATO "dual command": the United States and Britain, plus four de jure non-nuclear weapon states - Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey. This, by the way, is in violation of Articles 1 and 2 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
There are plans to extend a service lifespan of these bombs or to replace them after 2015 or even earlier by new "Reliably Replaced Warheads". There is a possibility that such weapons can appear on the territory of new NATO members in the form of a free-fall nuclear bombs on board nuclear-capable aircraft that are able to use air bases in Poland and the Baltic States. It is especially alarming that NATO has not abrogated its policy of the first use of nuclear weapons against Russia and its allies.
For its part, Russia does not have tactical nuclear weapons outside its territory - all were withdrawn from Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine in the early ‘90s, with many of them destroyed under Mikhail Gorbachev's unilateral initiatives. Washington and NATO many times rejected Moscow's offer to scrap such "battlefield" weapons of mass destruction.
Thirdly, there are several unresolved issues related to the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty: unlike Russia, the NATO signatories have not ratified the accord. Moreover, in recent years the Western signatories have exceeded limits in all five weapons categories by 26 per cent to 45 per cent. Unbelievably, some ex-Soviet bloc countries are still listed in the Eastern group, even though they became full NATO members - several years ago. For many years the term "substantial conventional forces" within the CFE accord was not defined due to NATO resistance, and this has allowed its forces to build up without any limits.
Fourthly, there is a real possibility that NATO again can be involved in intrastate conflicts in the post-Soviet space. By supplying offensive arms to Georgia prior to its invasion in South Ossetia last August, a number of NATO countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland, the United States, Turkey and some others) have created a dangerous precedent, when they offered substantial material and moral support to Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili to use excessive force mainly against South Ossetian civilians and Russian peacekeepers. Altogether, the 15 countries (many of whom are NATO members) that delivered modern weapons to Georgia worth $2.5 billion bear full responsibility for the conflict.
After the August war, NATO decided to rebuild Georgia's military capacity to a much greater extent than it had before - by doubling the value of its military aid.
Fifthly, NATO has not definitely closed the door to potential new members who acted as failed states in Eastern Europe. That, as Putin put it at NATO's Bucharest summit, constitutes "a direct threat" to Russia's security.
All these factors are taken very seriously by Russia. Can Russia accept the formula "business as usual" with NATO while they remain? No, surely, it can not. Until they vanish in the haze - for good.
Vladimir Kozin is a Moscow-based political analyst.
l these factors are taken very seriously by Russia. Can Russia accept the formula "business as usual"
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