MARIUPOL, Ukraine -- Even while speaking through a translator, Andrey is a man of few words. When asked why he defected from Russia to join a Ukrainian National Guard regiment, the 22-year-old Muscovite simply replied: “Common sense.”
After an assurance that his face would not be photographed or his last name used, Andrey opened up, explaining in more detail why it was such a logical decision to leave behind his life in Moscow to fight pro-Russian separatists—who, he claimed, his native country is both arming and sending troops to support.
Sitting at the cafeteria in the Azov Regiment’s camp in Mariupol only minutes before leaving for the front lines, Andrey talked about life in Russia under what he called the “Putin regime.”
Andrey described a repressive political environment in Moscow fueled by government-run propaganda and fear.
“Many young people in Russia who have common sense understand they have been deceived by Putin,” he said between sips of tea, casually leaning back in his chair with his Kalashnikov assault rifle propped against the table.
“I have a brain, but there are also many young people who have been brainwashed by the propaganda.”
“There are more of us,” he added.
“Putin is afraid of a Russian Maidan.”
Two brushes with the “Putin regime” and its repressive tactics ultimately spurred Andrey to leave Russia.
The first happened after he witnessed pro-reform protestors handing out flyers in the Moscow metro.
Even though he was just a passerby, Andrey said he was forcibly taken into custody and interrogated by a group of four men who never revealed for which agency they worked.
“They said they just wanted to have a talk,” he said.
The second instance was at a government-sanctioned peace march in Moscow, in which Andrey was participating to protest Russia’s involvement in the Ukraine conflict.
He said police began beating protestors without provocation.
“Their crime? They were just holding signs,” he said.
Fed up with life in Russia and with no substantial opposition party or movement to join, Andrey said he did “what any sensible man would do.”
He left Russia to fight for Ukraine as a member of the Ukrainian National Guard Azov Regiment.
The Ukraine war has drawn fighters from around the world.
Loose government oversight over civilian volunteer battalions opened a pathway for foreign fighters from countries including the United States, France, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Georgia, Poland, Spain, the Czech Republic, the United Kingdom, Croatia, Italy and Canada to join the ranks of pro-Ukrainian units with virtually no red tape.
There is even a Chechen volunteer battalion fighting for Ukraine named after Dzhokhar Dudayev, the Chechen rebel leader who led a war against Russia in the 1990s.
But recruitment rules were tightened after a push by Kiev to incorporate volunteer battalions into the National Guard, sending many foreign fighters home.
Although, according to an Azov Regiment spokesman, a new law has removed Ukrainian citizenship as a requirement for joining the National Guard.
Unlike the majority of foreign fighters in Ukraine for whom returning home is an option, Andrey said he will never go back to Russia.
“They will never forgive me,” he said.
“I will be persecuted.”
Andrey, however, wasn’t worried about Russian authorities retaliating against his family in Moscow.
In fact, with the exception of his grandmother, he said his family generally supported his decision to leave.
“My grandma went through the Stalin times and it’s difficult to convince her that Putin isn’t right,” he said.
“She watches Russian news and is terrified by what they tell her is going on in Ukraine. It’s all lies of course.”
Years of exposure to Russian propaganda also distorted Andrey’s perception of Ukraine before his arrival.
He wondered whether the country had truly been taken over by Nazis and far-right groups as Russian media reports had claimed, or if the Ukrainian war effort was actually a front for NATO expansionism as Russian media sites had also reported.
“Of course it’s all a lie,” he said.
“When I got here, I realized the situation was totally different.”
One of the key differences was the military training and firepower of the separatists.
“We are not fighting coal miners and tractor drivers, we are fighting trained professional soldiers,” he said, referring to Putin’s characterization of the separatists on Russian TV.
“And where do these so-called tractor drivers and coal miners buy grenade launchers?” he added.
“From a supermarket?”
Following the interview, Andrey left for the front lines near Shyrokyne, a small town about eight miles east of Mariupol.
His mission that day was to film evidence of separatists using heavy weapons in violation of the Feb. 12 cease-fire agreement.
He said he doesn’t get scared anymore before going to the front lines.
While at the front, amid the constant sounds of mortars, artillery and small arms, he appeared calm, displaying the muted reaction to danger common to soldiers who have spent much time in combat.
When separatists’ heavy weapons ignited a fire in a residential area, sending up plumes of smoke, he climbed to the roof of the house being used as the Azov Regiment’s combat outpost for a better vantage point from which to film the damage.
He leaned around a corner, exposing himself to potential sniper fire, and filmed.
Asked earlier what he was fighting for in Ukraine, Andrey succinctly replied:
“Justice.”
Responding to a follow-on question, he added:
“For Ukraine.”
Monday, 6 April 2015
Putin's Ukraine Gamble Has Largely Paid Off For The Kremlin
MOSCOW, Russia -- A year since the start of the fighting in eastern Ukraine, Vladimir Putin may not have emerged the winner in his showdown with the West but he has not lost either, analysts say.
By supporting Ukrainian separatists, they say, he took a huge risk but it largely paid off as it allowed him to punish Kiev's pro-Western authorities for seeking to turn their back on Russia and stand up to the West.
Most importantly for the Kremlin, the annexation of Crimea and support for fellow Russian speakers in Ukraine's east have given a huge boost to Putin's popularity ratings at home.
According to a February study from the Levada Centre independent polling group, the number of people who want Putin to seek a fourth term in 2018 has more than doubled to 57 percent since December 2013.
"What Putin wanted was clear a year ago -- he wanted a blocking stake in Ukraine or -- the next best option -- a manageable conflict," Nikolai Petrov, a professor at the Higher School of Economics, told AFP.
"To a large degree the Kremlin has achieved what it wanted."
Ukraine marks the first anniversary of the start of the conflict in a hugely demoralised state with its economy shattered and NATO membership a very distant, if not impossible, prospect.
"They managed to keep Ukraine out of NATO because it is struggling with two unresolved territorial disputes," Alexander Baunov, a senior associate at the Carnegie Moscow Center, told AFP.
If Putin gambled that the West would not move to burn all its bridges with Russia nor engage the former Cold War foe militarily, he was right.
While Washington has been vocal in its assertion that Moscow has been sending troops over the border to buttress Ukrainian separatists, it has held off on supplying Kiev with lethal weapons over fears of escalation.
Economy-wise, the US and European Union have forged a united front, slapping Russia with several rounds of sanctions, but decided against radical measures like cutting Moscow off from the SWIFT banking system.
Russia has withstood the blow, and the government recently declared that the worst was over for the recession-hit economy.
After a shock slump late last year, the Russian ruble has recently rebounded following a lull in fighting in Ukraine and the steadying of oil prices.
Economists have forecast stagnation over the next few years but naysayers predicting imminent financial collapse have been floored.
In a sign that Putin may be getting ready to break out of Western isolation, he is considering whether to travel to New York to speak at the 70th session of the UN General Assembly this fall, the Kremlin said.
It would be his first UN visit over the past 10 years.
Such a move would have appeared unimaginable several months ago when Putin appeared crushed under the weight of international condemnation when a Malaysia Airlines Boeing came down over rebel-held Ukraine, killing all 298 people on board.
The West and Kiev claim that Moscow-backed rebels shot the jet out of the skies by mistake, with a missile provided by Russia.
In a bid to counter raging accusations that he was personally guilty, an ashen-faced Putin recorded an unprecedented nighttime video address, urging the West and Kiev not to exploit the tragedy for political gains.
But as a shaky truce appears to be taking hold in Ukraine, Russia has apparently managed to put the worst of the fallout behind it.
That may explain Putin's jokey mood at the triumphant celebrations marking one year since the takeover of Crimea last month when he quipped that Russia "will overcome the difficulties that we have so easily created for ourselves."
'Putin will not back off'
To a large extent, Putin has been lucky, after rushing into the confrontation with the West without a well-thought-out plan, observers said.
"There was a set of tasks and Napoleon's famous maxim, 'On s'engage et puis on voit' (Let's jump into the fray and then figure out what to do next)," Konstantin Kalachev, head of the Political Expert Group think tank, said of the president's attitude.
Even if his tactics have often defied comprehension, Putin has made his message abundantly clear: the West should understand that a new, post-Soviet Russia is a force to be reckoned with.
"Putin will neither give up nor back off," Dmitry Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, wrote in a recent report.
"Moscow will continue to defy US global hegemony and act in its own self-interest, guided by its own set of values and without seeking prior US or EU approval."
The fighting has exacted a huge human toll. According to official statistics, more than 6,000 people have died in eastern Ukraine since last April, and human rights activists say scores of Russian troops sent over the border have also perished in the ex-Soviet country.
Ties between ordinary Russians and Ukrainians have also been torn apart, with observers saying years -- if not decades -- will be needed to heal the rift.
While the fighting has largely died down, an end to the Ukrainian crisis is nowhere in sight.
"The crisis is dragging on through inertia, which is dangerous," said Petrov of the Higher School of Economics.
"It has become a necessity to a large number of people."
By supporting Ukrainian separatists, they say, he took a huge risk but it largely paid off as it allowed him to punish Kiev's pro-Western authorities for seeking to turn their back on Russia and stand up to the West.
Most importantly for the Kremlin, the annexation of Crimea and support for fellow Russian speakers in Ukraine's east have given a huge boost to Putin's popularity ratings at home.
According to a February study from the Levada Centre independent polling group, the number of people who want Putin to seek a fourth term in 2018 has more than doubled to 57 percent since December 2013.
"What Putin wanted was clear a year ago -- he wanted a blocking stake in Ukraine or -- the next best option -- a manageable conflict," Nikolai Petrov, a professor at the Higher School of Economics, told AFP.
"To a large degree the Kremlin has achieved what it wanted."
Ukraine marks the first anniversary of the start of the conflict in a hugely demoralised state with its economy shattered and NATO membership a very distant, if not impossible, prospect.
"They managed to keep Ukraine out of NATO because it is struggling with two unresolved territorial disputes," Alexander Baunov, a senior associate at the Carnegie Moscow Center, told AFP.
If Putin gambled that the West would not move to burn all its bridges with Russia nor engage the former Cold War foe militarily, he was right.
While Washington has been vocal in its assertion that Moscow has been sending troops over the border to buttress Ukrainian separatists, it has held off on supplying Kiev with lethal weapons over fears of escalation.
Economy-wise, the US and European Union have forged a united front, slapping Russia with several rounds of sanctions, but decided against radical measures like cutting Moscow off from the SWIFT banking system.
Russia has withstood the blow, and the government recently declared that the worst was over for the recession-hit economy.
After a shock slump late last year, the Russian ruble has recently rebounded following a lull in fighting in Ukraine and the steadying of oil prices.
Economists have forecast stagnation over the next few years but naysayers predicting imminent financial collapse have been floored.
In a sign that Putin may be getting ready to break out of Western isolation, he is considering whether to travel to New York to speak at the 70th session of the UN General Assembly this fall, the Kremlin said.
It would be his first UN visit over the past 10 years.
Such a move would have appeared unimaginable several months ago when Putin appeared crushed under the weight of international condemnation when a Malaysia Airlines Boeing came down over rebel-held Ukraine, killing all 298 people on board.
The West and Kiev claim that Moscow-backed rebels shot the jet out of the skies by mistake, with a missile provided by Russia.
In a bid to counter raging accusations that he was personally guilty, an ashen-faced Putin recorded an unprecedented nighttime video address, urging the West and Kiev not to exploit the tragedy for political gains.
But as a shaky truce appears to be taking hold in Ukraine, Russia has apparently managed to put the worst of the fallout behind it.
That may explain Putin's jokey mood at the triumphant celebrations marking one year since the takeover of Crimea last month when he quipped that Russia "will overcome the difficulties that we have so easily created for ourselves."
'Putin will not back off'
To a large extent, Putin has been lucky, after rushing into the confrontation with the West without a well-thought-out plan, observers said.
"There was a set of tasks and Napoleon's famous maxim, 'On s'engage et puis on voit' (Let's jump into the fray and then figure out what to do next)," Konstantin Kalachev, head of the Political Expert Group think tank, said of the president's attitude.
Even if his tactics have often defied comprehension, Putin has made his message abundantly clear: the West should understand that a new, post-Soviet Russia is a force to be reckoned with.
"Putin will neither give up nor back off," Dmitry Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, wrote in a recent report.
"Moscow will continue to defy US global hegemony and act in its own self-interest, guided by its own set of values and without seeking prior US or EU approval."
The fighting has exacted a huge human toll. According to official statistics, more than 6,000 people have died in eastern Ukraine since last April, and human rights activists say scores of Russian troops sent over the border have also perished in the ex-Soviet country.
Ties between ordinary Russians and Ukrainians have also been torn apart, with observers saying years -- if not decades -- will be needed to heal the rift.
While the fighting has largely died down, an end to the Ukrainian crisis is nowhere in sight.
"The crisis is dragging on through inertia, which is dangerous," said Petrov of the Higher School of Economics.
"It has become a necessity to a large number of people."
Thursday, 19 March 2015
Why The U.S. Does Nothing In Ukraine
MOSCOW, Russia -- The ongoing war in Ukraine recently passed the first anniversary of the highly dubious referendum that split Crimea off from Ukraine and eventually saw it attached to Russia.
Over the course of the conflict that followed, over 6,000 people have died, large swathes of eastern Ukraine have been destroyed, and Russian support for separatists rendered insecure by the change of government in Kiev has gone from highly suspected to fairly open.
Reaction in Washington has been equally vitriolic with politicians and commentators pushing for President Obama either to escalate the challenge to Russia by providing greater amounts of military aid to Ukraine more quickly or to come to some sort of great power accommodation instead, effectively ceding a low-importance country in exchange for an end to the conflict to a much more resolved adversary.
Recent expert interviews conducted by my colleague Andrej Krickovic and I here in Moscow on Russian strategic interests, and insights derived from the bargaining theory of conflict, suggest that the current policy – doing little at the cost of watching the collateral damage rise – may best fulfill U.S. foreign policy interests by refusing to give Russia the fight it wants at the time and issue of the latter’s choosing.
For a recent paper, Krickovic and I interviewed a number of foreign policy experts here in Moscow to understand the extent of Russian strategic interests.
The interview subjects clearly indicated that the war in Ukraine is a symptom of greater dissatisfaction with the post-Cold War international order.
As Evgeny Lukyanov, the Deputy Secretary of Russia’s Security Council, has said, “We need to sit down [with the United States] and renegotiate the entire post-cold War settlement.”
The experts further stated that the potential loss of Ukraine directly threatens Russia’s ability to pursue Eurasian integration, which is central to the country’s larger strategic vision of developing a Eurasian bloc (through bolstering the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization) to resist the consequences of U.S. unipolarity and to compete in the multipolar world it expects to emerge.
In terms set out by our interviewees, Russia seeks a “grand bargain” that explicitly identifies the role of the United States in the international order and puts limits on U.S. behavior to make America more predictable in its behavior and to prevent it from overstepping its own authority.
Three tenets of this bargain that would assure Russian security include a collective security treaty binding Russia, the United States, and the leading European states; a supranational decision-making body (Security Council of Europe of NATO, the European Union, and CSTO) as previously proposed by Dmitry Medvedev that would end NATO dominance in Europe; and a “Monroe Doctrine” for the post-Soviet space that legitimizes a sphere of influence in the region.
These ideas follow along Vladimir Putin’s “collective leadership” offer at the latest Valdai meeting: a new world order based on competing hierarchies of states, mutual non-interference in spheres of interest, and coordinated responses to transnational problems of mutual interest, such as Islamist terrorism.
Eventually, all these institutional developments would lead to an “integration of integrations” so that a bigger EEU could associate with the European Union and other Western institutions as a full-fledged partner enjoying the same status as these powerful institutions.
These terms set out exactly why Russia is motivated to fight over the resolution of Ukraine now rather than later.
By Russia’s own bloc-oriented view of the future of international relations, the failure to “get” Ukraine means that the Eurasian bloc has roughly reached its apex (Kyrgyzstan will accede in May 2015 while other regional states are seemingly getting cold feet).
Facing a negative shift in future bargaining power means that it should fight now before it gets too weak in the future to mount a credible challenge to revise the international order later.
This very well explains what Russia is doing, but how can we explain Obama’s reluctance either to commit greater resources to the conflict or to cut bait and leave?
Why has Obama settled on a policy of seemingly strenuous inaction?
It is very likely that Obama can observe that Russia’s bloc-oriented strategy has led to the same apex, and that future decline by Russia’s own standards is approaching.
Thus, to accommodate Russia in this bargaining framework would not only involve upsetting European allies and the Ukrainians, but would give a lifeline to an adversary by ameliorating the decline.
Moreover, to challenge Russia over Ukraine would be to escalate a conflict that the United States is less able and less resolved to win with acceptable costs.
This places Obama in a different position relative to formulating strategy regarding a rising challenger like China that needs to be accommodated or challenged because the latter is dissatisfied with the international distribution of benefits.
Russia is instead a declining challenger (by its own standards) that offers the United States a third policy course of maintaining the status quo and waiting to negotiate later from a position of greater strength.
If Obama believes that Russia has internal structural contradictions (resource-dominated economy) and is externally at its peak, then he finds himself roughly in the same position as Dwight Eisenhower roughly 60 years ago: confident of prevailing in a long war or arms racing against an adversary with internal structural contradictions (command economy), but wary of entering into short-term conflicts close to Russia.
Just as Eisenhower failed to intervene in Hungary in 1956, Obama is failing to intervene decisively in Ukraine and giving Russia a fight at the latter’s time and place of choosing.
The policy of strenuous inaction of helping Ukraine to prevent collapse but insufficiently strongly to avoid challenging Russia runs the risk of allowing events on the ground to run away from the United States and opens up Obama to considerable domestic and international criticism, but it may leave the United States in a much stronger position vis-Ã -vis Russia later on – even at the cost of death and destruction in Ukraine and the precipitous decline of bilateral relations.
Over the course of the conflict that followed, over 6,000 people have died, large swathes of eastern Ukraine have been destroyed, and Russian support for separatists rendered insecure by the change of government in Kiev has gone from highly suspected to fairly open.
Reaction in Washington has been equally vitriolic with politicians and commentators pushing for President Obama either to escalate the challenge to Russia by providing greater amounts of military aid to Ukraine more quickly or to come to some sort of great power accommodation instead, effectively ceding a low-importance country in exchange for an end to the conflict to a much more resolved adversary.
Recent expert interviews conducted by my colleague Andrej Krickovic and I here in Moscow on Russian strategic interests, and insights derived from the bargaining theory of conflict, suggest that the current policy – doing little at the cost of watching the collateral damage rise – may best fulfill U.S. foreign policy interests by refusing to give Russia the fight it wants at the time and issue of the latter’s choosing.
For a recent paper, Krickovic and I interviewed a number of foreign policy experts here in Moscow to understand the extent of Russian strategic interests.
The interview subjects clearly indicated that the war in Ukraine is a symptom of greater dissatisfaction with the post-Cold War international order.
As Evgeny Lukyanov, the Deputy Secretary of Russia’s Security Council, has said, “We need to sit down [with the United States] and renegotiate the entire post-cold War settlement.”
The experts further stated that the potential loss of Ukraine directly threatens Russia’s ability to pursue Eurasian integration, which is central to the country’s larger strategic vision of developing a Eurasian bloc (through bolstering the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization) to resist the consequences of U.S. unipolarity and to compete in the multipolar world it expects to emerge.
In terms set out by our interviewees, Russia seeks a “grand bargain” that explicitly identifies the role of the United States in the international order and puts limits on U.S. behavior to make America more predictable in its behavior and to prevent it from overstepping its own authority.
Three tenets of this bargain that would assure Russian security include a collective security treaty binding Russia, the United States, and the leading European states; a supranational decision-making body (Security Council of Europe of NATO, the European Union, and CSTO) as previously proposed by Dmitry Medvedev that would end NATO dominance in Europe; and a “Monroe Doctrine” for the post-Soviet space that legitimizes a sphere of influence in the region.
These ideas follow along Vladimir Putin’s “collective leadership” offer at the latest Valdai meeting: a new world order based on competing hierarchies of states, mutual non-interference in spheres of interest, and coordinated responses to transnational problems of mutual interest, such as Islamist terrorism.
Eventually, all these institutional developments would lead to an “integration of integrations” so that a bigger EEU could associate with the European Union and other Western institutions as a full-fledged partner enjoying the same status as these powerful institutions.
These terms set out exactly why Russia is motivated to fight over the resolution of Ukraine now rather than later.
By Russia’s own bloc-oriented view of the future of international relations, the failure to “get” Ukraine means that the Eurasian bloc has roughly reached its apex (Kyrgyzstan will accede in May 2015 while other regional states are seemingly getting cold feet).
Facing a negative shift in future bargaining power means that it should fight now before it gets too weak in the future to mount a credible challenge to revise the international order later.
This very well explains what Russia is doing, but how can we explain Obama’s reluctance either to commit greater resources to the conflict or to cut bait and leave?
Why has Obama settled on a policy of seemingly strenuous inaction?
It is very likely that Obama can observe that Russia’s bloc-oriented strategy has led to the same apex, and that future decline by Russia’s own standards is approaching.
Thus, to accommodate Russia in this bargaining framework would not only involve upsetting European allies and the Ukrainians, but would give a lifeline to an adversary by ameliorating the decline.
Moreover, to challenge Russia over Ukraine would be to escalate a conflict that the United States is less able and less resolved to win with acceptable costs.
This places Obama in a different position relative to formulating strategy regarding a rising challenger like China that needs to be accommodated or challenged because the latter is dissatisfied with the international distribution of benefits.
Russia is instead a declining challenger (by its own standards) that offers the United States a third policy course of maintaining the status quo and waiting to negotiate later from a position of greater strength.
If Obama believes that Russia has internal structural contradictions (resource-dominated economy) and is externally at its peak, then he finds himself roughly in the same position as Dwight Eisenhower roughly 60 years ago: confident of prevailing in a long war or arms racing against an adversary with internal structural contradictions (command economy), but wary of entering into short-term conflicts close to Russia.
Just as Eisenhower failed to intervene in Hungary in 1956, Obama is failing to intervene decisively in Ukraine and giving Russia a fight at the latter’s time and place of choosing.
The policy of strenuous inaction of helping Ukraine to prevent collapse but insufficiently strongly to avoid challenging Russia runs the risk of allowing events on the ground to run away from the United States and opens up Obama to considerable domestic and international criticism, but it may leave the United States in a much stronger position vis-Ã -vis Russia later on – even at the cost of death and destruction in Ukraine and the precipitous decline of bilateral relations.
Ukraine Rebels Warn They Could Abandon Cease-Fire
KIEV, Ukraine -- Separatist leaders in eastern Ukraine threatened Wednesday to abandon a cease-fire following changes to a law granting their regions self-rule.
Alexander Zakharchenko and Igor Plotnitsky said in a statement that legislation giving areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions special status has been weakened by the amendments.
"We agreed to a special status for the Donbass within a renewed Ukraine, although our people wanted total independence. We agreed to this to avoid the spilling of fraternal blood," the statement said.
But Ukraine did not renew itself," it continued.
Rebels have pushed for revisions to the constitution to decentralize power, but argue that authority is still held by powerful businessmen.
A law on granting autonomy to eastern territories was approved by parliament Tuesday, but with a number of changes that have drawn sharp criticism from Moscow-backed rebels and Russia alike.
Foremost among the rebels' objections is a requirement for elections — to be held under Ukrainian laws — to take place before the special status can come into effect.
A Ukrainian foreign ministry spokesman said in an emailed statement that enacting the special status law without elections approved by Kiev would result in the legitimization of what Ukraine considers unlawful rebel governments.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said Ukraine's parliament had undertaken a wholesale rewriting of the agreement.
"What comes out of parliament's decree is that only when these territories are led by somebody suitable for Kiev will the law on special status come into effect," he said.
"That is an attempt to turn everything that was agreed upon on its head."
Ukraine has also drawn anger from separatists with its plans to seek deployment of United Nations and European Union peacekeeping missions in the east.
Parliament voted Tuesday to back a formal request for the mission.
Zakharchenko and Plotnitsky said placement of a peacekeeping contingent had not been agreed at cease-fire negotiations concluded between the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France last month in the Belarusian capital, Minsk.
"The manipulation of good intentions for coverage is another attempt to get out of the Minsk agreement," the rebel leaders' statement said.
A U.N. peacekeeping mission would likely need backing from all five permanent members of the Security Council, and Russia is almost certain to resist the move.
More than 6,000 people have been killed since fighting broke out last April.
Clashes have reduced substantially since a cease-fire was declared last month.
Alexander Zakharchenko and Igor Plotnitsky said in a statement that legislation giving areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions special status has been weakened by the amendments.
"We agreed to a special status for the Donbass within a renewed Ukraine, although our people wanted total independence. We agreed to this to avoid the spilling of fraternal blood," the statement said.
But Ukraine did not renew itself," it continued.
Rebels have pushed for revisions to the constitution to decentralize power, but argue that authority is still held by powerful businessmen.
A law on granting autonomy to eastern territories was approved by parliament Tuesday, but with a number of changes that have drawn sharp criticism from Moscow-backed rebels and Russia alike.
Foremost among the rebels' objections is a requirement for elections — to be held under Ukrainian laws — to take place before the special status can come into effect.
A Ukrainian foreign ministry spokesman said in an emailed statement that enacting the special status law without elections approved by Kiev would result in the legitimization of what Ukraine considers unlawful rebel governments.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said Ukraine's parliament had undertaken a wholesale rewriting of the agreement.
"What comes out of parliament's decree is that only when these territories are led by somebody suitable for Kiev will the law on special status come into effect," he said.
"That is an attempt to turn everything that was agreed upon on its head."
Ukraine has also drawn anger from separatists with its plans to seek deployment of United Nations and European Union peacekeeping missions in the east.
Parliament voted Tuesday to back a formal request for the mission.
Zakharchenko and Plotnitsky said placement of a peacekeeping contingent had not been agreed at cease-fire negotiations concluded between the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France last month in the Belarusian capital, Minsk.
"The manipulation of good intentions for coverage is another attempt to get out of the Minsk agreement," the rebel leaders' statement said.
A U.N. peacekeeping mission would likely need backing from all five permanent members of the Security Council, and Russia is almost certain to resist the move.
More than 6,000 people have been killed since fighting broke out last April.
Clashes have reduced substantially since a cease-fire was declared last month.
General: Russian Forces Tied Down In Ukraine — For Now
WASHINGTON, DC -- The Russian military isn’t capable of carrying out major interventions in the Baltic States or other neighboring countries while it’s tied down in Ukraine, according to the top U.S. Army general in Europe.
For the past year, Moscow has been sending forces and equipment into Ukraine to grab territory and support pro-Russia insurgents.
Thousands of Russian troops, tanks, heavy artillery and other weapons, have moved across the border and helped rebel forces inflict heavy casualties on the Ukrainian army.
In March 2014, Russia annexed Crimea.
The Kremlin is now pushing for political autonomy for the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, the strongholds of Moscow-backed insurgents.
Russia’s actions have stoked fears in neighboring countries worried that they too are in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s sights.
But the commander of U.S. Army Europe doesn’t believe Russia is about to launch a similar operation in other countries.
“This is not the Red Army of the ’80s,” Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges told reporters at a Tuesday breakfast in Washington.
Despite recent modernization efforts, “they do not have the capacity yet to do what they’re doing in Ukraine and up in the Baltics at the same time.
For the past year, Moscow has been sending forces and equipment into Ukraine to grab territory and support pro-Russia insurgents.
Thousands of Russian troops, tanks, heavy artillery and other weapons, have moved across the border and helped rebel forces inflict heavy casualties on the Ukrainian army.
In March 2014, Russia annexed Crimea.
The Kremlin is now pushing for political autonomy for the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, the strongholds of Moscow-backed insurgents.
Russia’s actions have stoked fears in neighboring countries worried that they too are in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s sights.
But the commander of U.S. Army Europe doesn’t believe Russia is about to launch a similar operation in other countries.
“This is not the Red Army of the ’80s,” Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges told reporters at a Tuesday breakfast in Washington.
Despite recent modernization efforts, “they do not have the capacity yet to do what they’re doing in Ukraine and up in the Baltics at the same time.
I think probably three or four years [from now] they will have the capacity.
But they don’t have the capacity to do that now, so I’m not worried about that sort of thing.”
But Hodges noted that people in the Baltics, many of whom lived under Russian domination during the Cold War, aren’t so confident.
“If you are from that region you’ll have a completely different view of the seriousness and the credibility of the threat than if you … live in north Florida, where I’m from,” he said.
To reassure jittery NATO allies in Eastern Europe, the U.S. military has been carrying out rotational deployments and training exercises in Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Poland.
The effort will expand to Bulgaria and Romania later this month.
The activities are part of Operation Atlantic Resolve, an ongoing assurance mission.
Commanders in Europe are in the process of deciding where to forward-station heavy weapons and equipment that rotating U.S. forces will use for training exercises with Eastern European allies.
The gear includes more than 1,000 vehicles, including 220 “fighting vehicles” such as tanks and armored personnel carriers, according to Hodges.
Much of the gear is being brought over by the Army’s 1st Armored Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, based at Fort Stewart, Ga.
But they don’t have the capacity to do that now, so I’m not worried about that sort of thing.”
But Hodges noted that people in the Baltics, many of whom lived under Russian domination during the Cold War, aren’t so confident.
“If you are from that region you’ll have a completely different view of the seriousness and the credibility of the threat than if you … live in north Florida, where I’m from,” he said.
To reassure jittery NATO allies in Eastern Europe, the U.S. military has been carrying out rotational deployments and training exercises in Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Poland.
The effort will expand to Bulgaria and Romania later this month.
The activities are part of Operation Atlantic Resolve, an ongoing assurance mission.
Commanders in Europe are in the process of deciding where to forward-station heavy weapons and equipment that rotating U.S. forces will use for training exercises with Eastern European allies.
The gear includes more than 1,000 vehicles, including 220 “fighting vehicles” such as tanks and armored personnel carriers, according to Hodges.
Much of the gear is being brought over by the Army’s 1st Armored Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, based at Fort Stewart, Ga.
About 3,000 troops from the unit are deploying to Eastern Europe for training exercises with Baltic and Polish forces.
When they depart in June, they’ll leave their heavy rolling stock behind in the European theater.
Three basing options are under consideration, according to Hodges.
One would be to keep them in Germany, where the U.S. military has a long-standing presence.
Hodges doesn’t see much value in storing them there.
“That’s a huge investment with really not much strategic effect. Nobody [in Eastern Europe] would even know they were there,” he said.
A second option, which Hodges favors, would be to forward base them in Eastern Europe.
Hodges believes there would be a much greater strategic payoff if they’re stationed on the territory of allies bordering Russia.
“Every single country … from Estonia down to Bulgaria wants it; in fact they all offered to host the entire thing,” Hodges said.
A third option would be a “hybrid” course, keeping a lot of the gear in Germany and the rest in Eastern Europe.
Hodges expects Air Force Gen. Philip Breedlove, the commander of U.S. European Command, to make a decision “in the next few weeks.”
When they depart in June, they’ll leave their heavy rolling stock behind in the European theater.
Three basing options are under consideration, according to Hodges.
One would be to keep them in Germany, where the U.S. military has a long-standing presence.
Hodges doesn’t see much value in storing them there.
“That’s a huge investment with really not much strategic effect. Nobody [in Eastern Europe] would even know they were there,” he said.
A second option, which Hodges favors, would be to forward base them in Eastern Europe.
Hodges believes there would be a much greater strategic payoff if they’re stationed on the territory of allies bordering Russia.
“Every single country … from Estonia down to Bulgaria wants it; in fact they all offered to host the entire thing,” Hodges said.
A third option would be a “hybrid” course, keeping a lot of the gear in Germany and the rest in Eastern Europe.
Hodges expects Air Force Gen. Philip Breedlove, the commander of U.S. European Command, to make a decision “in the next few weeks.”
If a decision is made to put them in Eastern Europe, Coleman Barracks in Mannheim, Germany, will be used as an “interim site” to store the equipment while infrastructure improvements are made in host countries.
Hodges said the additional heavy equipment will remain in Europe indefinitely, describing the activities surrounding Operation Atlantic Resolve as “the new normal.”
When it comes to Ukraine, the Obama administration is weighing whether to send weapons to Ukrainian government forces to help them fight the Russian-backed separatists.
During his confirmation hearing in February, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter suggested that he supports such a move.
Thus far, U.S. military support has been limited to nonlethal equipment, such as body armor, night-vision goggles, and radars.
Hodges noted that the Ukrainians are at a “disadvantage” in the face of Russian forces and equipment, but stopped short of calling for arming them.
The U.S. military has a plan to train Kiev’s forces.
The training of three Ukrainian national guard battalions by American soldiers was supposed to begin this month, but it was postponed as the U.S. waited to see whether last month’s ceasefire agreement would hold.
As the fighting continues, Hodges anticipates the training will go forward next month, although he hasn’t received orders to that effect.
U.S. Delays Ukraine Military Training, General Says
WASHINGTON, DC -- The Pentagon is delaying a training program for Ukrainian soldiers so as to avoid giving the Kremlin an excuse to scrap the tenuous peace deal struck last month between Kiev and Moscow-backed separatists, a top U.S. general said Tuesday.
Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, commander of U.S. Army in Europe, said U.S. officials wanted to make sure such training—which would involve U.S. military instructors deploying to western Ukraine—doesn’t “give the Russians an opportunity to say, ‘Look, the Americans are bringing in all these soldiers, they are not serious about it.’ ”
The general’s comments, at a breakfast with reporters in Washington, reflect a dilemma the West has faced in dealing with Russia’s yearlong push into Ukraine: how to force President Vladimir Putin to back down without provoking him to escalate the fight instead.
Worried that any overt military assistance to Ukraine’s embattled armed forces would push Moscow to retaliate, the White House has repeatedly overruled some senior officials at the State and Defense Departments, and refused Kiev’s requests for lethal aid, such as antitank weapons.
The training delay appears to continue the U.S. policy of caution in dealing with a nuclear-armed Russia that has so far defied Western economic sanctions in its support of east Ukraine separatists.
Last month, after a bloody attack to grab more land from Kiev, the rebels agreed to a new peace deal.
An earlier deal, negotiated in Minsk, Belarus in the fall, had collapsed quickly.
Now Washington and the European Union are watching whether the so-called Minsk-2 truce will prove any more durable than its predecessor.
“The administration is being very cautious; they don’t want to upset the Minsk-2 apple cart,” said Steven Pifer, a former ambassador to Ukraine now with the Brookings Institution.
The training of Ukrainian National Guard battalions was supposed to take place in western Ukraine, far from the front lines of the conflict.
The Ukrainian units were supposed to be matched up with U.S. Army battalions and instructed in how to improve battlefield first-aid, how to combat enemy radio jamming, and how to survive heavy artillery fire, among other areas.
“The start of the training was delayed to try and provide some more space to see that the ceasefire and the full Minsk agreement could be successfully implemented,” Gen. Hodges said Tuesday during the breakfast with reporters.
He said he expected the training would begin later in the spring.
The alleged presence of Western mercenaries among Ukrainian armed forces has been a frequent—and unsubstantiated—plotline of Russian propaganda since the war in Ukraine began.
Speaking about the Ukrainian army in January, President Vladimir Putin said, “This is not even an army, it’s a foreign legion. In this case, it’s a foreign NATO legion,” he said, referring to the multinational North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
At the same time, the Kremlin has denied widespread reports of Russian soldiers and Russian military gear being used in east Ukraine.
Gen. Hodges also lashed out at Putin for his recent televised revelation that he had put Russia’s nuclear forces on alert during the annexation of Crimea last year.
“There are people who are very concerned about us doing things that might provoke the Russians. They clearly need no provocation when you look at what they are doing,” Gen. Hodges said.
“When the president of a country talks about use of nuclear forces—talk about provocative. That is reckless, and completely changes the whole nature of the discussion.”
Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, commander of U.S. Army in Europe, said U.S. officials wanted to make sure such training—which would involve U.S. military instructors deploying to western Ukraine—doesn’t “give the Russians an opportunity to say, ‘Look, the Americans are bringing in all these soldiers, they are not serious about it.’ ”
The general’s comments, at a breakfast with reporters in Washington, reflect a dilemma the West has faced in dealing with Russia’s yearlong push into Ukraine: how to force President Vladimir Putin to back down without provoking him to escalate the fight instead.
Worried that any overt military assistance to Ukraine’s embattled armed forces would push Moscow to retaliate, the White House has repeatedly overruled some senior officials at the State and Defense Departments, and refused Kiev’s requests for lethal aid, such as antitank weapons.
The training delay appears to continue the U.S. policy of caution in dealing with a nuclear-armed Russia that has so far defied Western economic sanctions in its support of east Ukraine separatists.
Last month, after a bloody attack to grab more land from Kiev, the rebels agreed to a new peace deal.
An earlier deal, negotiated in Minsk, Belarus in the fall, had collapsed quickly.
Now Washington and the European Union are watching whether the so-called Minsk-2 truce will prove any more durable than its predecessor.
“The administration is being very cautious; they don’t want to upset the Minsk-2 apple cart,” said Steven Pifer, a former ambassador to Ukraine now with the Brookings Institution.
The training of Ukrainian National Guard battalions was supposed to take place in western Ukraine, far from the front lines of the conflict.
The Ukrainian units were supposed to be matched up with U.S. Army battalions and instructed in how to improve battlefield first-aid, how to combat enemy radio jamming, and how to survive heavy artillery fire, among other areas.
“The start of the training was delayed to try and provide some more space to see that the ceasefire and the full Minsk agreement could be successfully implemented,” Gen. Hodges said Tuesday during the breakfast with reporters.
He said he expected the training would begin later in the spring.
The alleged presence of Western mercenaries among Ukrainian armed forces has been a frequent—and unsubstantiated—plotline of Russian propaganda since the war in Ukraine began.
Speaking about the Ukrainian army in January, President Vladimir Putin said, “This is not even an army, it’s a foreign legion. In this case, it’s a foreign NATO legion,” he said, referring to the multinational North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
At the same time, the Kremlin has denied widespread reports of Russian soldiers and Russian military gear being used in east Ukraine.
Gen. Hodges also lashed out at Putin for his recent televised revelation that he had put Russia’s nuclear forces on alert during the annexation of Crimea last year.
“There are people who are very concerned about us doing things that might provoke the Russians. They clearly need no provocation when you look at what they are doing,” Gen. Hodges said.
“When the president of a country talks about use of nuclear forces—talk about provocative. That is reckless, and completely changes the whole nature of the discussion.”
British Military Trainers Arrive In Ukraine To Help In Fight Against Pro-Russian Rebels
LONDON, England -- British military trainers are now in Ukraine to help those fighting pro-Russian rebels.
The 35 personnel are based in Mykolaiv, in the south of the country and are expected to be in the region for the next two months.
The team will be training forces engaged in battles in eastern Ukraine in medicine and defensive tactics, and supplying non-lethal equipment.
Defence Secretary Michael Fallon announced last month that the UK would sent up to 75 troops and military staff to the war-torn country.
He said they would offer advice and training to government forces there in an attempt to boost their resilience while also reducing fatalities and casualties.
An MoD spokeswoman said: “The UK is committed to supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity in the face of Russia’s aggression.
“The gifting of non-lethal equipment is designed to prevent further Ukrainian fatalities and casualties and to help improve situational awareness on the ground.
“Our overall aim is to strengthen the defensive capability of the Ukrainian armed forces and build the resilience that they need.”
The British government is also supplying first aid kits, sleeping bags and night-vision goggles to the country.
It is the first time a Western nation has conducted a long-term military training programme in Ukraine since its war against pro-Russian rebels began last year.
More than 6,000 people have been killed since fighting broke out last April, but clashes have reduced since a ceasefire was declared last month.
As part of the training programme, more British teams are expected to arrive in Ukraine over the coming weeks, and the United States has also said it is planning to send a battalion to train three Ukrainian battalions.
The 35 personnel are based in Mykolaiv, in the south of the country and are expected to be in the region for the next two months.
The team will be training forces engaged in battles in eastern Ukraine in medicine and defensive tactics, and supplying non-lethal equipment.
Defence Secretary Michael Fallon announced last month that the UK would sent up to 75 troops and military staff to the war-torn country.
He said they would offer advice and training to government forces there in an attempt to boost their resilience while also reducing fatalities and casualties.
An MoD spokeswoman said: “The UK is committed to supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity in the face of Russia’s aggression.
“The gifting of non-lethal equipment is designed to prevent further Ukrainian fatalities and casualties and to help improve situational awareness on the ground.
“Our overall aim is to strengthen the defensive capability of the Ukrainian armed forces and build the resilience that they need.”
The British government is also supplying first aid kits, sleeping bags and night-vision goggles to the country.
It is the first time a Western nation has conducted a long-term military training programme in Ukraine since its war against pro-Russian rebels began last year.
More than 6,000 people have been killed since fighting broke out last April, but clashes have reduced since a ceasefire was declared last month.
As part of the training programme, more British teams are expected to arrive in Ukraine over the coming weeks, and the United States has also said it is planning to send a battalion to train three Ukrainian battalions.
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