WASHINGTON, D.C. -- Eighty-five percent of Ukrainians in May told Gallup they disapprove of the job performance of their country's leadership, up from 75% in 2008 and 73% in 2007. The 4% of Ukrainians who approve is not only the lowest rating Gallup has ever measured in former Soviet countries, but also the lowest in the world.
Worldwide low 4% of Ukrainians approve of their country’s leadership.Ukrainians' high disapproval likely reflects frustration with the bitter political infighting between President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. The conflict between the former allies has essentially paralyzed policymaking for the past year and a half. Individually, Ukrainians give both leaders low marks.Do you approve or disapprove of the job performance of the leadership of Ukraine?Yushchenko's 7% approval rating is less than half of the 17% he garnered in 2008. (Gallup did not ask Ukrainians to rate Tymoshenko in 2008.) The prime minister's current 20% approval is nearly three times higher than the president's rating, which could be relevant to their chances when they run against each other in Ukraine's presidential election in five months. Analysts suggest that low approval could give outside candidates an advantage in January.Power Partnership in RussiaRussians' approval of the performance of their leadership over the last several years stands in stark contrast to that of their neighbors in Ukraine. Since the 2008 presidential election, majorities of Russians have approved of the leadership of their country. Approval declined slightly to 56% in June of this year from 63% in May 2008; both measures are substantially higher than the 39% approval rating in May 2007.Do you approve or disapprove of the job performance of the leadership of Russia?Russians' approval ratings of their prime minister and president again contrast the situation in Ukraine -- one acrimonious and the other a "tandem." More than two-thirds of Russians approve of President Dmitry Medvedev (68%) and more than three in four approve of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin (77%).One year into Medvedev's presidency, that more Russians approve of Putin than approve of his protégé, underscores Putin's continuing popularity. Nineteen percent of Russians have no opinion of Medvedev's leadership, which is more than the 12% who have no opinion of Putin's.Bottom LineGallup Polls suggest many Ukrainians likely welcomed the advice U.S. Vice President Joe Biden's gave during his visit to the country last week. Biden urged leaders to put aside their "political posturing" in the difficult economic times and "heed the lessons of history -- effective, accountable government is the only way to provide a stable, predictable, and transparent environment that attracts investment, which is the economic engine of development."In Russia, where the global economic downturn has hit residents hard, approval ratings have stayed relatively buoyant. At this point, the Medvedev-Putin partnership appears to be providing Russians a united front and a sense of political stability in tough times.Survey MethodsResults are based on face-to-face interviews with at least 1,000 adults, aged 15 and older, conducted in July 2007, May 2008, and May 2009 in Ukraine and with at least 2,000 adults in Russia in May 2007, May 2008, and June 2009. For results based on the total sample of national adults, one can say with 95% confidence that the maximum margin of sampling error was ±4 percentage points in Ukraine and ±3 percentage points in Russia.Samples in Russia and Ukraine are nationally representative, with urban oversample. The margin of error reflects the influence of data weighting. In addition to sampling error, question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of public opinion polls.
Showing posts with label US. Show all posts
Showing posts with label US. Show all posts
Sunday, 2 August 2009
Saturday, 1 August 2009
The Russian Economy And Russian Power
AUSTIN, TX -- U.S. Vice President Joe Biden’s visit to Georgia and Ukraine partly answered questions over how U.S.-Russian talks went during U.S. President Barack Obama’s visit to Russia in early July.
That Biden’s visit took place at all reaffirms the U.S. commitment to the principle that Russia does not have the right to a sphere of influence in these countries or anywhere in the former Soviet Union.The Americans’ willingness to confront the Russians on an issue of fundamental national interest to Russia therefore requires some explanation, as on the surface it seems a high-risk maneuver. Biden provided insights into the analytic framework of the Obama administration on Russia in a July 26 interview with The Wall Street Journal.In it, Biden said the United States “vastly” underestimates its hand. He added that “Russia has to make some very difficult, calculated decisions. They have a shrinking population base, they have a withering economy, they have a banking sector and structure that is not likely to be able to withstand the next 15 years, they’re in a situation where the world is changing before them and they’re clinging to something in the past that is not sustainable.”U.S. Policy ContinuityThe Russians have accused the United States of supporting pro-American forces in Ukraine, Georgia and other countries of the former Soviet Union under the cover of supporting democracy. They see the U.S. goal as surrounding the Soviet Union with pro-American states to put the future of the Russian Federation at risk.The summer 2008 Russian military action in Georgia was intended to deliver a message to the United States and the countries of the former Soviet Union that Russia was not prepared to tolerate such developments but was prepared to reverse them by force of arms if need be.Following his July summit, Obama sent Biden to the two most sensitive countries in the former Soviet Union — Ukraine and Georgia — to let the Russians know that the United States was not backing off its strategy in spite of Russian military superiority in the immediate region.In the long run, the United States is much more powerful than the Russians, and Biden was correct when he explicitly noted Russia’s failing demographics as a principle factor in Moscow’s long-term decline. But to paraphrase a noted economist, we don’t live in the long run.Right now, the Russian correlation of forces along Russia’s frontiers clearly favors the Russians, and the major U.S. deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan would prevent the Americans from intervening should the Russians choose to challenge pro-American governments in the former Soviet Union directly.Even so, Biden’s visit and interview show the Obama administration is maintaining the U.S. stance on Russia that has been in place since the Reagan years. Reagan saw the economy as Russia’s basic weakness. He felt that the greater the pressure on the Russian economy, the more forthcoming the Russians would be on geopolitical matters. The more concessions they made on geopolitical matters, the weaker their hold on Eastern Europe. And if Reagan’s demand that Russia “Tear down this wall, Mr. Gorbachev” was met, the Soviets would collapse.Ever since the Reagan administration, the idee fixe of not only the United States, but also NATO, China and Japan has been that the weakness of the Russian economy made it impossible for the Russians to play a significant regional role, let alone a global one. Therefore, regardless of Russian wishes, the West was free to forge whatever relations it wanted among Russian allies like Serbia and within the former Soviet Union. And certainly during the 1990s, Russia was paralyzed.Biden, however, is saying that whatever the current temporary regional advantage the Russians might have, in the end, their economy is crippled and Russia is not a country to be taken seriously. He went on publicly to point out that this should not be pointed out publicly, as there is no value in embarrassing Russia. The Russians certainly now understand what it means to hit the reset button Obama had referred to: The reset is back to the 1980s and 1990s.Reset to the 1980s and 90sTo calculate the Russian response, it is important to consider how someone like Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin views the events of the 1980s and 1990s. After all, Putin was a KGB officer under Yuri Andropov, the former head of the KGB and later Chairman of the Communist Party for a short time — and the architect of glasnost and perestroika.It was the KGB that realized first that the Soviet Union was failing, which made sense because only the KGB had a comprehensive sense of the state of the Soviet Union. Andropov’s strategy was to shift from technology transfer through espionage — apparently Putin’s mission as a junior intelligence officer in Dresden in the former East Germany — to a more formal process of technology transfer. To induce the West to transfer technology and to invest in the Soviet Union, Moscow had to make substantial concessions in the area in which the West cared the most: geopolitics.To get what it needed, the Soviets had to dial back on the Cold War. Glasnost, or openness, had as its price reducing the threat to the West. But the greater part of the puzzle was perestroika, or the restructuring of the Soviet economy. This was where the greatest risk came, since the entire social and political structure of the Soviet Union was built around a command economy. But that economy was no longer functioning, and without perestroika, all of the investment and technology transfer would be meaningless. The Soviet Union could not metabolize it.Former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was a communist, as we seem to forget, and a follower of Andropov. He was not a liberalizer because he saw liberalization as a virtue; rather, he saw it as a means to an end. And that end was saving the Communist Party, and with it the Soviet state.Gorbachev also understood that the twin challenge of concessions to the West geopolitically and a top-down revolution in Russia economically — simultaneously—risked massive destabilization. This is what Reagan was counting on, and what Gorbachev was trying to prevent. Gorbachev lost Andropov’s gamble. The Soviet Union collapsed, and with it the Communist Party.What followed was a decade of economic horror, at least as most Russians viewed it. From the West’s point of view, collapse looked like liberalization. From the Russian point of view, Russia went from a superpower that was poor to an even poorer geopolitical cripple. For the Russians, the experiment was a double failure. Not only did the Russian Empire retreat to the borders of the 18th century, but the economy became even more dysfunctional, except for a handful of oligarchs and some of their Western associates who stole whatever wasn’t nailed down.The Russians, and particularly Putin, took away a different lesson than the West did. The West assumed that economic dysfunction caused the Soviet Union to fail. Putin and his colleagues took away the idea that it was the attempt to repair economic dysfunction through wholesale reforms that caused Russia to fail. From Putin’s point of view, economic well-being and national power do not necessarily work in tandem where Russia is concerned.Russian Power, With or Without ProsperityRussia has been an economic wreck for most of its history, both under the czars and under the Soviets. The geography of Russia has a range of weaknesses, as we have explored. Russia’s geography, daunting infrastructural challenges and demographic structure all conspire against it. But the strategic power of Russia was never synchronized to its economic well-being.Certainly, following World War II the Russian economy was shattered and never quite came back together. Yet Russian global power was still enormous. A look at the crushing poverty — but undeniable power — of Russia during broad swaths of time from 1600 until Andropov arrived on the scene certainly gives credence to Putin’s view.The problems of the 1980s had as much to do with the weakening and corruption of the Communist Party under former Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev as it had to do with intrinsic economic weakness. To put it differently, the Soviet Union was an economic wreck under Joseph Stalin as well.The Germans made a massive mistake in confusing Soviet economic weakness with military weakness. During the Cold War, the United States did not make that mistake. It understood that Soviet economic weakness did not track with Russian strategic power. Moscow might not be able to house its people, but its military power was not to be dismissed.What made an economic cripple into a military giant was political power. Both the czar and the Communist Party maintained a ruthless degree of control over society. That meant Moscow could divert resources from consumption to the military and suppress resistance.In a state run by terror, dissatisfaction with the state of the economy does not translate into either policy shifts or military weakness — and certainly not in the short term. Huge percentages of gross domestic product can be devoted to military purposes, even if used inefficiently there. Repression and terror smooth over public opinion.The czar used repression widely, and it was not until the army itself rebelled in World War I that the regime collapsed. Under Stalin, even at the worst moments of World War II, the army did not rebel. In both regimes, economic dysfunction was accepted as the inevitable price of strategic power. And dissent — even the hint of dissent — was dealt with by the only truly efficient state enterprise: the security apparatus, whether called the Okhraina, Cheka, NKVD, MGB or KGB.From the point of view of Putin, who has called the Soviet collapse the greatest tragedy of our time, the problem was not economic dysfunction. Rather, it was the attempt to completely overhaul the Soviet Union’s foreign and domestic policies simultaneously that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. And that collapse did not lead to an economic renaissance.Biden might not have meant to gloat, but he drove home the point that Putin believes. For Putin, the West, and particularly the United States, engineered the fall of the Soviet Union by policies crafted by the Reagan administration — and that same policy remains in place under the Obama administration.It is not clear that Putin and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev disagree with Biden’s analysis — the Russian economy truly is “withering” — except in one sense. Given the policies Putin has pursued, the Russian prime minister must believe he has a way to cope with that. In the short run, Putin might well have such a coping mechanism, and this is the temporary window of opportunity Biden alluded to. But in the long run, the solution is not improving the economy — that would be difficult, if not outright impossible, for a country as large and lightly populated as Russia.Rather, the solution is accepting that Russia’s economic weakness is endemic and creating a regime that allows Russia to be a great power in spite of that.Such a regime is the one that can create military power in the face of broad poverty, something we will call the “Chekist state.”This state uses its security apparatus, now known as the FSB, to control the public through repression, freeing the state to allocate resources to the military as needed. In other words, this is Putin coming full circle to his KGB roots, but without the teachings of an Andropov or Gorbachev to confuse the issue. This is not an ideological stance; it applies to the Romanovs and to the Bolsheviks. It is an operational principle embedded in Russian geopolitics and history.Counting on Russian strategic power to track Russian economic power is risky.Certainly, it did in the 1980s and 1990s, but Putin has worked to decouple the two. On the surface, it might seem a futile gesture, but in Russian history, this decoupling is the norm. Obama seems to understand this to the extent that he has tried to play off Medvedev (who appears less traditional) from Putin (who appears to be the more traditional), but we do not think this is a viable strategy — this is not a matter of Russian political personalities but of Russian geopolitical necessity.Biden seems to be saying that the Reagan strategy can play itself out permanently. Our view is that it plays itself out only so long as the Russian regime doesn’t reassert itself with the full power of the security apparatus and doesn’t decouple economic and military growth. Biden’s strategy works so long as this doesn’t happen. But in Russian history, this decoupling is the norm and the past 20 years is the exception.A strategy that assumes the Russians will once again decouple economic and military power requires a different response than ongoing, subcritical pressure. It requires that the window of opportunity the United States has handed Russia by its wars in the Islamic world be closed, and that the pressure on Russia be dramatically increased before the Russians move toward full repression and rapid rearmament.Ironically, in the very long run of the next couple of generations, it probably doesn’t matter whether the West heads off Russia at the pass because of another factor Biden mentioned: Russia’s shrinking demographics. Russian demography has been steadily worsening since World War I, particularly because birth rates have fallen. This slow-motion degradation turned into collapse during the 1990s.Russia’s birth rates are now well below starkly higher death rates; Russia already has more citizens in their 50s than in their teens. Russia can be a major power without a solid economy, but no one can be a major power without people. But even with demographics as poor as Russia’s, demographics do not change a country overnight. This is Russia’s moment, and the generation or so it will take demography to grind Russia down can be made very painful for the Americans.Biden has stated the American strategy: squeeze the Russians and let nature take its course. We suspect the Russians will squeeze back hard before they move off the stage of history.
That Biden’s visit took place at all reaffirms the U.S. commitment to the principle that Russia does not have the right to a sphere of influence in these countries or anywhere in the former Soviet Union.The Americans’ willingness to confront the Russians on an issue of fundamental national interest to Russia therefore requires some explanation, as on the surface it seems a high-risk maneuver. Biden provided insights into the analytic framework of the Obama administration on Russia in a July 26 interview with The Wall Street Journal.In it, Biden said the United States “vastly” underestimates its hand. He added that “Russia has to make some very difficult, calculated decisions. They have a shrinking population base, they have a withering economy, they have a banking sector and structure that is not likely to be able to withstand the next 15 years, they’re in a situation where the world is changing before them and they’re clinging to something in the past that is not sustainable.”U.S. Policy ContinuityThe Russians have accused the United States of supporting pro-American forces in Ukraine, Georgia and other countries of the former Soviet Union under the cover of supporting democracy. They see the U.S. goal as surrounding the Soviet Union with pro-American states to put the future of the Russian Federation at risk.The summer 2008 Russian military action in Georgia was intended to deliver a message to the United States and the countries of the former Soviet Union that Russia was not prepared to tolerate such developments but was prepared to reverse them by force of arms if need be.Following his July summit, Obama sent Biden to the two most sensitive countries in the former Soviet Union — Ukraine and Georgia — to let the Russians know that the United States was not backing off its strategy in spite of Russian military superiority in the immediate region.In the long run, the United States is much more powerful than the Russians, and Biden was correct when he explicitly noted Russia’s failing demographics as a principle factor in Moscow’s long-term decline. But to paraphrase a noted economist, we don’t live in the long run.Right now, the Russian correlation of forces along Russia’s frontiers clearly favors the Russians, and the major U.S. deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan would prevent the Americans from intervening should the Russians choose to challenge pro-American governments in the former Soviet Union directly.Even so, Biden’s visit and interview show the Obama administration is maintaining the U.S. stance on Russia that has been in place since the Reagan years. Reagan saw the economy as Russia’s basic weakness. He felt that the greater the pressure on the Russian economy, the more forthcoming the Russians would be on geopolitical matters. The more concessions they made on geopolitical matters, the weaker their hold on Eastern Europe. And if Reagan’s demand that Russia “Tear down this wall, Mr. Gorbachev” was met, the Soviets would collapse.Ever since the Reagan administration, the idee fixe of not only the United States, but also NATO, China and Japan has been that the weakness of the Russian economy made it impossible for the Russians to play a significant regional role, let alone a global one. Therefore, regardless of Russian wishes, the West was free to forge whatever relations it wanted among Russian allies like Serbia and within the former Soviet Union. And certainly during the 1990s, Russia was paralyzed.Biden, however, is saying that whatever the current temporary regional advantage the Russians might have, in the end, their economy is crippled and Russia is not a country to be taken seriously. He went on publicly to point out that this should not be pointed out publicly, as there is no value in embarrassing Russia. The Russians certainly now understand what it means to hit the reset button Obama had referred to: The reset is back to the 1980s and 1990s.Reset to the 1980s and 90sTo calculate the Russian response, it is important to consider how someone like Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin views the events of the 1980s and 1990s. After all, Putin was a KGB officer under Yuri Andropov, the former head of the KGB and later Chairman of the Communist Party for a short time — and the architect of glasnost and perestroika.It was the KGB that realized first that the Soviet Union was failing, which made sense because only the KGB had a comprehensive sense of the state of the Soviet Union. Andropov’s strategy was to shift from technology transfer through espionage — apparently Putin’s mission as a junior intelligence officer in Dresden in the former East Germany — to a more formal process of technology transfer. To induce the West to transfer technology and to invest in the Soviet Union, Moscow had to make substantial concessions in the area in which the West cared the most: geopolitics.To get what it needed, the Soviets had to dial back on the Cold War. Glasnost, or openness, had as its price reducing the threat to the West. But the greater part of the puzzle was perestroika, or the restructuring of the Soviet economy. This was where the greatest risk came, since the entire social and political structure of the Soviet Union was built around a command economy. But that economy was no longer functioning, and without perestroika, all of the investment and technology transfer would be meaningless. The Soviet Union could not metabolize it.Former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was a communist, as we seem to forget, and a follower of Andropov. He was not a liberalizer because he saw liberalization as a virtue; rather, he saw it as a means to an end. And that end was saving the Communist Party, and with it the Soviet state.Gorbachev also understood that the twin challenge of concessions to the West geopolitically and a top-down revolution in Russia economically — simultaneously—risked massive destabilization. This is what Reagan was counting on, and what Gorbachev was trying to prevent. Gorbachev lost Andropov’s gamble. The Soviet Union collapsed, and with it the Communist Party.What followed was a decade of economic horror, at least as most Russians viewed it. From the West’s point of view, collapse looked like liberalization. From the Russian point of view, Russia went from a superpower that was poor to an even poorer geopolitical cripple. For the Russians, the experiment was a double failure. Not only did the Russian Empire retreat to the borders of the 18th century, but the economy became even more dysfunctional, except for a handful of oligarchs and some of their Western associates who stole whatever wasn’t nailed down.The Russians, and particularly Putin, took away a different lesson than the West did. The West assumed that economic dysfunction caused the Soviet Union to fail. Putin and his colleagues took away the idea that it was the attempt to repair economic dysfunction through wholesale reforms that caused Russia to fail. From Putin’s point of view, economic well-being and national power do not necessarily work in tandem where Russia is concerned.Russian Power, With or Without ProsperityRussia has been an economic wreck for most of its history, both under the czars and under the Soviets. The geography of Russia has a range of weaknesses, as we have explored. Russia’s geography, daunting infrastructural challenges and demographic structure all conspire against it. But the strategic power of Russia was never synchronized to its economic well-being.Certainly, following World War II the Russian economy was shattered and never quite came back together. Yet Russian global power was still enormous. A look at the crushing poverty — but undeniable power — of Russia during broad swaths of time from 1600 until Andropov arrived on the scene certainly gives credence to Putin’s view.The problems of the 1980s had as much to do with the weakening and corruption of the Communist Party under former Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev as it had to do with intrinsic economic weakness. To put it differently, the Soviet Union was an economic wreck under Joseph Stalin as well.The Germans made a massive mistake in confusing Soviet economic weakness with military weakness. During the Cold War, the United States did not make that mistake. It understood that Soviet economic weakness did not track with Russian strategic power. Moscow might not be able to house its people, but its military power was not to be dismissed.What made an economic cripple into a military giant was political power. Both the czar and the Communist Party maintained a ruthless degree of control over society. That meant Moscow could divert resources from consumption to the military and suppress resistance.In a state run by terror, dissatisfaction with the state of the economy does not translate into either policy shifts or military weakness — and certainly not in the short term. Huge percentages of gross domestic product can be devoted to military purposes, even if used inefficiently there. Repression and terror smooth over public opinion.The czar used repression widely, and it was not until the army itself rebelled in World War I that the regime collapsed. Under Stalin, even at the worst moments of World War II, the army did not rebel. In both regimes, economic dysfunction was accepted as the inevitable price of strategic power. And dissent — even the hint of dissent — was dealt with by the only truly efficient state enterprise: the security apparatus, whether called the Okhraina, Cheka, NKVD, MGB or KGB.From the point of view of Putin, who has called the Soviet collapse the greatest tragedy of our time, the problem was not economic dysfunction. Rather, it was the attempt to completely overhaul the Soviet Union’s foreign and domestic policies simultaneously that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. And that collapse did not lead to an economic renaissance.Biden might not have meant to gloat, but he drove home the point that Putin believes. For Putin, the West, and particularly the United States, engineered the fall of the Soviet Union by policies crafted by the Reagan administration — and that same policy remains in place under the Obama administration.It is not clear that Putin and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev disagree with Biden’s analysis — the Russian economy truly is “withering” — except in one sense. Given the policies Putin has pursued, the Russian prime minister must believe he has a way to cope with that. In the short run, Putin might well have such a coping mechanism, and this is the temporary window of opportunity Biden alluded to. But in the long run, the solution is not improving the economy — that would be difficult, if not outright impossible, for a country as large and lightly populated as Russia.Rather, the solution is accepting that Russia’s economic weakness is endemic and creating a regime that allows Russia to be a great power in spite of that.Such a regime is the one that can create military power in the face of broad poverty, something we will call the “Chekist state.”This state uses its security apparatus, now known as the FSB, to control the public through repression, freeing the state to allocate resources to the military as needed. In other words, this is Putin coming full circle to his KGB roots, but without the teachings of an Andropov or Gorbachev to confuse the issue. This is not an ideological stance; it applies to the Romanovs and to the Bolsheviks. It is an operational principle embedded in Russian geopolitics and history.Counting on Russian strategic power to track Russian economic power is risky.Certainly, it did in the 1980s and 1990s, but Putin has worked to decouple the two. On the surface, it might seem a futile gesture, but in Russian history, this decoupling is the norm. Obama seems to understand this to the extent that he has tried to play off Medvedev (who appears less traditional) from Putin (who appears to be the more traditional), but we do not think this is a viable strategy — this is not a matter of Russian political personalities but of Russian geopolitical necessity.Biden seems to be saying that the Reagan strategy can play itself out permanently. Our view is that it plays itself out only so long as the Russian regime doesn’t reassert itself with the full power of the security apparatus and doesn’t decouple economic and military growth. Biden’s strategy works so long as this doesn’t happen. But in Russian history, this decoupling is the norm and the past 20 years is the exception.A strategy that assumes the Russians will once again decouple economic and military power requires a different response than ongoing, subcritical pressure. It requires that the window of opportunity the United States has handed Russia by its wars in the Islamic world be closed, and that the pressure on Russia be dramatically increased before the Russians move toward full repression and rapid rearmament.Ironically, in the very long run of the next couple of generations, it probably doesn’t matter whether the West heads off Russia at the pass because of another factor Biden mentioned: Russia’s shrinking demographics. Russian demography has been steadily worsening since World War I, particularly because birth rates have fallen. This slow-motion degradation turned into collapse during the 1990s.Russia’s birth rates are now well below starkly higher death rates; Russia already has more citizens in their 50s than in their teens. Russia can be a major power without a solid economy, but no one can be a major power without people. But even with demographics as poor as Russia’s, demographics do not change a country overnight. This is Russia’s moment, and the generation or so it will take demography to grind Russia down can be made very painful for the Americans.Biden has stated the American strategy: squeeze the Russians and let nature take its course. We suspect the Russians will squeeze back hard before they move off the stage of history.
Wednesday, 22 July 2009
Biden: US Supports Ukraine's NATO Bid
KIEV, Ukraine -- Washington supports Ukraine's bid to join NATO, and the former Soviet republic is free to choose its allies regardless of what other nations want, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden told Ukraine's president on Tuesday.
Both statements were aimed at Russia, which vehemently opposes NATO membership for its neighbors and is uncomfortable with their desire for greater economic and political integration with the West.Russia warned the U.S. against playing "under-the-carpet games" or building its ties with Ukraine at Moscow's expense.Biden met with President Viktor Yushchenko in Kiev, then said in a speech later that if Ukraine chose to join NATO, "which I believe you have, we strongly support that."Polls, however, have shown a majority of Ukrainians oppose NATO membership.Ukrainian officials were looking for signals that Washington's effort to improve ties with Moscow would not hurt Ukraine's push for integration with the West. Ukrainians also are looking for support as Russia acts to reassert some control over its former Soviet satellite states — most blatantly with its invasion of Georgia last year."We don't recognize, and I want to reiterate this, any spheres of influence. We do not recognize anyone else's right to dictate to any other country what alliance it should seek to belong to, or what relationships, bilateral relationships, you have," Biden said.President Barack Obama stressed at a July 6-8 summit in Moscow that "NATO seeks collaboration with Russia, not confrontation." Obama's speech was part of a White House effort to form a more productive relationship with Russia. Those ties reached post Cold-War lows after last year's Russian-Georgian war.Better ties with Moscow "will not come at Ukraine's expense," Biden said. "To the contrary, I believe it can actually benefit Ukraine. The more substantive relationship we have with Moscow, the more we can defuse the zero-sum thinking about our relations with Russia's neighbors."Welcoming Biden, Yushchenko called Ukraine a "European country where democracy rules.""We are going forward, we have chosen a European path," Yushchenko said.Biden was to meet Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko later Tuesday, as well as key opposition leaders who are also likely to challenge Yushchenko in January's presidential election.Yushchenko and Tymoshenko were allies in the 2004 Orange Revolution, which brought Yushchenko to power. They are now bitter foes, and the rivalry has hampered the government's response to the global economic crisis, which has hit Ukraine hard.That has allowed Viktor Yanukovych, the Moscow-backed presidential candidate who lost the 2004 election but is very popular in Ukraine's largely Russian-speaking east, to come back into the running for the January vote.Biden is also set to meet with Arseniy Yatsenyuk, the reformist former parliament speaker, who plans to run for president.Russia was watching Biden's visit to its former Soviet backyard with keen interest, suspicious that Washington is out to block any moves to bring Ukraine and Georgia back into Moscow's orbit.Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Andrei Nesterenko told a weekly news conference that Moscow is "not usurping or monopolizing anyone's rights," and that all nations are free to choose their partners.But in a warning to Washington, he added, "It's important that this be done transparently, without under-the-carpet games and not at the expense of others' interests."He also suggested the U.S. should keep Ukraine's traditional ties with Russia in mind, saying the regional context and "historical specifics" should be taken into account.The U.S. has repeatedly denied that it seeks to dictate who should rule in any democratic country.Biden on Wednesday visits Georgia, where the opposition is demanding President Mikhail Saakashvili resign over his handling of the war with Russia and what they say is his retreat from democracy.Saakashvili has vowed not to resign before the end of his term in 2013.The Russian army quickly crushed the Georgian army last August after Georgia attacked its own breakaway province of South Ossetia to try to bring it back under control.Thousands of Russian troops remain in South Ossetia and another separatist-held Georgian enclave, Abkhazia, and Russia has recognized both regions as independent nations.Washington said it did not support Georgia's attempt to retake South Ossetia by force.Saakashvili, who had committed thousands of troops for U.S.-led missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, pleaded for military support from Washington during the fighting, but the U.S. did not intervene.
Both statements were aimed at Russia, which vehemently opposes NATO membership for its neighbors and is uncomfortable with their desire for greater economic and political integration with the West.Russia warned the U.S. against playing "under-the-carpet games" or building its ties with Ukraine at Moscow's expense.Biden met with President Viktor Yushchenko in Kiev, then said in a speech later that if Ukraine chose to join NATO, "which I believe you have, we strongly support that."Polls, however, have shown a majority of Ukrainians oppose NATO membership.Ukrainian officials were looking for signals that Washington's effort to improve ties with Moscow would not hurt Ukraine's push for integration with the West. Ukrainians also are looking for support as Russia acts to reassert some control over its former Soviet satellite states — most blatantly with its invasion of Georgia last year."We don't recognize, and I want to reiterate this, any spheres of influence. We do not recognize anyone else's right to dictate to any other country what alliance it should seek to belong to, or what relationships, bilateral relationships, you have," Biden said.President Barack Obama stressed at a July 6-8 summit in Moscow that "NATO seeks collaboration with Russia, not confrontation." Obama's speech was part of a White House effort to form a more productive relationship with Russia. Those ties reached post Cold-War lows after last year's Russian-Georgian war.Better ties with Moscow "will not come at Ukraine's expense," Biden said. "To the contrary, I believe it can actually benefit Ukraine. The more substantive relationship we have with Moscow, the more we can defuse the zero-sum thinking about our relations with Russia's neighbors."Welcoming Biden, Yushchenko called Ukraine a "European country where democracy rules.""We are going forward, we have chosen a European path," Yushchenko said.Biden was to meet Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko later Tuesday, as well as key opposition leaders who are also likely to challenge Yushchenko in January's presidential election.Yushchenko and Tymoshenko were allies in the 2004 Orange Revolution, which brought Yushchenko to power. They are now bitter foes, and the rivalry has hampered the government's response to the global economic crisis, which has hit Ukraine hard.That has allowed Viktor Yanukovych, the Moscow-backed presidential candidate who lost the 2004 election but is very popular in Ukraine's largely Russian-speaking east, to come back into the running for the January vote.Biden is also set to meet with Arseniy Yatsenyuk, the reformist former parliament speaker, who plans to run for president.Russia was watching Biden's visit to its former Soviet backyard with keen interest, suspicious that Washington is out to block any moves to bring Ukraine and Georgia back into Moscow's orbit.Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Andrei Nesterenko told a weekly news conference that Moscow is "not usurping or monopolizing anyone's rights," and that all nations are free to choose their partners.But in a warning to Washington, he added, "It's important that this be done transparently, without under-the-carpet games and not at the expense of others' interests."He also suggested the U.S. should keep Ukraine's traditional ties with Russia in mind, saying the regional context and "historical specifics" should be taken into account.The U.S. has repeatedly denied that it seeks to dictate who should rule in any democratic country.Biden on Wednesday visits Georgia, where the opposition is demanding President Mikhail Saakashvili resign over his handling of the war with Russia and what they say is his retreat from democracy.Saakashvili has vowed not to resign before the end of his term in 2013.The Russian army quickly crushed the Georgian army last August after Georgia attacked its own breakaway province of South Ossetia to try to bring it back under control.Thousands of Russian troops remain in South Ossetia and another separatist-held Georgian enclave, Abkhazia, and Russia has recognized both regions as independent nations.Washington said it did not support Georgia's attempt to retake South Ossetia by force.Saakashvili, who had committed thousands of troops for U.S.-led missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, pleaded for military support from Washington during the fighting, but the U.S. did not intervene.
Friday, 22 May 2009
Ambassador Breaks Ground On New U.S. Embassy Just Before Leaving Kiev
KIEV, Ukraine -- In a ceremony attended by journalists, Kiev city officials and diplomats, U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine William Taylor broke ground at a construction site in Kiev where the new U.S. Embassy will be located.
The event may have been one of Taylor's last public appearances as U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine. His diplomatic mission in Ukraine is coming to an end. It is still uncertain who will replace him.Asked at the event who will replace him, Taylor said that a decision had not yet been made.“However, I know that there is a lot of discussions ongoing right now. There are many candidates who want to come and work here,” he added.The new, 5-story embassy will be located on Tankova street. It is expected to be built and functional by 2012, employing 400 people.The consulate and embassy building, currently located in separate sites in Kiev, will be located at the new site. It will also include a food store and bank for personnel, and a gym with showers.The site will also include quarters for a special forces squad from the Navy Seals, and a basketball court for them. The facility will also include a children’s play ground and tennis and volley ball courts with room for spectators.Parking for almost 400 cars will be made available.
The event may have been one of Taylor's last public appearances as U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine. His diplomatic mission in Ukraine is coming to an end. It is still uncertain who will replace him.Asked at the event who will replace him, Taylor said that a decision had not yet been made.“However, I know that there is a lot of discussions ongoing right now. There are many candidates who want to come and work here,” he added.The new, 5-story embassy will be located on Tankova street. It is expected to be built and functional by 2012, employing 400 people.The consulate and embassy building, currently located in separate sites in Kiev, will be located at the new site. It will also include a food store and bank for personnel, and a gym with showers.The site will also include quarters for a special forces squad from the Navy Seals, and a basketball court for them. The facility will also include a children’s play ground and tennis and volley ball courts with room for spectators.Parking for almost 400 cars will be made available.
Saturday, 16 May 2009
Linkage is everything in Russian-US nuclear talks
When Russian and US officials formally begin talks in Moscow on May 19 on a new arms control treaty, it will be something like a scene from an old Western: each side is waiting for the other to draw first.
As the only comprehensive document limiting strategic nuclear warheads for two nations that possess 90 per cent of the world's nuclear weapons stockpiles, START-1, which expires in December, is on everyone's agenda - but how to resolve the endless bargaining points is a different matter.
From the tactical standpoint, each side is waiting for the other to present proposals first because it's easier to criticise the other party's plan than to come up with your own without losing out," said Yury Fedorov, a security expert and an associate fellow at London-based think tank Chatham House.
This latest attempt to draft a new treaty will involve direct bargaining chips - like the US plans for a missile shield in Europe, cooperation on Iran, and provisions to count stored warheads together with "deployed" warheads - but also some indirect geopolitical challenges - like NATO expansion on the one hand and Russia's pledge to provide transit support to troops in Afghanistan on the other. This conflicted tangle of interests stands as the chief hurdle on the way to the "reset" button proposed by US Vice President Joe Biden earlier this year.
Since Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev met on the eve of the G20 summit in London on April 1, Russia has been making the type of provisions it would like addressed in the new treaty increasingly clear.
Store or destroy?
"We are destroying warheads, Americans are storing them," said Yevgeny Yevstafiyev, a Russian defense expert and retired general. "They have return potential. And we are not monitoring this. It's a very important question and a lot of spears will be broken over it." Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was more diplomatic.
"We think the main thing is having an agreement that includes all warheads and all carriers. As for the warheads in storage, it is important to understand how they will be counted," Lavrov was quoted by RIA-Novosti as saying. But Moscow was "not categorically saying ‘no' to those positions that the Americans are presenting."
The roots of the problem go back to the end of the Cold War in 1991.
That year, the START-1 treaty was signed, summing up two decades of arms limitation talks that began as SALT-1 under Brezhnev and Nixon, then progressed to the INF Treaty under Gorbachev and Reagan, and finally spelled out a comprehensive road map for slashing both sides' nuclear warhead arsenal by over 40 per cent.
Both sides acknowledge just how valuable START-1 was because it outlined the specifics of mutual monitoring. Moscow and Washington complied with the limitations, slashing their arsenals. Then, in the spirit of further disarmament, Bush and Putin signed SORT, also known as the Moscow Treaty, in 2002, further cutting not only warhead arsenals, but the number of delivery vehicles, or various types of missiles that carry the nuclear warhead. The problem with SORT, however, was that it did not spell out how each side would monitor the other.
Today, there is no easy solution, said Fedorov.
"To make sure that no one is storing its warheads, is necessary to monitor and verify the implementation of the treaty. But for that to happen, mutual inspector teams need access to storage of nuclear warheads and all production facilities where the warheads are created and destroyed. Yet neither the US nor Russia will allow foreign experts to visit these facilities, because there is very sensitive information there. Russia is demanding something which it will never be able to allow itself."
‘Direct linkage'
The missile shield that Washington wants to set up in Eastern Europe would have been regulated by a different sort of treaty - the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty - had the US not withdrawn from that in 2002. But now Moscow, angry over the new missile shield that it feels is directed against Russia rather than Iran, wants the issue back on the table. In the jargon of military diplomacy, it is creating "direct linkage" between missile defense and strategic offensive weapons.
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin described this "linkage" in an interview to Japanese media ahead of his trip to Tokyo this week: "One needn't be an expert to understand: if one party wants or would have an umbrella against all kinds of threats, this party would develop an illusion that it is allowed to do anything and then the aggressiveness of its actions will increase numerously, and the threat of global confrontation will reach a very dangerous level."
In turn, Washington has attempted to create "direct linkage" between the missile shield and Iran. From the US perspective, the issues are logically linked: Washington insists that the interceptors in Poland are aimed to counter what it sees as a threat coming from Teheran. If Moscow can help eliminate the threat, then there will be no need for missile interceptors.
But Moscow has refused. "It means that we will have to stop all military and technical cooperation with Iran," said Yevstafiyev. "We will lose political manouvring space. We cannot accept that."
But Federov thinks that officials in Moscow are well aware that the missile shield is not aimed at them. "I believe that Moscow supposes that the Iranian problem is a bigger headache for US and Israel than it is for Moscow. Therefore, it is a lever that Moscow can use to exert pressure on Washington. Iran is something of a bargaining chip."
Georgia, NATO, Afghanistan
When Obama and Medvedev meet for talks in Moscow in July, the START-1 issue will be examined in the context of a myriad of other problems. Moscow has underlined that it sees NATO expansion - and its friendliness with former Soviet Georgia - a direct threat to its security. Russia, which recently pledged transit support for NATO troops in Afghanistan, feels snubbed. But the US believes that Russia was behind Kyrgyzstan's decision to close the US airbase in Manas.
The recent diplomatic row between Russia and NATO in Brussels is not helping matters. These indirect issues are compounding the contentious points of any new arms control deal.
Altogether, the Russian side has been voicing its concerns - short of actually naming the bargaining chips - as it strives to improve its bargaining position ahead of next week's preliminary talks. ■
Number crunching
What the treaties say
START-1
Limits the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and warheads attributed to them so that seven years after entry into force aggregate numbers do not exceed:
1,600 for deployed ICBMs SLBMs and their associated launchers, and deployed Heavy Bombers, including 154 for deployed Heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers
6,000 for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and Heavy Bombers
4,900 warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and SLBMs
Includes a verification regime
SORT
US-Russian Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction (Also known as 'The Moscow Treaty')
Signed May 2002
In 2001, Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin announced plans for deeper cuts in strategic nuclear warheads
Both sides to reduce their arsenals to 1,700-2,200 strategic nuclear warheads by December 31, 2012
As a first step, US deactivated all 50 of its 10-warhead Peacekeeper ICBMs and removed four Trident submarines from strategic service
ABM Treaty
US-Soviet Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems
Signed in 1972, US withdrew in 2002
US and Soviet Union agree each may have only two ABM deployment areas, so restricted and so located that they cannot provide a nationwide ABM defence or become the basis for developing one.
The Treaty permits each side to have one limited ABM system to protect its capital
Permits another to protect an ICBM launch area.
As the only comprehensive document limiting strategic nuclear warheads for two nations that possess 90 per cent of the world's nuclear weapons stockpiles, START-1, which expires in December, is on everyone's agenda - but how to resolve the endless bargaining points is a different matter.
From the tactical standpoint, each side is waiting for the other to present proposals first because it's easier to criticise the other party's plan than to come up with your own without losing out," said Yury Fedorov, a security expert and an associate fellow at London-based think tank Chatham House.
This latest attempt to draft a new treaty will involve direct bargaining chips - like the US plans for a missile shield in Europe, cooperation on Iran, and provisions to count stored warheads together with "deployed" warheads - but also some indirect geopolitical challenges - like NATO expansion on the one hand and Russia's pledge to provide transit support to troops in Afghanistan on the other. This conflicted tangle of interests stands as the chief hurdle on the way to the "reset" button proposed by US Vice President Joe Biden earlier this year.
Since Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev met on the eve of the G20 summit in London on April 1, Russia has been making the type of provisions it would like addressed in the new treaty increasingly clear.
Store or destroy?
"We are destroying warheads, Americans are storing them," said Yevgeny Yevstafiyev, a Russian defense expert and retired general. "They have return potential. And we are not monitoring this. It's a very important question and a lot of spears will be broken over it." Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was more diplomatic.
"We think the main thing is having an agreement that includes all warheads and all carriers. As for the warheads in storage, it is important to understand how they will be counted," Lavrov was quoted by RIA-Novosti as saying. But Moscow was "not categorically saying ‘no' to those positions that the Americans are presenting."
The roots of the problem go back to the end of the Cold War in 1991.
That year, the START-1 treaty was signed, summing up two decades of arms limitation talks that began as SALT-1 under Brezhnev and Nixon, then progressed to the INF Treaty under Gorbachev and Reagan, and finally spelled out a comprehensive road map for slashing both sides' nuclear warhead arsenal by over 40 per cent.
Both sides acknowledge just how valuable START-1 was because it outlined the specifics of mutual monitoring. Moscow and Washington complied with the limitations, slashing their arsenals. Then, in the spirit of further disarmament, Bush and Putin signed SORT, also known as the Moscow Treaty, in 2002, further cutting not only warhead arsenals, but the number of delivery vehicles, or various types of missiles that carry the nuclear warhead. The problem with SORT, however, was that it did not spell out how each side would monitor the other.
Today, there is no easy solution, said Fedorov.
"To make sure that no one is storing its warheads, is necessary to monitor and verify the implementation of the treaty. But for that to happen, mutual inspector teams need access to storage of nuclear warheads and all production facilities where the warheads are created and destroyed. Yet neither the US nor Russia will allow foreign experts to visit these facilities, because there is very sensitive information there. Russia is demanding something which it will never be able to allow itself."
‘Direct linkage'
The missile shield that Washington wants to set up in Eastern Europe would have been regulated by a different sort of treaty - the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty - had the US not withdrawn from that in 2002. But now Moscow, angry over the new missile shield that it feels is directed against Russia rather than Iran, wants the issue back on the table. In the jargon of military diplomacy, it is creating "direct linkage" between missile defense and strategic offensive weapons.
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin described this "linkage" in an interview to Japanese media ahead of his trip to Tokyo this week: "One needn't be an expert to understand: if one party wants or would have an umbrella against all kinds of threats, this party would develop an illusion that it is allowed to do anything and then the aggressiveness of its actions will increase numerously, and the threat of global confrontation will reach a very dangerous level."
In turn, Washington has attempted to create "direct linkage" between the missile shield and Iran. From the US perspective, the issues are logically linked: Washington insists that the interceptors in Poland are aimed to counter what it sees as a threat coming from Teheran. If Moscow can help eliminate the threat, then there will be no need for missile interceptors.
But Moscow has refused. "It means that we will have to stop all military and technical cooperation with Iran," said Yevstafiyev. "We will lose political manouvring space. We cannot accept that."
But Federov thinks that officials in Moscow are well aware that the missile shield is not aimed at them. "I believe that Moscow supposes that the Iranian problem is a bigger headache for US and Israel than it is for Moscow. Therefore, it is a lever that Moscow can use to exert pressure on Washington. Iran is something of a bargaining chip."
Georgia, NATO, Afghanistan
When Obama and Medvedev meet for talks in Moscow in July, the START-1 issue will be examined in the context of a myriad of other problems. Moscow has underlined that it sees NATO expansion - and its friendliness with former Soviet Georgia - a direct threat to its security. Russia, which recently pledged transit support for NATO troops in Afghanistan, feels snubbed. But the US believes that Russia was behind Kyrgyzstan's decision to close the US airbase in Manas.
The recent diplomatic row between Russia and NATO in Brussels is not helping matters. These indirect issues are compounding the contentious points of any new arms control deal.
Altogether, the Russian side has been voicing its concerns - short of actually naming the bargaining chips - as it strives to improve its bargaining position ahead of next week's preliminary talks. ■
Number crunching
What the treaties say
START-1
Limits the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and warheads attributed to them so that seven years after entry into force aggregate numbers do not exceed:
1,600 for deployed ICBMs SLBMs and their associated launchers, and deployed Heavy Bombers, including 154 for deployed Heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers
6,000 for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and Heavy Bombers
4,900 warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and SLBMs
Includes a verification regime
SORT
US-Russian Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction (Also known as 'The Moscow Treaty')
Signed May 2002
In 2001, Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin announced plans for deeper cuts in strategic nuclear warheads
Both sides to reduce their arsenals to 1,700-2,200 strategic nuclear warheads by December 31, 2012
As a first step, US deactivated all 50 of its 10-warhead Peacekeeper ICBMs and removed four Trident submarines from strategic service
ABM Treaty
US-Soviet Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems
Signed in 1972, US withdrew in 2002
US and Soviet Union agree each may have only two ABM deployment areas, so restricted and so located that they cannot provide a nationwide ABM defence or become the basis for developing one.
The Treaty permits each side to have one limited ABM system to protect its capital
Permits another to protect an ICBM launch area.
Thursday, 30 April 2009
Ukraine Bans Pig Imports From Mexico, Canada, U.S.
KIEV, Ukraine -- The deputy head of Ukraine's state veterinary committee said on Monday the country had banned the import of live pigs and pork from Mexico, Canada, the U.S. and New Zealand as fears grew of a swine flu pandemic.
He said the ban concerned all products imported from these states since April 21."Such shipments will not be received or unloaded on Ukrainian territory," Yuriy Satvary said.Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko said on Monday a special group had been established in the former Soviet republic to study issues connected with swine flu. There have so far been no reported cases in Ukraine.The virus is suspected to have killed over a hundred people in Mexico, although only 20 cases have been confirmed. Over a 1,000 people have been infected with the virus in the Latin American country.Forty cases of swine flu have been confirmed in the United States and six in Canada, although there have been no fatalities. The United States has declared a public health emergency. One case of swine flu has also been confirmed in Spain. A number of cases of possible swine flu have also been reported in the U.K.World Health Organization director general Margaret Chan warned on Sunday that the outbreak had "pandemic potential", and urged governments to improve measures to monitor the virus.
He said the ban concerned all products imported from these states since April 21."Such shipments will not be received or unloaded on Ukrainian territory," Yuriy Satvary said.Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko said on Monday a special group had been established in the former Soviet republic to study issues connected with swine flu. There have so far been no reported cases in Ukraine.The virus is suspected to have killed over a hundred people in Mexico, although only 20 cases have been confirmed. Over a 1,000 people have been infected with the virus in the Latin American country.Forty cases of swine flu have been confirmed in the United States and six in Canada, although there have been no fatalities. The United States has declared a public health emergency. One case of swine flu has also been confirmed in Spain. A number of cases of possible swine flu have also been reported in the U.K.World Health Organization director general Margaret Chan warned on Sunday that the outbreak had "pandemic potential", and urged governments to improve measures to monitor the virus.
Saturday, 24 January 2009
US 'Welcomes' End Of Russia-Ukraine Gas Dispute
WASHINGTON, DC -- The United States said Thursday it "welcomes" the end to the gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine, and offered to help the European Union's efforts to enhance energy security.
The United States welcomes the resolution of the gas dispute between Ukraine and Russia. We understand gas flows have been restored to European customers," said acting State Department spokesman Robert Wood.Both Russian state-run energy giant Gazprom and its Ukrainian counterpart Naftogaz confirmed that gas flows had resumed after they signed a 10-year contract on Monday to end their dispute."This incident underscores the need for transparent, market-oriented arrangements for the sale and shipment of natural gas and the importance of diversifying energy supplies," Wood added in a statement."The United States stands ready to support European Union efforts to enhance its energy security."The crisis erupted on January 1 when Russia cut gas to Ukraine's domestic market over unpaid debts and demands for a higher price in 2009.It escalated six days later, when all supplies for Europe transiting through Ukraine were halted, with Moscow accusing Kiev of stealing gas. Ukraine vehemently denied the allegation.
The United States welcomes the resolution of the gas dispute between Ukraine and Russia. We understand gas flows have been restored to European customers," said acting State Department spokesman Robert Wood.Both Russian state-run energy giant Gazprom and its Ukrainian counterpart Naftogaz confirmed that gas flows had resumed after they signed a 10-year contract on Monday to end their dispute."This incident underscores the need for transparent, market-oriented arrangements for the sale and shipment of natural gas and the importance of diversifying energy supplies," Wood added in a statement."The United States stands ready to support European Union efforts to enhance its energy security."The crisis erupted on January 1 when Russia cut gas to Ukraine's domestic market over unpaid debts and demands for a higher price in 2009.It escalated six days later, when all supplies for Europe transiting through Ukraine were halted, with Moscow accusing Kiev of stealing gas. Ukraine vehemently denied the allegation.
Monday, 29 December 2008
US, Russia, China in Dogfight Over Jet Sales
WASHINGTON (AFP) - The United States is bracing for tough competition from Russia and China as cash-flush Asian economies look up to the trio for a new breed of fighter jets to beef up their air forces, experts say.
Japan, India, Australia and South Korea are keen to have the most modern, fifth generation, jet fighters while Southeast Asian nations such as Malaysia and Indonesia are reportedly eyeing fourth generation fighters from China.
With Asia powering ahead with military modernization and capability growth, the United States wants to maintain leadership in defense sales in the region attracted by low cost offerings from Russia and China, experts said.
"The Americans and Russians are competing hard for the Asian fighter aircraft market, but everybody is also watching to see how aggressively the Chinese will be entering this market," Richard Fisher, an expert with the Washington-based International Assessment and Strategy Center, said.
The tight competition comes as Asian economies move ahead "much more aggressively" to upgrade their air defense capabilities, he said.
"It's not quite right to say an arms race, but there is an arms jog in Asia," Fisher said.
The United States is currently the sole producer of fifth generation fighters - the F-22s and F-35s. Export of F-22s is barred by law while the lower cost F-35s have just started flight testing ahead of deployment around 2012.
Russia and China's fifth generation fighter offerings could well be on the market between 2015 and 2020, a time frame experts say is not very far away in terms of defense planning.
"I don't want to get into the numbers because they were given to me in confidence but the price the Russians are estimating for their fifth generation fighter is substantially less than the Joint Strike Fighter (F-35) and substantially less than F-22," U.S. aviation expert Reuben Johnson told a Washington forum last week on "challenges to the Asian air power balance."
He said the Russian arms industry was grappling with high production costs.
Russian weapon exports to China have also plunged as Beijing became more wary over Moscow's sales of its most advanced weaponry to neighbor India, Johnson said.
"What is really the challenge is we have two very large countries, China and India, whose economies are booming and who are buying lots of hardware and we are looking at a situation down the road where they are going to have very, very sophisticated air forces," he said.
Russia had already teamed up with India to co-develop and co-produce a version of Moscow's fifth generation fighter, but Fisher said that given the Indian preference of diversifying its weapons sources, it was possible New Delhi could purchase a U.S. fifth generation fighter at some point.
The United States is also vying with Russia and others for a 12-billion-dollar contract to sell 126 fourth generation fighter jets to the Indian air force.
The competition from Russia could prod the Americans to lift an export ban on F-22s, eyed by Australia and Japan, top U.S. allies in the region, experts said.
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates hinted during a recent Australian visit that Congress may be asked to reconsider the ban.
"It is imperative that the United States consider selling some version of the F-22 to maintain a strong deterrent posture in Asia," Fisher said.
"I would say categorically that Japan requires a capability of the level of the F-22 in order to sustain a sufficient position to deter China," he said.
Japan, India, Australia and South Korea are keen to have the most modern, fifth generation, jet fighters while Southeast Asian nations such as Malaysia and Indonesia are reportedly eyeing fourth generation fighters from China.
With Asia powering ahead with military modernization and capability growth, the United States wants to maintain leadership in defense sales in the region attracted by low cost offerings from Russia and China, experts said.
"The Americans and Russians are competing hard for the Asian fighter aircraft market, but everybody is also watching to see how aggressively the Chinese will be entering this market," Richard Fisher, an expert with the Washington-based International Assessment and Strategy Center, said.
The tight competition comes as Asian economies move ahead "much more aggressively" to upgrade their air defense capabilities, he said.
"It's not quite right to say an arms race, but there is an arms jog in Asia," Fisher said.
The United States is currently the sole producer of fifth generation fighters - the F-22s and F-35s. Export of F-22s is barred by law while the lower cost F-35s have just started flight testing ahead of deployment around 2012.
Russia and China's fifth generation fighter offerings could well be on the market between 2015 and 2020, a time frame experts say is not very far away in terms of defense planning.
"I don't want to get into the numbers because they were given to me in confidence but the price the Russians are estimating for their fifth generation fighter is substantially less than the Joint Strike Fighter (F-35) and substantially less than F-22," U.S. aviation expert Reuben Johnson told a Washington forum last week on "challenges to the Asian air power balance."
He said the Russian arms industry was grappling with high production costs.
Russian weapon exports to China have also plunged as Beijing became more wary over Moscow's sales of its most advanced weaponry to neighbor India, Johnson said.
"What is really the challenge is we have two very large countries, China and India, whose economies are booming and who are buying lots of hardware and we are looking at a situation down the road where they are going to have very, very sophisticated air forces," he said.
Russia had already teamed up with India to co-develop and co-produce a version of Moscow's fifth generation fighter, but Fisher said that given the Indian preference of diversifying its weapons sources, it was possible New Delhi could purchase a U.S. fifth generation fighter at some point.
The United States is also vying with Russia and others for a 12-billion-dollar contract to sell 126 fourth generation fighter jets to the Indian air force.
The competition from Russia could prod the Americans to lift an export ban on F-22s, eyed by Australia and Japan, top U.S. allies in the region, experts said.
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates hinted during a recent Australian visit that Congress may be asked to reconsider the ban.
"It is imperative that the United States consider selling some version of the F-22 to maintain a strong deterrent posture in Asia," Fisher said.
"I would say categorically that Japan requires a capability of the level of the F-22 in order to sustain a sufficient position to deter China," he said.
Sunday, 14 December 2008
President Obama,Russia and US Relations
Even as Barack Obama faces front-page issues like Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan, he will still have to find the time and courage to deal with a certain nuclear-armed autocracy that controls much of the world’s oil and gas.
How should Mr. Obama deal with Russia’s official president, Dmitry Medvedev, and Russia’s real leader, Vladimir Putin? The choice is straightforward: Mr. Obama can treat them like fellow democratic leaders or like the would-be dictators that they are. His decision will tell the world a great deal about how seriously he takes his promises of change.
The Kremlin is very eager to be accepted as an equal. It apparently hopes that Mr. Obama will send the signal that democracy in Russia doesn’t matter, that the Kremlin’s crushing of the opposition and free speech is irrelevant, and that annexing pieces of neighboring Georgia is a local issue and not an international one.
Last week Mr. Medvedev was in France to meet with the leaders of Europe. French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who is also the current European Union president, tripped over his tongue to ingratiate himself and to present himself as a great peacemaker.
Mr. Sarkozy proudly announced that Russia had “mostly completed” its obligations to resolve the conflict with Georgia. But there is no way to “mostly” accept a dictatorship.
Russia’s ruling elite has close allies among the European nations that Mr. Obama is expected to woo. I am far less concerned by Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s clownish remarks about Mr. Obama’s “suntan” than about the way he so eagerly rushes to defend the commercial and political interests of Mr. Putin’s clan.
Leaders like Messrs. Berlusconi and Sarkozy have no allegiance to the nation of Russia. Rather, they are defending Mr. Putin as a means to protect their personal and business relationships. Will Mr. Obama’s desire to be the toast of Europe come at the expense of democracy in Russia? Mr. Obama must listen very carefully when European voices defend the Putin regime. Nearly always there is the hiss of gas or the bubbling of oil in the background.
Last weekend Mr. Medvedev was in Washington to continue his new charm offensive. But Mr. Obama must remember that he was selected by over 66 million votes while Mr. Medvedev needed only one — that of his predecessor, Mr. Putin.
There is little doubt the most recent elections in Russia had even less value than those in Venezuela and Iran. Russia’s own “supreme leader” cannot be treated as a true democratic representative if the new U.S. administration wishes to maintain any credibility on matters of human rights and freedom abroad. For a glimpse into Russia’s “democracy,” just look at its idea of a bailout. While Washington is worried about Main Street, in Russia the government wants to rescue the oligarchs — at the expense of the Russian taxpayer.
In Mr. Medvedev’s Nov. 5 speech in Moscow, he assured the mafia running the country that everything is business-as-usual despite the global financial crisis. He also talked about extending the presidential and parliamentary terms of office, even though the next Russian parliamentary elections aren’t until 2011.
The speech sent two signals. First, that the Constitution, praised by Mr. Medvedev as the “cornerstone of law,” can be twisted. This helps pave the way for Mr. Putin’s return to his old Kremlin office, perhaps even before all the furniture has been moved out. Equally important, it says that Messrs. Medvedev and Putin aren’t going anywhere until they are forced to leave.
In a Nov. 7 meeting of senior officials, Mr. Medvedev instructed the interior minister to crush any demonstrators “exploiting the crisis” as extremists and criminals. If the EU has “mostly” ignored bloodshed in Georgia, would they accept it in Russia as well?
The collapsing Russian economy precipitated Mr. Medvedev’s new batch of threats. The vast majority of Russians, who haven’t shared the trough with Mr. Putin’s elites over the past decade, are realizing that they never will. When Mr. Medvedev took office he said that Russia would become a global financial center and that the ruble would become a reserve currency of choice. But with oil nearing $50 a barrel, the charade of a strong and stable Russia is over. The ruble is becoming a reserve currency — in Russia. With so many aspects of life in Russia deteriorating simultaneously, the regime has to squeeze harder to keep control.
Each day decreases the likelihood of a quiet transition of power later on. As John F. Kennedy said, “Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable.” Such talk about the fall of the Putin regime is not just wishful thinking. Remember all the experts who failed to anticipate the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Do not believe that the damage from a violent fall would be limited to within Russia’s borders. Gazprom and its ilk have many allies in the Western companies and administrations that currently serve as the Kremlin’s enablers. There is also the issue of Russia’s vast nuclear arsenal and large, though impoverished, military.
Mr. Medvedev’s posturing about the supposed threat of NATO expansion — and about deploying missiles near the Polish border in response to the U.S. missile shield — are part of his plan to get Western leaders to leave him alone so that he can continue his looting. Mr. Obama must quickly make clear that he will not tolerate this. He cannot repeat his predecessor’s mistake and look into Mr. Putin’s eyes instead of looking at his record.
Mr. Obama’s character is already being tested. He will fail unless he labels the Putin dictatorship correctly from the start. If he does, Mr. Obama might even be able to help bring hope and change to an entirely new constituency: 142 million Russians.
How should Mr. Obama deal with Russia’s official president, Dmitry Medvedev, and Russia’s real leader, Vladimir Putin? The choice is straightforward: Mr. Obama can treat them like fellow democratic leaders or like the would-be dictators that they are. His decision will tell the world a great deal about how seriously he takes his promises of change.
The Kremlin is very eager to be accepted as an equal. It apparently hopes that Mr. Obama will send the signal that democracy in Russia doesn’t matter, that the Kremlin’s crushing of the opposition and free speech is irrelevant, and that annexing pieces of neighboring Georgia is a local issue and not an international one.
Last week Mr. Medvedev was in France to meet with the leaders of Europe. French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who is also the current European Union president, tripped over his tongue to ingratiate himself and to present himself as a great peacemaker.
Mr. Sarkozy proudly announced that Russia had “mostly completed” its obligations to resolve the conflict with Georgia. But there is no way to “mostly” accept a dictatorship.
Russia’s ruling elite has close allies among the European nations that Mr. Obama is expected to woo. I am far less concerned by Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s clownish remarks about Mr. Obama’s “suntan” than about the way he so eagerly rushes to defend the commercial and political interests of Mr. Putin’s clan.
Leaders like Messrs. Berlusconi and Sarkozy have no allegiance to the nation of Russia. Rather, they are defending Mr. Putin as a means to protect their personal and business relationships. Will Mr. Obama’s desire to be the toast of Europe come at the expense of democracy in Russia? Mr. Obama must listen very carefully when European voices defend the Putin regime. Nearly always there is the hiss of gas or the bubbling of oil in the background.
Last weekend Mr. Medvedev was in Washington to continue his new charm offensive. But Mr. Obama must remember that he was selected by over 66 million votes while Mr. Medvedev needed only one — that of his predecessor, Mr. Putin.
There is little doubt the most recent elections in Russia had even less value than those in Venezuela and Iran. Russia’s own “supreme leader” cannot be treated as a true democratic representative if the new U.S. administration wishes to maintain any credibility on matters of human rights and freedom abroad. For a glimpse into Russia’s “democracy,” just look at its idea of a bailout. While Washington is worried about Main Street, in Russia the government wants to rescue the oligarchs — at the expense of the Russian taxpayer.
In Mr. Medvedev’s Nov. 5 speech in Moscow, he assured the mafia running the country that everything is business-as-usual despite the global financial crisis. He also talked about extending the presidential and parliamentary terms of office, even though the next Russian parliamentary elections aren’t until 2011.
The speech sent two signals. First, that the Constitution, praised by Mr. Medvedev as the “cornerstone of law,” can be twisted. This helps pave the way for Mr. Putin’s return to his old Kremlin office, perhaps even before all the furniture has been moved out. Equally important, it says that Messrs. Medvedev and Putin aren’t going anywhere until they are forced to leave.
In a Nov. 7 meeting of senior officials, Mr. Medvedev instructed the interior minister to crush any demonstrators “exploiting the crisis” as extremists and criminals. If the EU has “mostly” ignored bloodshed in Georgia, would they accept it in Russia as well?
The collapsing Russian economy precipitated Mr. Medvedev’s new batch of threats. The vast majority of Russians, who haven’t shared the trough with Mr. Putin’s elites over the past decade, are realizing that they never will. When Mr. Medvedev took office he said that Russia would become a global financial center and that the ruble would become a reserve currency of choice. But with oil nearing $50 a barrel, the charade of a strong and stable Russia is over. The ruble is becoming a reserve currency — in Russia. With so many aspects of life in Russia deteriorating simultaneously, the regime has to squeeze harder to keep control.
Each day decreases the likelihood of a quiet transition of power later on. As John F. Kennedy said, “Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable.” Such talk about the fall of the Putin regime is not just wishful thinking. Remember all the experts who failed to anticipate the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Do not believe that the damage from a violent fall would be limited to within Russia’s borders. Gazprom and its ilk have many allies in the Western companies and administrations that currently serve as the Kremlin’s enablers. There is also the issue of Russia’s vast nuclear arsenal and large, though impoverished, military.
Mr. Medvedev’s posturing about the supposed threat of NATO expansion — and about deploying missiles near the Polish border in response to the U.S. missile shield — are part of his plan to get Western leaders to leave him alone so that he can continue his looting. Mr. Obama must quickly make clear that he will not tolerate this. He cannot repeat his predecessor’s mistake and look into Mr. Putin’s eyes instead of looking at his record.
Mr. Obama’s character is already being tested. He will fail unless he labels the Putin dictatorship correctly from the start. If he does, Mr. Obama might even be able to help bring hope and change to an entirely new constituency: 142 million Russians.
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