KIEV, Ukraine -- The U.S. Embassy cables from Ukraine leaked recently by  the website WikiLeaks prompt two observations.
The first is that the embassy believed Party of Regions leader Viktor  Yanukovych had changed from what he was during the 2004 election, when  he sought to come to power through election fraud.
The second is  that U.S. officials believed Yulia Tymoshenko was not a better option  than Yanukovych in the 2010 presidential election. One cable quotes  former President Leonid Kuchma as saying the 2010 election was one of  "choosing between bad and very bad" -- with Tymoshenko allegedly being  the latter.
Both of these positions were fundamentally wrong --  especially as seen from the hindsight of Yanukovych's first year in  power.
The WikiLeaks cables critical of Tymoshenko were a  reflection of her own mistakes and of lobbying by U.S. political  consultants working for Yanukovych and the Party of Regions since 2005.  One of the main criticisms was that Tymoshenko is a "populist," a claim  that ignores widespread populism among all Ukrainian politicians.
Indeed,  Yanukovych was the most populist in the 2010 elections and the prize  for the most populist billboard goes to former President Viktor  Yushchenko, who promised to place a 20 percent tax on yachts,  limousines, and villas.
The U.S. Embassy bought into the  accusation that Tymoshenko was beholden to Russian Prime Minister  Vladimir Putin. Tymoshenko was allegedly the biggest threat to Ukraine's  sovereignty and willing to be Russia's pawn, according to a cable  quoting oligarch Dmytro Firtash.
Evidence to back this conclusion  was her supposed concessions on Georgia during Russia's 2008 invasion  and Moscow-friendly positions on the Holodomor and the Black Sea Fleet.
In  reality, Yanukovych has caved in to Russia on all three issues. During  the Georgian crisis, the Party of Regions and the Communist Party (KPU)  supported Russia's dismemberment of Georgia. Likewise, the Party of  Regions and the KPU did not support the 2006 law on the Holodomor, and  Yanukovych has adopted Russia's position that it was a Soviet (not  Ukrainian) famine.
As president, he has extended the Black Sea  Fleet base in Sevastopol until 2042-47. A January 2010 U.S. cable  reports Yanukovych telling the U.S. ambassador that he was ready to  extend the base in exchange for economic preferences from Russia.
Yanukovych, The Pro-Russian Candidate
All  this led to the mistaken impression that Russia supported both  Tymoshenko and Yanukovych in the 2010 election, as they were both  "pro-Russian" and Moscow would be satisfied with either winning the  election.
Yushchenko made this argument during the campaign,  calling for his supporters not to vote for either candidate in the  second round of balloting. That decision probably cost Tymoshenko the  election, since she ended up losing by just 3 percentage points.
Other  cables claimed it made no difference whether Yanukovych or Tymoshenko  were elected as both are authoritarian and would allegedly seek to build  a "Putinist vertical power." Such analysis contradicted the reality  that Tymoshenko did not have the political machine, ability to blackmail  deputies, or control of television stations necessary for such a  project.
In addition, since 2008 Tymoshenko has consistently  argued for the need to move toward a full parliamentary system. The  authoritarianism of the Party of Regions is well documented among  Ukrainian sociologists and has been plain to see during the  transformation of parliament into a rubber-stamp institution and the  return to a presidential constitution.
U.S. cables also buy into  the argument of a "pragmatic" wing in the Party of Regions that  supposedly desires to unify Ukraine and is pro-European, even possibly  willing to compromise on NATO. Such views were intensely lobbied by U.S.  political consultants working for the Party of Regions.
But the  pragmatic wing of the Party of Regions was not evident in 2005-08 when  the party voted with the KPU against legislation to join the WTO.  Ukraine's 2008 WTO membership paves the way for the signing of a Deep  Free Trade Agreement with the EU, a process the pragmatic wing of the  Party of Regions allegedly supports.
These cables also ignored  the anti-NATO stances of Yanukovych and the Party of Regions, arguing  that this was election rhetoric to mobilize eastern Ukrainian voters  that would be ignored after the voting. Again this was wrong, as  President Yanukovych is the first of four post-Soviet Ukrainian  presidents to not support NATO membership.
The party has also  adopted contradictory positions on Ukraine's participation in NATO's  Program for Peace exercises, opposing them when in opposition (leading  to the cancellation of the Sea Breeze exercises in 2006 and 2009) and  supporting them when in power.
U.S. cables from Ukraine also  claimed that Yanukovych, if he won the 2010 election, would not be a  Russian pawn and would defend Ukraine's interests, even if only in the  economic sphere. Although Yanukovych defends his economic interests from  Russia, he has adopted domestic, national-identity, and foreign  policies that are in Russia's national interests.
Russia  successfully lobbied for the four candidates who became the chairman of  the Security Service (SBU) and ministers of education, foreign affairs,  and defense. Russian citizens illegally control the president's  bodyguards and the media-analytical section of the presidential  administration.
The Real  Yanukovych
U.S. cables from 2005-06 were more critical of  the Party of Regions, but in 2008-10 two factors changed. First,  public-relations efforts by U.S. consultants persuaded many in the West,  including the U.S. Embassy, that Yanukovych had changed.
This  ignored his unwillingness to concede the election fraud of 2004 and his  continued contention that he won that election. A December 2005 cable  quotes Yanukovych as complaining that a "putsch" and "Kuchma's  machinations" had denied him the presidency. One cable analyzed the  Party of Regions' "heavily pro-Russian campaign rhetoric" in 2006,  attributing this to its co-option of Communist voters.
A second  factor that changed the tone in the U.S. cables by 2008 was Western  fatigue with the feuding Orange political leaders, Yushchenko and  Tymoshenko. The pair had squandered the five years of opportunity given  to them by the Orange Revolution.
All four elections held on  Yanukovych's watch -- two as governor in Donetsk in 1999 and 2002 and  two as prime minister and president in 2004 and 2010 -- have been  criticized as unfree.
U.S. cables from 2005-06 showed that senior  members of the Kuchma government who were involved in abuse of office  and election fraud were embedded in the Party of Regions, which is  described as a "cover for Donetsk criminal circles and oligarchs."
These  cables continued to be skeptical about the new face of the Party of  Regions and express concern it would abuse state administrative  resources, tamper with election laws, and seek to close media outlets  they do not control. This is precisely what Yanukovych has done in his  first year in office.
 
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