Showing posts with label Yanukovych. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Yanukovych. Show all posts

Sunday, 4 December 2011

Yanukovych Set To Sacrifice European Future And Keep Tymoshenko In Prison

KIEV, Ukraine -- As the EU-Ukraine summit scheduled for December 19 approaches, the chances for concluding an association agreement decrease.
Although the two sides have completed their association and free trade talks, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych’s determination to keep in prison his bitter rival, former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, makes the logical conclusion of the talks with the signing of the agreement and its further ratification by the legislatures of EU member states nearly impossible.

The efforts made in November by several EU leaders to persuade Yanukovych to change his mind on Tymoshenko proved futile.

Apparently, Yanukovych either believes that the EU will proceed with the association agreement despite Tymoshenko, as Ukraine is too important to lose to Russia, or keeping the most popular oppositionist incarcerated ahead of the October 2012 parliamentary elections is more important to him than relations with the EU.

On November 15, the Ukrainian parliament refused to decriminalize the abuse of power law upon which basis Tymoshenko was indicted in October.

Yanukovych’s Party of Regions insisted that the law would not be changed for the sake of one person.

Yanukovych had mentioned the possibility of decriminalization, while meeting EU leaders earlier this fall, so many hoped this would be the way to resolve the situation.

Meeting Polish President, Bronislaw Komorowski, and German President, Christian Wulff, in Poland on November 15, Yanukovych admitted that there may be problems with ratifying the association agreement due to Tymoshenko’s imprisonment.

However, Yanukovych reiterated that he would not interfere with the courts and that Tymoshenko was not an opposition leader but prime minister when she exceeded her authority in preparing gas contracts with Russia’s Gazprom in 2009.
Yanukovych repeats this in all his meetings with visitors from the EU.

On November 22, it was Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite’s turn to try to persuade Yanukovych to change his mind.

She told him in Kiev that the results of the summit would depend on the resolution of the situation around Tymoshenko, adding that this was a message that the EU authorized her to convey to Yanukovych.

The court’s decision to imprison Tymoshenko for seven years shocked the EU, as it is believed that the aim was to politically neutralize Tymoshenko, said Grybauskaite.

The only positive outcome of Grybauskaite’s plea for Tymoshenko was that Yanukovych after meeting her instructed the health ministry to ensure that Tymoshenko, who has had spinal problems, be properly examined in a hospital.

At the same time, Yanukovych threatened that Kiev would take a pause with the EU “if certain politicians and countries think that Ukraine does not match” EU criteria.

The Polish Foreign Minister, Radoslaw Sikorski, and his Swedish counterpart, Carl Bildt, paid an enigmatic visit to Yanukovych’s stronghold of Donetsk on November 23, to meet Ukraine’s richest businessman and Yanukovych’s old ally Rinat Akhmetov; who is viewed by many as pro-European.

No details about the meeting have emerged, but the Ukrainian weekly Zerkalo Nedeli suggested on November 26 that Sikorski and Bildt overestimated Akhmetov’s influence on Yanukovych, as far as his attitude to Tymoshenko is concerned.

At the same time, a report by Interfax on November 23 suggested that Yanukovych would ignore the summit on December 19 and visit Moscow on that day instead.
On November 24, the business daily Kommersant-Ukraine cited its sources as saying that the report in Interfax was aimed by Yanukovych’s team at testing the EU’s reaction.

However, visiting Polish President, Bronislaw Komorowski, made it clear on November 28 that the EU was firm in its belief that by keeping Tymoshenko behind bars Kiev demonstrated that it did not meet the EU’s criteria for treatment of the opposition.

Komorowski reiterated that Tymoshenko’s imprisonment would slow the process of ratification of the EU-Ukraine association agreement.

He added that he had hoped that Tymoshenko’s offenses would be decriminalized.

For his part, Yanukovych only promised Komorowski to improve the conditions of Tymoshenko’s incarceration, while Prosecutor-General Viktor Pshonka insisted in a TV interview that politics had nothing to do with Tymoshenko’s imprisonment.

Meanwhile, it has become obvious that the association agreement will not even be initialed on December 19.

Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister, Pavlo Klimkin, said on November 23 that Kiev had intended to only complete the talks by the summit, while the association agreement could be signed later.

European Commission representative in Kiev, Jose Manuel Pinto Teixeira confirmed that the agreement would not be initialed at the summit.

Diplomats are explaining this by referring to technical problems, but it is clear from statements by EU leaders that the main problem is Tymoshenko’s imprisonment.

Yanukovych’s argument that he may not interfere with the courts is ambiguous.
Second, Yanukovych could have asked his party caucus, which dominates parliament, to approve decriminalization of the articles under which Tymoshenko was convicted, but he chose not to.

Saturday, 5 November 2011

Yanukovych Warns Of Imminent Shake-Up

KIEV, Ukraine -- Ukraine’s President Viktor Yanukovych yesterday challenged his government to either win people’s trust or resign while dismissing two officials himself.
Yanukovych made a rare appearance at a cabinet session during which he lashed out at his trusted prime minister and singled out other officials for allegedly paying too little attention to voters’ economic needs.

His comments came a day after about a thousand veterans of the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster tried to storm parliament over planned cuts in benefits and coincided with another festering row over natural gas prices with Russia.

The head of the president’s administration said ahead of the meeting that Yanukovych was on the verge of announcing his first reshuffle since beating the 2004 Orange Revolution leader Yulia Tymoshenko for the presidency in February 2010.

But the increasingly isolated leader completed the session by announcing the dismissal of just two regional governors while telling the rest of his cabinet to improve their performance in the coming weeks.

“This is not the end of our conversation,” Yanukovych said in televised comments.

“We will take a look at things again before the end of the year, towards the end of December, and see how quickly people are improving their work.”

He also urged “those who cannot handle things to find easier work - preferably on a voluntary basis.”

Yanukovych yesterday did replace the head of the western Lviv district that was once a hotbed of support for the pro-Western Orange leaders and sacked the old governor of Zaporozhia - an industrial region in the southeast.

Local media however speculated that the wave of dismissals could eventually touch up to five ministers including those responsible for finance and defence.

An unidentified government source told the independent censor.net.ua online publication that even Prime Minister Mykola Azarov’s position was not safe.

Yanukovych did not spare his long-standing ally from criticism but appeared to save his harshest comments for Health Minister Oleksandr Anishchenko - a relatively low-level official also rumoured to be on the way out.

“It is hard to work with you - really hard,” Yanukovych is reported to have told the minister at one point.

Several reports said Azarov was currently trying to save the job of Finance Minister Fedir Yaroshenko amid attempts by some groups to replace him with the hawkish head of Ukraine’s SBU state security service.

Analysts said talk of a reshuffle appeared to have been sparked in part by attempts by Yanukovych to distance himself from domestic criticism and improve his government’s credibility at a time of tensions with the West.

But analysts also point to a heated rivalry within the president’s Regions Party that has spilled out into the open less than a year before October’s elections to the Verkhovna Rada upper house.

The talk of impending government changes results from “a fight for government access between big business and political groups,” said Volodymyr Fesenko of the Penta political studies group.

Sunday, 9 October 2011

Europe brainwashes Ukraine's Yanukovych over Tymoshenko

he persistent desire of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych to become a part of Europe has resulted in a confusing situation. Ukraine took part in Eastern Partnership summit in Warsaw. Clouds began to gather above Mr. Yanukovych a lot earlier - soon after the beginning of the trial of Yulia Tymoshenko.

"The majority view [in the EU] is that the agreement can be finalized only if the Tymoshenko case is solved," Reuters quoted Alain Juppe, the French foreign minister, as saying. "It means having a free and fair trial and abandoning the unjustified charges against her.

Ukraine ignored the remarks from the French official. As a result, Mr. Yanukovych received a letter written by two women. One of them is known as US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. The other one was EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton.

It was a personal letter, but it just so happened that the essence of it was made public. The authors particularly wrote that the charges against Tymoshenko were politically motivated. In addition, the case against the former prime minister of Ukraine demonstrated the absence of the supremacy of law in Ukraine. Clinton and Ashton concluded the letter saying that Tymoshenko's conviction would irrevocably ruin Ukraine's reputation abroad.

The Ukrainian president did not respond to the ladies.

Viktor Yanukovych had a meeting with three high-ranking European officials during the annual YES conference (Yalta European Strategy). The Ukrainian president has a conversation with Commissioner Stefan Fule, Swedish Foreign Secretary Carl Bildt and Elmar Brok, a German member of the European Parliament.

The message from the European officials was clear and simple. Tymoshenko must be freed. Secondly, Ukraine must create all necessary conditions to give her an opportunity to participate in the forthcoming elections.

Should Tymoshenko be released? Yes, she should be, immediately, former EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana, who also attended the forum, said. Politicians should not be treated like criminals or punished for political decisions, he said.

Several days later, though, Ukrainian prosecutors claimed that the "Ukrainian Joan of Arc" must be jailed for seven years. The court will deliver the verdict on October 11.

Several more days later, Mr. Yanukovych set off for the Eastern Partnership summit. The story reminds an old joke. "I was walking along a desolate street yesterday and was raped. I am going to that street tonight again."

As EU President Herman Van Rompuy said at the briefing, Tymoshenko was discussed Thursday evening with Yanukovych during the dinner of heads of state and government, during bilateral meetings, including with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, as well as during the plenary session on Friday," reports Deutsche Welle radio.

"We expressed our concerns about the fate of the former prime minister," EU President Herman Van Rompuy said, "and we expressed our rejection of the possible selective use of judicial measures against members of the former administration," the message on the official website of Yulia Tymoshenko said.

In turn, Barroso said that he supports Ukraine's course towards European integration. He said Ukraine has an opportunity to become the first country of the Eastern Partnership project. However, he added, Europe was extremely concerned about the case of Yulia Tymoshenko.

"We have presented to the authorities of Ukraine with a very clear opinion of the European Union and of each and every one of us individually, namely that the bad treatment of the opposition, the violation of citizen and civil standards infringe very gravely upon the execution of [Ukraine's European] aspirations," Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk stated.

Everyone in the West is very well aware of the fact that Tymoshenko's political views did not serve as the reason for her trial. Tymoshenko used to be able to use world's strongest forces, including the United States, as well as international financial institutions, such as the IMF. Nowadays, Yulia Tymoshenko has turned into a dumb weapon used by someone else's skillful hands.

It is worthy of note that the association agreement, which Ukraine would be able to sign with Europe on condition of Tymoshenko's release, does not stipulate Ukraine's EU membership even in the long-term perspective.

Sunday, 18 September 2011

Ukraine President Signals He May Yield On Tymoshenko

KIEV, Ukraine -- President Viktor Yanukovych hinted Friday he might yield to increasing Western pressure and end the trial of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko by changing Ukraine's criminal code.
Speaking at a conference in Yalta, Mr. Yanukovych distanced himself from the trial of the opposition leader, calling it "very painful."

He said he hoped that the criminal code would be "modernized" this year.

Political analysts said such an overhaul could decriminalize the article under which Ms. Tymoshenko is being tried.

The criminal code dates to 1962, when Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union, the president said. "That, undoubtedly, is nonsense," he said, according to a transcript of his remarks posted on his website.

The prosecution of Ms. Tymoshenko on abuse-of-office charges over a gas deal she struck with Russia in 2009 has threatened to hamper Mr. Yanukovych's push for deeper economic and political ties with the European Union.

Senior European politicians have warned that the failure to free Ms. Tymoshenko could lead to refusal by parliaments of some EU states to ratify an association agreement.

The trial judge called an unexpected two-week pause in proceedings Monday, three days after a joint letter to Mr. Yanukovych by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton raised concerns about the case.

Analysts said the recess gives Mr. Yanukovych an opportunity to find a way out of the prosecution of Ms. Tymoshenko, a longtime rival.

She accuses him of carrying out a political vendetta and using the trial to remove his leading opponent from the political scene.

EU Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Fule said after a meeting with Mr. Yanukovych on Friday: "We have been fully assured about his commitment to finding a solution," Reuters news agency reported. "We would like to see her being fully a part of political life," Mr. Fule said.
Russia's leaders have tried to tempt Mr. Yanukovych with an offer of lower gas prices, which Ukraine has long sought, in return for his agreement to take Ukraine into a Moscow-led customs union.

On Friday, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said Mr. Yanukovych's declared aim of joining the EU is "completely unrealistic," Interfax news agency reported.

Mr. Yanukovych, who will travel to Moscow on Sept. 24, repeated his rejection of Russia's offer.

Sunday, 10 April 2011

Yanukovych dismisses some deputy ministers, including two deputy defense ministers

Ukraine's President Viktor Yanukovych has dismissed Mykhailo Maliarchuk and Borys Andresiuk as deputy defense ministers of Ukraine.

In addition, Kostiantyn Vaschenko, Vitaly Muschynin, Anatoliy Dziubak, and Ihor Lushnikov were dismissed as deputy ministers of labor and social policy, Artem Volodin as deputy environment minister.

Serhiy Bozhko was dismissed as deputy head of the State Nuclear Regulation Committee of Ukraine.

Mykola Shubin was dismissed as deputy chairman of the national agency for the preparation and holding of the Euro 2012 finals in Ukraine responsible for budgetary programs and financial support.

Relevant decrees were signed on Wednesday and published at the presidential Web site.

Tuesday, 31 August 2010

The Rebalancing Of Ukraine's Political System

KIEV, Ukraine -- In a speech given to mark Ukraine's 19th year of independence on Aug 24, President Viktor Yanukovych declared that he has a "formula" for strengthening Ukraine that includes "a strong president who has real powers to coordinate and control the implementation of key reform issues and the country's strategic course."
The main ingredient in the president's "formula" is a return of Ukraine's government to the presidential-parliamentary system of the Kuchma era. In order to accomplish this, Yanukovych is pushing for a repeal of law No. 2222-IV.

Enacted in 2004, law No. 2222-IV shifted significant power from the president to the prime minister and parliament (Verkhovna Rada). Yanukovych attempted to repeal the law in early July 2010 by initiating a referendum, but the motion was shot down in parliament by the opposition and the Communist Party and Lytvyn Bloc - both members of the Stability and Reform Coalition spearheaded by the Party of Regions (PoR).

The president's ambitions did not fade, however, and on July 14 parliament approved a motion by a vote of 252 (out of 450) requesting the Constitutional Court consider the constitutionality of law No. 2222-IV. The court's decision is expected in October.

Rebalancing power could lead to political tension. In our view, the court is increasingly likely to determine the law unconstitutional. Though this decision would result in a clearer separation of the powers of Ukraine's central governmental bodies, tensions between groups within the PoR could appear in the ensuing reshuffle.
If law No. 2222-IV is repealed, the following changes would take place:

-- The president would have the right to nominate the PM (confirmed by parliament), the Cabinet of Ministers and the heads of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), the Antimonopoly Committee, the State Property Fund and the State Committee on TV.

-- The president would be able to dismiss the PM and prosecutor general without approval from parliament.

-- All bills would require the president's signature. (Currently, bills with a 2/3 majority approval by parliament become law after 10 days with or without the president's approval).

-- The President would be able to annul decisions made by the cabinet.

-- The Prosecutors Office would no longer serve as the supervisory authority over state and local authorities and government offices and officers, thus weakening the Prosecutor Office's influence.

-- Parliamentarians would be elected for four-year terms rather than the current five-year terms.

Repeal of law No. 2222-IV looks increasingly likely. Recent developments point to the Constitutional Court ruling law No. 2222-IV unconstitutional. On July 12, Anatoly Golovin was elected head of the Constitutional Court - Golovin was President Yanukovych's clear favourite for the position.

Sergiy Vdovichenko has been appointed Judge-Rapporteur for the court's decision on the law. Both Golovin and Vdovychenko are natives of the Donbass region - the PoR's home turf - and Golovin has been present at meetings on judicial reform held by the presidential administration.

In addition, among the most eager lobbyists for the repeal has been the group within the PoR led by the president's Chief-of-Staff Sergiy Levochkin and Dmitry Firtash.

The Levochkin-Firtash group maintains the closest ties with the Yanukovych group and together wield significant influence over Ukraine's judiciary, the Constitutional Court included. Both groups will be able to bolster their political stature once the authority of parliament and the Prosecutors Office has been weakened Tension in the ranks.

Not all groups within the PoR are excited about repealing law No. 2222-IV. The group led by steel magnate Rinat Akhmetov would like to see an alternative, and initiated a revision of the law "On the foundations of foreign and domestic policy" along this line.

The proposal would have increased the president's power by providing him control of the National Security Council; however, this mechanism did not find the necessary support.
When the smoke clears, the group led by Prime Minister Azarov may be on the outside looking in. The buzz among political insiders in Kyiv is that Azarov will be used as a scapegoat for the government's recently implemented unpopular reforms and demoted to head of the National Bank.

President Yanukovych would then use his new found power to hand select the replacement PM. Top contenders for the position include First Vice Prime Minister Andriy Kliuyev (Kliuyev group), Vice Prime Minister Borys Kolesnikov (Akhmetov group), Sergiy Levochkin and Minister of Fuel and Energy Yuriy Boiko (both of the Levochkin-Firtash group).

As President Yanukovych forges ahead in his plan to transform Ukraine's government back into the presidential-parliamentary system of the Kuchma era, tensions may rise among groups within the PoR, which would weaken the country's relatively stable political environment.

On the other hand, if groups are able to settle their differences, the PoR would lead Ukraine toward further stability as the current parliamentary- presidential system has a tumultuous track record - the imbalance that this system creates led to the demise of the Orange Revolution.

We are optimistic that all sides within the PoR will come to terms sooner than later. We base our judgment on the fact that the motion to send law No. 2222-IV to the Constitutional Court was strongly supported by the PoR in parliament. In addition, the party's recent dip in the polls will foster cohesion ahead of local elections scheduled for October 31, 2010.

Earlier than expected parliamentary elections are a possibility. The repeal of law No. 2222-IV could result in parliamentary elections being held a year earlier than anticipated. The current parliament was elected in 2007 to a five-year term as dictated by the rules established under the 2004 reform.

Therefore, if the law is repealed, a fifth year for parliamentarians could be deemed illegitimate, thus resulting in elections in 2011.

The uncertainty surrounding election campaigns in Ukraine has never been good for investor confidence, a trend unlikely to change in the near future. However, considering the PoR's recent dip in the polls and that more unpopular reforms are on the way in the next six months, the party would have little to gain by holding elections in 2011 and will look to defer elections until 2012, in our view.

Tuesday, 6 July 2010

Yanukovych presents Order of Liberty to Nazarbayev


Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych has presented the Order of Liberty to Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev.

Nazarbayev was awarded for "his outstanding personal contribution to the development of Kazakh cooperation," the presidential press service reported on Tuesday.

Yanukovych signed a respective decree on July 2.

As reported, on July 6, Nazarbayev celebrates his 70th birthday.

On July 9, Yanukovych will celebrate his 60th birthday. Nazarbayev and a number of the presidents of other countries are expected to arrive in Crimea to congratulate Yanukovych on his birthday


Sunday, 6 June 2010

Yanukovych goes to Greece on official visit

President Viktor Yanukovych on Sunday morning went to Athens, Greece on an official visit, reads a statement made by the presidential press service.

There he will have a meeting with Greek President Karolos Papoulias.

Apart from this, on Sunday he will make a pilgrim voyage to the Mount Athos.


As Ukrainian News earlier reported, in his June 4 congratulation to President Papoulias on his birthday Yanukovych expressed confidence in further development of Ukraine's relations with Greece.

Saturday, 5 June 2010

Ukraine Disappoints Russia On Georgia Rebel Regions

KIEV, Ukraine -- President Viktor Yanukovych said Friday Ukraine was against recognizing Georgia's rebel regions, dashing Russian hopes Kiev will support one of Moscow's most controversial policies
Russia recognised Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent after fighting a brief war in August 2008 with Georgia over their status, but its hotly-contested move has only been followed by a handful of far-flung states.

Yanukovych -- a pro-Russian figure who defeated the leaders of the pro-West Orange Revolution in February elections -- said the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as that of Kosovo, were against international law.

"I have never recognized Abkhazia, South Ossetia or Kosovo as independent states. This is a violation of international laws and norms," he told reporters at a news conference to mark his first 100 days in power.

"According to international law, any violation of the territorial integrity of any state is forbidden."

The president said he had never "in any interview" supported actions which violated the borders of states.

While in opposition in 2008, Yanukovych declared that Ukraine should "accept the will" of the people of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and "recognize their independence," according to the website of his party.

The recognition of Kosovo by Western powers and most of the EU infuriated Russia, a traditional ally of Serbia, and analysts believe this encouraged Russian recognition of the Georgian breakaway regions.

Yanukovych's comments appear aimed at emphasizing his vision of Ukraine as a neutral, non-aligned state, which while ditching the previous government's aim to join NATO will also not join Russian-led military alliances.

The day earlier, parliament had voted to formally end the ambition to join NATO espoused by the administration of previous President Viktor Yushchenko -- a goal which had deeply riled Russia.

Carefully balanced neutrality between East and West was the flagship policy of Ukraine's second post-independence president, Leonid Kuchma.

Since taking power, Yanukovych has moved with blistering speed to reinforce ties with Moscow, agreeing a deal to extend the stay of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine in an exchange for a huge discount on gas prices.

But there have been signs Kiev is nervous at the swiftness of events, notably after Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin astonished his Ukrainian counterpart with an impromptu announcement their state gas firms should merge.

Prominent Russian MP Konstantin Zatulin said Yanukovych's statement was linked to Ukrainian concerns about separatism on its Black Sea peninsula of Crimea which has a Russian majority as well as a large Tatar minority.

"The doubts about the territorial integrity of Ukraine have not disappeared and these are making Kiev extra careful," he told the Interfax news agency.

But he said the issue was not paramount in Russian-Ukrainian relations and expressed hope that Ukraine "after some time comes to a different decision".

Russia's recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent was condemned by the West, which considers the two regions to be an integral part of Georgia.

Embarrassingly for Moscow, so far only the South American states of Nicaragua and Venezuela and the tiny Pacific island nation of Nauru have followed its move.

Even Russia's once steadfast ally Belarus has so far held off from recognizing the rebel regions.

Friday, 28 May 2010

Yanukovych is welcomed with the traditional bread-and-salt ceremony at the Lviv airport.

Lviv Welcomes Yanukovych

LVIV, Ukraine – More than three months into his presidency, Viktor Yanukovych finally made a trip to Lviv, where he is a deeply unpopular and divisive figure for his pro-Russian policies.

The result?

He came. He talked. He answered questions. And he probably didn’t change many minds in the unofficial capital of western Ukraine, where less than 10 percent of voters supported his presidential bid.

Olha Balaban is a second-year student at Lviv Politechnic University, where Yanukovych spent two hours of his five-hour visit. Balaban may have summarized the local feeling with these comments: “I didn’t see him. I don’t want to see him. Everything would be fine if we had a normal president.”

As one might expect, more than 1,000 protesters turned up outside Polytechnic University, where a similar number officers, many of whom were helmeted and armed, forcibly pushed the crowd to a side street for their demonstration. There were, unsurprisingly, conflicting reports over whether unruly protesters were to blame for breaking through security lines or whether the officers got overly aggressive and started striking demonstrators with truncheons.
In either case, Yanukovych barely noticed the demonstrators before he ended the official part of his visit about 3:30 p.m. on May 27. He suggested the protesters had been hired to cause trouble.

“I think Lviv Oblast in general positively assesses our work, but the group of people [yelling outside] are paid for political issues,” Yanukovych told regional government leaders. “We have a democratic society and this shouldn’t get in the way of our decisions and our attitude toward any regions. Do you agree with me or not?” Members responded: “Yes!”

The biggest news of the day, perhaps, was his announcement that Ukraine will make an official bid to host the Winter Olympics in 2022.

The president arrived at the airport, visited a new soccer stadium under construction to host the Euro 2012 football championships and also spent time at a military academy. The bulk of his visit was taken up by a two-hour discussion that he chaired with regional government officials. Yanukovych brought along many leading members of the Ukrainian government, including Central Bank chairman Volodymyr Stelmakh and Deputy Prime Minister Sergiy Tigipko.

He took four questions from regional journalists. He brushed aside one question about whether his Russian-friendly policies are dividing the nation. Yanukovych has criticized early 20th century Ukrainian nationalist leaders Stepan Bandera and Roman Shukhevych, both popular in western Ukraine for fighting Soviet rule. The president also has agreed to let the Russian Black Sea Fleet remain based on Ukrainian territory until at least 2042, a decision that is an anathema here. His appointment of Dmitry Tabachnyk as education minister continues to rile many, since Tabachnyk has questioned whether Ukraine deserved to be an independent nation and has been
especially dismissive of western Ukrainians.

Saturday, 22 May 2010

Yanukovych to attend service in Kyiv Pechersk Lavra on Trinity

Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych will attend a festive mass Kyiv Pechersk Lavra on Orthodox Trinity Sunday, on May 23, the president's press service reported on Saturday.

On religious holidays, Yanukovych usually attends service in Kyiv Pechersk Lavra, which is a center of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate.

Friday, 14 May 2010

Yanukovych plays the Moscow card

Ukraine's new leader, Viktor Yanukovych, is betting on a strongly pro-Russian and anti-Orange stance ahead of President Dmitry Medvedev's state visit to Kiev on Monday, as he seeks to gain Moscow's help with the country's struggling economy.

With the European Union's attention focused on Greek and Portuguese financial woes, it may be just the time to play the Moscow card, analysts say.

Medvedev is set to sign a bunch of deals, variously on border demarcation, joint use of Russia's Glonass satellite system, cooperation between Russia's VTB and Ukraine's Ukreximbank and on cultural and scientific corporation, RIA Novosti reported.

In the most controversial area, energy, talks but no deals are expected.

Yanukovych has made dramatic overtures towards Moscow since his election in February. Most controversial has been the deal to extend the lease for Russia's Black Sea naval base by 25 years in return for gas savings of up to $40 billion over the next decade.

And in what looks like a well-timed move, two criminal investigations were opened against former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko this week, putting Yanukovych's main opponent on the defensive ahead of Medvedev's visit next week.

Another contentious issue for Ukraine's nationalist opposition could be talks between Russian and Ukrainian security services on the resumption of patrols by Russia's Federal Security Service officers around Russia's Black Sea naval base at Sevastopol in the Crimea. A deal on the patrols could be signed on May 19, during Medvedev's visit to Kiev.

Ukraine's prosecutors have revived a 2001 bribery investigation against Tymoshenko that was halted after the Orange Revolution in 2005 and opened a new investigation into claims she skimmed hundreds of millions of dollars from sales of Kyoto emission quotas to Japan.

The investigations were launched as Tymoshenko was stepping up her campaign against Yanukovych's new government. She has called the investigations a personal attack by Yanukovych against her.

The decision on whether she will be taken into custody or not will be made on May 17, the day Medvedev is due to arrive in Kiev.

According to Sergei Markov, a senior United Russia State Duma deputy, it is unlikely that Tymoshenko will go to jail. "However, the investigation can be used as pressure on Tymoshenko's European partners," he said.

The moves against Tymoshenko are either intended as a signal to Moscow or an attempt by the Yanukovych regime to consolidate power, but either way they underpin Ukraine's new enthusiasm for Moscow, analysts said.

"Unexpectedly, Ukraine has moved closer to Moscow in the last couple of days, politically and economically," Alexander Rahr, a Russia and Eastern Europe expert at the German Council on Foreign Relations, told The Moscow News. "It looks like Ukraine is steadily moving towards becoming a member of the single economic space," an ambitious reunification program Russia pledged to complete by 2012 with Belarus and Kazakhstan.

Though Ukraine is increasingly looking eastwards, the country has no intention of giving up on closer ties with Europe, analysts said.

"Neither Ukraine nor its partners can count on a quick resolution of its economic problems" unless it gets help from Russia, said Dmitry Danilov, head of European Security Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Europe.

Yanukovych had initially proposed a three-way consortium between Naftogaz, Gazprom and European investors to rebuild Ukraine's dilapidated gas transport system. But those plans appear to be scuppered after Prime Minister Vladimir Putin instead proposed a straight two-way merger between Gazprom and Naftogaz, which would see the Russian energy giant practically swallowing up the undercapitalised Ukrainian company.

Yanukovych's government has not yet reacted to the offer, and officials no such deals are expected during Medvedev's visit. But analysts said it was a proposal that Yanukovych would certainly be considering.

"Right now Yanukovych is interested in stability, particularly energy stability," Danilov said. "Ukraine got a very nice offer - it was a step forward. Though Yanukovych will be criticised for selling out to Russia, he is effectively taking advantage of the situation and getting gas concessions."

Ukraine understands that the European Union is currently too preoccupied with Greece and Portugal, and with its own economic problems, said Rahr, of the German Council on Foreign Relations. "It can expect less from the European Union than it can from Russia."

The EU, faced with its own budget problems, has "irresponsibly lost Ukraine" from its field of vision, Rahr said. "I have heard nothing concrete about any steps in the partnership with Ukraine."

Europe is not giving up on Ukraine, but there is an acknowledgement that there is little it can currently offer. Meanwhile, Russia has mutual interests with Ukraine, Rahr said.
Those interests appear to be more economic than political, said Markov, of United Russia. "The integrated assets of Russia and Ukraine will be more capitalised, and they will bring more profit for both sides," he said.



Saturday, 8 May 2010

End Of Ukraine And Future Of Eurasia

KIEV, Ukraine -- For the first time in 20 years, Ukraine’s disappearance as a state is imaginable. Since Ukraine is a pivotal state of great geopolitical significance to the stability of both Europe and Asia, its collapse could have considerable geopolitical consequences.
If Ukraine fails as a state, future historians will place the blame on four factors:

First - NATO enlargement up to Ukraine’s western border. Expanding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to include East Central Europe and the Baltic states effectively placed Ukraine in a strategically untenable no-man’s land between a united West and an increasingly hostile Russia.

Second - President Viktor Yushchenko’s catastrophic mismanagement of the country in 2005-2009. Yushchenko neglected the economy, permitted corruption to flourish, demoralized the population, polarized the country, and destroyed the unity of pro-Western Ukrainian elites.

Third - Europe’s criminal indifference to Ukraine’s strategic dilemmas and experiment in democracy after the Orange Revolution of 2004. Europe—and especially Germany—courted authoritarian Russia and turned its back on Ukraine’s pleas for assistance, at precisely the time that even a vague promise of eventual membership in the European Union would have united Ukraine’s pro-Western elites around a democratic reform agenda.

Fourth - President Viktor Yanukovych’s rush to dismantle democracy and destroy Ukraine’s Ukrainian identity. In the two months that Yanukovych has been in office, he and his comrades in the Party of Regions have launched a full-scale rollback of Ukraine’s democratic institutions, a full-scale attack on Ukrainian language and culture, and a full-scale shift toward Russia.

Yanukovych’s actions could result in three possible scenarios, arranged below according to long-, medium-, and short-term probability:

1) Least likely in the short term is Ukraine’s transformation into a vassal state of Russia. Although critics of Yanukovych’s agreement to extend the Black Sea Fleet’s base in Sevastopol for 30 years accuse him of selling out to Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, the short-term reality is that the fleet would have stayed in the Crimea until 2017 anyway. The long-term prospects, however, are different.

The continued presence of the fleet until 2047 — in conjunction with Yanukovych’s apparent desire to forge the closest possible economic, cultural, political, and military ties with Russia — will draw Ukraine into Russia’s sphere of influence and could then, in a process of creeping re-imperialization, transform Ukraine into a Russian protectorate.

2) The real importance, in the short to medium term, of the Black Sea Feet deal is that it demonstrates that Yanukovych is not an economic reformer committed to introducing genuine market relations in Ukraine. The deal rests on an anti-market approach to economics and shows that Yanukovych is less interested in making Ukraine modern and productive than in acquiring easy money to sustain his hyper-centralized rule and make painful reforms unnecessary.

Yanukovych, in sum, is rapidly transforming Ukraine into a backward sultanistic regime, in which authoritarianism and corruption flourish and the economy stagnates. Such regimes are inherently unstable and, as they lose the support of even their die-hard supporters in the medium term, become vulnerable to people power, radical movements, and terrorism.

3) The most immediate — and most likely — short-term consequence of Yanukovych’s anti-Ukrainian and anti-democratic measures is the mobilization of Ukrainian democrats and the radicalization of Ukrainian nationalists. The harder Yanukovych pushes, the harder will they push back.

A second Orange Revolution would be the best-case outcome, but rather more likely is the abandonment of moderation by Ukrainians fed up with being treated as second-class citizens by a chauvinistic regime determined to push Ukrainian identity into Bantustans.

As social tensions rise, both violence and an attempt by Western Ukraine to secede become increasingly conceivable. Yanukovych will try to crack down, but how the resulting conflict will be resolved is anybody’s guess. One thing is sure: Ukraine will be destabilized.

What would be the consequences for Eurasia of the end of Ukraine?

First, the European project will collapse. If the European Union is unwilling or unable to defend democracy in its back yard and to prevent Ukraine’s transformation into a second Yugoslavia, then the EU is as meaningless as its commitment to supposedly humane European values is hollow.

Second, Russian democracy will be set back for generations, as Ukraine’s collapse will be said to demonstrate that Eastern Slavs are congenitally incapable of democratic self-rule. In turn, the case for autocracy will be made with increased vigor, and the authoritarian character of the Putin-Medvedev regime will be strengthened.

Third, Putin Russia’s neo-imperial agenda will have been vindicated. The end of Ukraine will seemingly prove that Russia can, should, and must reestablish imperial sway over the formerly Soviet states. If a Russian empire is reestablished, a second cold war with the United States is inevitable, an arms race in Central Europe is probable, and a hot war with imperial Russia’s non-Russian neighbors, including China, becomes possible.

If the imperial project fails — as a result, perhaps, of misguided imperialist adventures that lead to disaster and discredit the Russian regime — Russia will be destabilized and Eurasia will suffer the contagion. At the very least, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Middle East will remain unstable for many decades to come.

Are such trends inevitable? Europe could easily correct Ukraine’s trajectory by promoting Ukraine’s integration into Euro-Atlantic structures — but will not as long as it frames the issue as Ukrainian democracy vs Russian gas. The United States could impress Yanukovych with the need to keep his sultanistic ambitions in check—but won’t as long as it deems Russia indispensable to its geopolitical designs.

That means that Ukrainians alone will have to stop the destruction of their state. The chances of such an outcome are actually greater than Yanukovych may think. He’s already alienated one third to one half of the country and transformed most of its truculent intellectual and cultural elites into his enemies.

As the country continues to stagnate economically under his sultanistic rule, disenchantment will spread to those Ukrainians who are still willing to give Yanukovych a chance. As the gap between his increasingly brittle sultanistic regime and the increasingly angry population grows, elite defections will multiply and a second Orange Revolution could very well take place.

Whatever the scenario — vassalage, popular upheaval, or civil conflict — Ukraine will be unstable. And Yanukovych will go down in history as even more ineffective than the hapless Yushchenko.

Tuesday, 4 May 2010

The Re-Finlandisation Of Ukraine – Yanukovich Trashes Economic Restructuring And Democracy

KIEV, Ukraine -- Less than three months after the Presidential elections in Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovich, the elected President, has already surprised the great majority of analysts with his policies.
Most pundits, inferring things from the leader of the Party of Regions’ speeches and political programme and the current Ukrainian political circumstances, were dubious of his capability to steer Ukraine’s politics and economy towards Russia. There would be no new course in Ukrainian foreign policy after Yanukovich’s victory, they predicted.

The author of this article was viciously ridiculed in a comment posted by a reader when he wrote in this column that a Yanukovich Presidency would entirely change the internal and external political dynamic in Ukraine.

The last two weeks’ events seem to vindicate my prognosis. Ukraine is relinquishing a balanced foreign policy for what it thinks will be an economic relief.

Since April 21 history is on the roll again in Kiev, with its streets filled with thousands of “orange” and “blue” demonstrators. On that date, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed an agreement on extending the Russian Black Sea Fleet's lease of Sevastopol beyond the 2017 expiry date in return for lower prices for gas imported from Russia.

The deal was concluded in two documents. The first document specifies the interstate agreement to extend the stationing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet until 2042, with the possibility of a further extension by 5 years. The second document amends the gas contract signed on January 19, 2009 by then Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and Russian PM Vladimir V. Putin.

This amendment states that Ukraine will receive $40 billion worth of worth of gas “for free” over the next 10 years, a discount of 30 percent. It means that in 2011 fuel bills for oil and natural gas imports from Russia will be cut by an estimated $4 billion.

On April 27, this agreement was ratified by the Rada, the Ukrainian Parliament, by a vote of 236 Deputies (out of 450) amid turmoil and despite efforts of the former President Viktor Yushchenko and former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko to convince a majority of Deputies to vote against the agreement.

The deal has many consequences for Ukraine, Russia and the West. First, it reinforces, if not perpetuates, Russia’s influence and presence in Ukraine. Ukraine’s sovereignty and security policy becomes de facto limited and constrained.

With this agreement, Yanukovich has clearly ruled out the chances of Ukraine becoming a member of NATO. In the years to come, Russia will endeavour to include Ukraine in its area of security for good by pressuring Kiev to formally become a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), considered by The Kremlin as a counterweight to NATO.

Second, in the midterm, the Russian economic, military and political presence in the Crimea will be strengthened. This will give Russia an enviable position from which to pressurise Ukraine should the Ukrainian leadership not agree to perform some important strategic and political tasks imposed by Russia.

The effect is already being felt, since Yanukovich is reviewing the policies of his predecessor on almost all important fronts. On April 27 in Strasbourg, he said that the “famine” in Ukraine between 1932 and 1933 was not a genocide, as claimed by Yushchenko, but a “common tragedy of the participating States of the USSR.”

Third, if the Ukrainian Government believes that the reduction of the price of gas (the price is now comparable with the average European prices) will solve the many problems of the Ukrainian economy, they are totally wrong. Only thorough structural reforms can save the Ukrainian economy from further decline.

This is not to deny, however, that a reduction of the price of gas and all other Governmental actions will bring the state deficit down and improve public finances in the current and following years.

In Sevastopol, for instance, the extension the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s presence will continue to provide 15,000 jobs for Ukrainian citizens and President Medvedev has pledged to make major investments in improving the naval port’s aging infrastructures.

The economic situation in Ukraine is really bad. Its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell in 2009 by 15%. Metallurgical production - the main source of state revenue - shrank by 30%. However, the tumult that accompanied the Ukrainian Parliament’s extension of the lease agreement will frighten foreign investors.

Ukraine is likely to sink into political conflict and internecine war. In such a situation it will be difficult to save the country from its economic woes. Russia’s state finances will be in a slightly better shape in 2010, but if one takes into account the reduced gas price as a result of the agreement, Russia will run a wider budget deficit than Ukraine in 2010.

Fourth, the immediate winners of the agreement to lower gas prices are Ukrainian industrialists doing business in the eastern part of the country, by coincidence the stronghold of the Party of Regions. The chemical industry in particular and, partly, the metallurgical industry will be the main beneficiaries of the Yanukovich-Medvedev deal.

However, bringing gas prices back to the level of 2009 will not give the chemical and metallurgical industries a determining advantage over their competitors since the rebirth of these industries depends more on a long term programme of modernisation than the advantages of short term financial factors.

Fifth, while opposition Deputies in the Rada were throwing eggs at Volodymyr Lytvyn, Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada, Russian Prime Minister Putin was in Kiev to meet his Ukrainian counterpart, Mykola Azarov, to discuss further energy and industrial cooperation.

For example, Putin proposed creating a nuclear power holding company with Ukraine (“energy cooperation”) as way to rebuild ties between the two states. Such an agreement on energy cooperation will significantly limit Ukraine’s sovereignty on energy policy and seriously jeopardise plans on energy cooperation with the European Union (EU). Russia is trying to monopolise the Ukrainian gas and nuclear energy sectors and it seems that the new Ukrainian President agrees with such a policy.

Sixth, the agreement marks a return of Russia’s clout in its “privileged sphere of influence,” although most ex-Soviet republics will remain disobedient to Moscow’s diktat on many counts.

With the EU’s – and the Obama Administration's – softness in its relations with Russian nationalists, one can expect a gain of confidence in The Kremlin and greater assertiveness against Georgia, Belarus and, to a lesser extent, Turkmenistan, countries which have in the last few years pursued a foreign policy largely independent of Russia.

Monday, 3 May 2010

Russia And Ukraine: Take-Over Or Business Merger?

MOSCOW, Ukraine -- Russian and Ukrainian analysts were astonished last Friday at Vladimir Putin’s proposal of merging energy giants Gazprom (Russia) and Naftogaz (Ukraine).
In light of the recent agreement between the two countries to allow Russia’s Black Sea Fleet into Crimea for the next 32 years, Ukrainian opposition leaders declared their fear of the “destruction of Ukraine”.

There is nothing to suggest that Russia has an elusive and elaborate plan to take over Ukraine and annex it to become part of the Russian Federation, as some have unrealistically suspected.

It is more reasonable to believe that Russia sees an opportunity to gain an important regional ally back into its sphere of influence while building up the economy of a vital economic partner.

Russian authorities perfectly understand that a stable, economically viable, friendly and happy Ukraine will yield an array of benefits for Russia.

Russia sees an opportunity in power politics and is taking it.

Tuesday, 13 April 2010

Ukraine's New President The Highlight Of Obama's Nuclear Summit

WASHINGTON, DC -- Viktor Yanukovych emerged Monday as an unlikely star among the four dozen foreign leaders President Obama gathered in Washington for his nuclear security summit.
The hulking Ukrainian president, who won election only two months ago, has long been perceived as the leader of Ukraine’s anti-Western camp: In 2004, it was his announced victory in a fraud-ridden presidential election that prompted his country’s pro-democracy Orange Revolution.

But Yanukovych has come a long way since then. His victory in the February presidential election was clean, and he proved deft in the following months as he overturned the crumbling Orange coalition in parliament and installed his own prime minister.

His announcement of an agreement with President Obama under which Ukraine would give up the highly enriched uranium that it now uses in three research reactors gave Obama one of the most tangible results of the summit.

It also signaled Yanukovych’s ambition to position Ukraine between Russia and the NATO powers -- outside the Western alliance, but also not part of a Russian sphere of influence.

Yanukovych outlined that strategy in an interview Monday afternoon with me and The Post’s Mary Beth Sheridan. “The policy of the new administration of Ukraine is to strike the right balance in our relations with Russia and the European Union,” he said. “We want to be a reliable bridge between Europe and Russia.”

The means, in part, an end to the previous government’s policy of seeking full membership in NATO -- a cause that the alliance endorsed in principle at the urging of the Bush administration, but then put on a back burner.

“The relations between Ukraine and NATO are not going to change,” Yanukovych said. “They will stay on the same level and with the previous attention. The only thing that has changed is that Ukraine as a non-bloc member is not stating that it wants to accede to NATO” -- because the majority of Ukrainians oppose full membership. “We will keep developing partnership interests,” he added. “We will keep improving that.”

At the same time the Ukraine leader made clear that he did not intend to go along with Moscow’s wish that his government join a customs union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, instead of seeking a free trade agreement with the European Union.

“At this stage the accession of Ukraine to the customs union isn’t possible,” he said -- but he hopes to finish a trade agreement with the European Union by the end of the year.

Yanukovych also pledged to patch Ukraine’s fractured relationship with the International Monetary Fund by implementing austerity measures the previous government balked at. An IMF deal could win the government fresh financing from the World Bank and send a positive signal to Western foreign investors, he noted.

Thanks in part to its loss of Western confidence, Ukraine has suffered more than most countries in Europe during the great recession, with a drop of over 15 percent in its gross domestic product.

The Obama administration has been accused of neglecting Ukraine as it drifted back toward Russia’s orbit. But Obama was one of the first foreign leaders to call Yanukovych in February following his electoral victory, according to aides.

The United States and Ukraine had been negotiating for years about a deal under which the United States would help replace highly-enriched uranium in the country’s research reactors with fuel that could not be used for weapons if it were stolen or diverted.

Yanukovych said Obama proposed that they complete the deal, and invited the new president to Washington for this week’s summit.

By quickly accepting, Yanukovych built a link to the White House to balance his long-standing connection to the Kremlin -- and managed to stand out among the dozens of leaders jamming the luxury hotels of downtown Washington Monday.

“We’ve had this idea for quite some time,” he said. “But it was only realized when Barrack Obama raised it to a much higher level.”

Saturday, 20 March 2010

Yanukovych wants to visit United States in April

President Viktor Yanukovych of Ukraine is intending to pay an official visit to the United States in April 2010.

Foreign Minister Kostiantyn Hryschenko announced this during the Big Politics political talk show on the Inter television channel on Friday evening.

"We are planning the closest visit for mid April or even sooner," said the Ukrainian foreign minister.

Foreign Minister Hryschenko voiced hope the visit won't be the last visit of President Yanukovych to the United States.

Hryschenko said work was underway on the agenda of Yanukovych's visit to the United States.

As Ukrainian News earlier reported, Yanukovych said he wanted to meet with US President Barack Obama.

The United States expects the Ukrainian leadership to take part in the Global Nuclear Security Summit in Washington on April 12-13.

On February 12, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko met with Ambassador of the United States in Ukraine John F. Tefft. During the meeting J. Tefft passed a letter from US President Barack Obama to Ukraine's Head of State with an invitation to take part in the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington on April 12-13.

Sunday, 14 March 2010

Yanukovych congratulates Belarusian premier on birthday

Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych has congratulated Belarusian Prime Minister Sergei Sidorsky on his birthday.

"With great pleasure, I want to praise your successful experience at the post of Belarusian prime minister and your active attention to supporting a traditionally high level of economic cooperation between Ukraine and Belarus," the presidential press service quoted Yanukovych as saying on Saturday.

Wednesday, 10 March 2010

Yanukovych Offers Key Ukraine Post To Reformer

KIEV, Ukraine -- Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych has offered the post of deputy prime minister in charge of economic affairs to reformist former central bank chairman Serhiy Tihipko, Yanukovych's office said.
It said in a statement that Tihipko, 50, had "agreed to work in the new government", but did not make clear whether he had accepted the post of deputy prime minister.

A spokeswoman for Tihipko could not confirm whether he had agreed to take the post.

Yanukovych's offer will fuel speculation that the job of prime minister will go to the president's Russian-born close ally, former Finance Minister Mykola Azarov, 62.

The nomination of a new prime minister is likely soon after the formation of a new ruling coalition in parliament, expected in the next two days.

Yanukovych's Regions Party is trying to stitch together a new alliance and a government to replace that of ousted Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, who lost a presidential runoff election in February to Yanukovych.

On March 9, the Regions Party and its allies pushed through parliament a rule change easing the creation of a ruling coalition by giving deputies the right to join as individuals, not necessarily as part of a parliamentary faction.

Yanukovych's lawmakers say they could announce a coalition on March 11 or 12 after the rule change is signed by the president and published in the official gazette.

Lawmakers said Azarov was meeting leaders of the Our Ukraine faction of former President Viktor Yushchenko today, a crucial bloc if the Regions Party is to clinch a majority in parliament.

Tihipko, who came a strong third in the first round of the presidential election in January, previously ruled out accepting any job other than that of prime minister, and demanded "unpopular" reforms to tackle a serious economic crisis.

Political analysts have questioned whether he could push such reforms through a government beholden in large part to Yanukovych's wealthy industrial backers.